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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the ways spatial planning understands and engages with personal 
security through a study of inner-suburban surface transit stops in Toronto, Ontario, Canada.  
Although often considered by planning, personal security does not appear to be subjected to the 
same level of attention as other design and planning priorities.  The foundation for this study was 
a review of security focussed criminological, spatial planning, and a small quantity of legal texts 
in order to analyze overlaps and deviations.  This was followed by analysis of relationship 
between personal security and the city’s public transit operator, the Toronto Transit Commission, 
through a review of historical texts and current policy documents guiding surface transit stop 
placement and design.   The final component of this paper is a discussion of an audit of the 
design and placement of a selection of conventional bus stops in inner-suburban areas.   Overall, 
there are indications that some progress is being made in addressing personal security but there is 
still significant room for improvement. 
Keywords: Spatial Planning, Surface Transit Stops, Public Transit, Personal Security, 
Toronto Transit Commission 
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Foreword 
My decision to research public transit surface stops stems from a general interest in 
public transit and a desire to ensure the continued, and hopefully increased, viability of public 
transit for all users and at all periods of time.  Additionally, public transit continues to be 
positioned as a key tool towards ensuring the sustainability and competitiveness of urban 
communities. 
This major paper served to expand my knowledge of the issues of transportation planning, 
spatial planning, and personal security beyond the curriculum of FES.   This firstly took the form 
of knowledge derived from North American and limited amounts of Western European academic 
and professional literature.  Secondly, this paper was informed by both historical and 
contemporary pieces of literature specific to the issues and history of Toronto, Canada.   
Combined, these helped to satisfy learning objectives 1a, 2a, 2b 3a, 3b on my plan of study.   
Additionally, this paper attempts to fill niches in existing literature and contemporary literature 
on the subject from a general and Toronto-specific context.    
This major paper also examines spatial planning in order to fulfill the requirements of the 
Ontario Professional Planner Institute (OPPI) recognized Master of Environmental Studies 
planning stream degree.   Within the constraints of this paper, I strove to develop an 
understanding of the environmental, financial, transportation and other diverse considerations for 
planners through my study of the planning of bus stops and their surrounding urban form.   
Additionally, this also entailed critical thinking with regards to the significance and importance 
of these considerations when they conflicted.   My review of policy, and planning texts specific 
to the City of Toronto were directed towards OPPI’s emphasis on education and subsequent 
awareness of the history of planning from a general and context specific perspective.   As stated 
previously, this paper is also directed addressing objective 1b, and the skills envisioned by OPPI 
as being fundamental aspects of a registered professional planner. 
 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  2 
 
 
Planning for Secure Surface Bus Stops in Toronto 
Fear of crime at the hands of strangers remains as an ongoing concern in the management 
and utilization of contemporary public environments and surface public transit by extension.    
As these problems occur in and are mapped onto these spaces, spatial planning and urban 
planning, may serve as a means of modifying these physical environments in order to mediate 
these negative interactions and reduce fear.   These efforts, however, must compete with other 
context-specific planning considerations, and in cases like Toronto, Ontario, Canada, may be 
subject to both intermittent and uneven attention, analysis, evaluation, and general 
documentation.   The purpose of this paper is to develop a more comprehensive and 
contemporary understanding of the history and futures challenges of securing the inner-suburban 
portions of Toronto’s surface transit network. 
Why is Public Transit Considered to be Insecure? 
Personal security may be extremely relevant to public transit due to a combination of its 
inherent characteristics that fall within and outside the control of public transit operators.   These 
factors were identified as falling within one of two main themes, the fact that public transit trips 
involve a relatively high amount of uncertainty, and the fact that these uncertainties may make it 
susceptible to contemporary crimes and acts that may elicit fear or discomfort.    
The first, and arguably lead-up theme to the issue, is the fact that public transit may 
introduce travellers to a relatively greater number of uncertainties when compared to more 
private forms of transportation such as automobiles.   At its most basic level, conventional public 
transit systems often utilize fixed timing and routing for trips, with users needing to traverse, 
wait, transfer, and occupy both familiar and unfamiliar public spaces at varying hours of the day
1
.   
Aside from the fact that these spaces themselves may change due to temporary or permanent 
                                                 
1
 This issue is said to be especially relevant to female transit patrons (Scarborough Women’s Action 
Network and Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children, 1991) 
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route changes, the timing of a transit user’s journey is also uncertain due to mechanical, 
crowding, and customer-related issues that may delay or disrupt a patron’s journey.  The second 
main form of uncertainty facing public transit users consists of the potentially unpredictable 
strangers that are encountered when riding and accessing public transit.  Examples of these 
strangers include passerbys on the street, individuals loitering or otherwise occupying space near 
stops, and fellow transit passengers onboard vehicles and in transit facilities.  Wariness and fear 
of strangers is both an old and documented phenomenon (Jacobs, 2002; European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport Economic Research Centre, 2003), with a presumption that strangers are 
an unknown variable, if not a potential attacker.  Exposure to strangers may be increased due to 
the uncertain times and spaces associated with public transit trips, especially for patrons that are 
unfamiliar with the transit system or route(s) in question.  Although these types of uncertainty 
are arguably an inseparable aspect of urban life, they nevertheless appear to remain relevant for 
the issue of security in conventional public transit systems. 
The second main theme encountered in the literature was the fact that contemporary 
forms of crime and unrest may be perceived to be applicable to public transit.  This phenomenon 
appears to result from the need to address continued public apprehension of violent crimes that 
involve strangers in public spaces, such as street crimes (Atlas, 2008; Transportation Research 
Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975; Walkate, 2005).  Unsurprisingly, these types of 
crime have also been consistently viewed as being extremely relevant for both public transit 
patrons and operators (Di Serio, 2003; Feltes, 2003; Perone and Tucker, 2003; SWAN and 
METRAC, 1991).  In order to develop a better understanding of insecurity on public transit, 
criminological literature and literature on personal security in public spaces and public transit 
was consulted, and this topic serves as the starting point for the following section.  Three types 
of behaviour were identified as being unconducive to personal security: “traditional” crimes that 
target riders; signs of disorder and indiscriminate crime; and the unsettling and unpleasant types 
of behaviour that are captured by anti-social behaviour.   
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Traditional Crime 
Traditional crimes are both the most severe and feared types of security-compromising 
behaviour for public transit patrons and include both violent and non-violent forms of behaviour 
directed towards property and  pople. These forms of behaviour have long been the subject of 
study by societies, and in particular the discipline of criminology, in order to understand the 
reasons for their occurrence and devise preventative strategies.  Possibly due to its 
interconnections and status as a public or semi-public space
2
, traditional crimes that are relevant 
to public transit primarily consist of petty and violent face-to-face crimes between strangers 
rather than domestic or white-collar crimes.  Seven general criminal acts were noted as 
consistently appearing through the course of the literature review and these were categorized into 
five types based on their characteristics (Table 1).  Categorization was carried out for the 
purposes of analysis, and to also compensate for similar crimes that may not have been included 
in the literature or omitted during the literature review.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The “public” nature of public transit environments, especially in regards to privately operated/contracted 
service is a debate that will not be touched upon in this paper. 
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Table 1  Types and examples of passenger-directed traditional crime. 
Type of Crime                  
(Directed Against Passengers) 
Examples of Criminal Event 
Non-violent property Pickpocketing 
a,b,b1
 /Theft
 a, c
 
Violent personal (and 
potentially property) 
Assault
 a, e, d, e, n, b1, d1
 
Sexual assault 
d,
 
g, h, i, k, n,  g1
   
Certain forms of harassment* 
a, e, f
 
Robbery 
d1,c,d,e, n
 
Terrorism  Terrorist acts 
 j, k, m, b1, h1, i1, o, p
 
*Harassment remains a broad, evolving category during the time of writing and cannot be accurately 
represented by its inclusion in a single category 
a
 Poyner, 1983 
b
 European Conference of Ministers of Transport Economic Research Centre, 2003 
 
c
 Welsh and Farrington, 2009 
d
  Transportation Research Institute: Carneige-Mellon University, 1975 
e
  Gladwell, 2002 
f
  Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children, 1992 
g
  City of Toronto Planning and Development Department and Wekerle, 1992  
h
 Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children, 1992 
i
 Scarborough Women’s Action Network and Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women 
and Children, 1991 
j
 Atlas, 2008 
k
 Feltes, 2003 
l
 Welch and Yayuz, 2010 
m
 Perone and Tucker, 2003 
n
 Ligget, Sideris, and Iseki, 2003 
o
 Litman, 2005 
p
 Taylor, Fink, and Liggett, 2006 
Footnotes that include “1” are sources that did not specifically address public transit but were deemed to 
be relevant 
a1
 Cozens, 2008 
 b1
 European Conference of Ministers of Transport Economic Research Centre, 2003:  
 
c1
 Zelink and Brennon, 2002 
d1
 City of Toronto Planning and Development Department and Wekerle, 1992 
e1
 Di Serio, 2003 
f1
 Walkate, 2002 
g1
 Wagers, Sousa, and Kelling, 2008 
h1
 Walkate, 2002 
i1
 Welsh and Farrington, 2009 
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Violent personal and violent property crime.   Violent personal crimes are the most 
consistently discussed type of crime among researchers, public transit users, and members of the 
general public
3
. Prime examples of these crimes are assault, sexual assault, and robbery.  As per 
Canada’s Criminal Code (1985B), assault refers to physical and non-physical interactions that 
successfully or unsuccessfully harm or threaten harm to an individual.  This definition 
encompasses a variety of acts including threatening gestures, verbal assault, and physical 
altercations.  Sexual assault, being assaults that occur in circumstances of a sexual nature or 
violate sexual integrity of the victim, technically falls under the crime of assault in Canada 
(Hoddenbagh, Zhang, and McDonald, 2014), but is listed separately in this paper in recognition 
of the attention paid to it as well as its unique characteristics.  Examples of this crime include 
voyeurism, sexual touching, and forced penetration.  It appears that sexual assault is a gendered 
crime (Bornstein, Fink, Germai, Loukaitou-Sideris, Loukaito-Sideris, 2014; Bornstein, Fink, 
Germai,  Loukaitou-Sideris and Samuels, 2009; Loukaitou-Sideris and Fink, 2009), being feared 
most by women (City of Toronto Planning and Development Department [City Planning] and 
Wekerle, 1992; Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children 
[METRAC], 1989; Scarborough Women’s Action Network [SWAN] and METRAC, 1991) and 
this appears to be partially reflected by their higher sexual assault risk (METRAC, 1992).  
Robbery refers to the act of assaulting or threatening to assault other person(s) in order to deprive 
them of their property (Criminal Code, 1985C) and includes crimes such as swarming and 
weapon related robberies.  Robberies are noted in at least one text as being the crime most feared 
by men (METRAC, 1991).   
Violent crime’s high-profile nature in public transit security does not appear to be 
dissimilar from its perception in other circumstances.  At its most basic level, its infamy may 
stem from its direct violation of personal security, specifically the right for individuals to not be 
a victim of crime and the perceived responsibility for governments to safeguard this right 
(Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975; Tulemello, 2016).  As 
noted previously, sexual assault arguably goes even further than its peers as its entails the 
                                                 
3
 As per the views expressed in the primary and secondary surveys encountered during the literature review. 
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violation of an individual’s sexual integrity, while robbery is distinguished by the fact that it is 
centred on the forcible removal of property from an individual.  Taken together, violent crimes 
may be particularly alarming due to relatability of the personal and property harms suffered by 
victims, as well as the disruptive nature of their aftermath on local communities.  Harm aside, 
violent crime’s notoriety also appears to be partially attributable to the increased speed and 
geographical dissemination afforded by modern technology and the media.  Knowledge of 
criminal incidents and rates now extends beyond local users of a space, with actual, 
sensationalized, and fictional depictions of these crimes being captured in news, television, and 
other media (Walkate, 2005).  
Terrorism.   Notwithstanding its occurrence throughout history, terrorism is a relatively 
recent and varyingly important personal security concern for public transit in North America.  
Contemporary concern regarding terrorism, at least in the United States, arguably began in 
earnest following the September 11, 2001 attacks (DiSerio, 2003; Feltes, 2003).   At face value, 
terrorism consists of acts that endanger persons or property and intimidate the public or a 
government in order to further a religious, ideological, or political cause (Criminal Code, 1985A).  
In the context of the North America and Western Europe, these acts may use vehicles as rams, 
explosive or harmful packages, and weapons such as firearms.   
Public transit, possibly due to its public nature and importance to the functioning of urban 
areas, has also been targeted by terrorist attacks.  Previous high-profile attacks include the 1995 
Tokyo subway sarin gas attack (Feltes, 2003) and the 2005 London 7/7 bus and subway 
bombings (“7 July bombers”, 2010).  The relevance of terrorism in discussions of security on 
public transit, however, appears to be inconsistent depending on the audience in question.  
Concern regarding terrorism appears to be highest among practitioners and researchers (Atlas, 
2008; European Conference of Ministers of Transport: Economic Research Centre, 2003), and 
relatively low among transit users if it is mentioned at all (Perone and Tucker, 2003).   
  Terrorism’s compatibility with general crime prevention measures has been a subject of 
debate for researchers and practitioners.  The most basic controversy concerns the fact that 
terrorism’s methods and motivations have been argued as being more similar to political action 
and military strategy rather than conventional crime (Atlas, 2008).  As noted by Di Serio (2003), 
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this presents a resource and jurisdictional challenge at the very least, as it arguably falls under 
the purview of national security rather than municipal governments and agencies.  Furthermore 
there has also been wariness surrounding the applicability of crime-prevention measures to 
terrorism’s comparatively unique root causes, actors, and strategies (Feltes, 2003).  This 
distinction, however, may matter little to the potential victims of these types of events who may 
suffer material and personal harm.  Overall, terrorism appears to be an inconsistent and 
controversial facet of conventional personal security strategies. 
Non-violent property crime   Non-violent property crimes directed against passengers, 
namely theft, appear to be a less controversial public transit security violation.  These acts 
generally do not result in personal injury, may go unnoticed by victims until a later point in time, 
and thus remain simply unexplained or unreported.  These forms of crime are not a new 
phenomenon, with notable examples including non-violent distraction based swarmings and 
pickpocketing of patrons waiting at surface stops in England (Poyner, 1983).  Despite its low 
profile and lack of resulting personal harm, theft appears to be a common issue affecting public 
transit systems (ECMTERC, 2003; Poyner, 1983; Welsh and Farrington, 2009) but a lower 
priority for public transit patrons compared to public transit operators. 
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Signs of Disorder 
Signs of disorder will be used to refer to a host of behaviours that do not necessarily harm 
patrons in the same way as traditional crimes, but nevertheless promote feelings of insecurity.  
The following discussion is partially informed by research on public space based on its similarity 
to public transit environments.  While they may be less severe than traditional crimes, many of 
these acts may be codified and punishable through bylaws.  Three categories of signs of disorder 
were identified: disruptive acts that are not directed at other individuals or property; personal or 
property crimes directed at public transit employees or property; and acts that affect the quality 
of life of patrons (Table 2).  Aside from differences in characteristics, these acts appear to be 
perceived in varying degrees of significance by patrons, operators, and professionals,  
Table 2. Types and examples of signs of disorder. 
Type of Behaviour Example 
Quality of 
life crimes 
Directed quality of life 
crimes 
Public intoxication 
a1
  
Panhandling  
f
 
Unwanted attention/Certain less severe types of harassment 
Undirected quality of 
life crimes 
Loitering 
a, b1
 
Mutual disorderly conduct/Rowdiness 
b
 
Nuisance behaviour (ie: excessive noise) 
Directed at transit property/employees 
Assaulting (including robbery) of a transit employee 
a, c
  
Littering 
d
 
Graffiti/Tagging/Scratchitti 
b1, c1, d, e, f, g
 
Postering 
b1
 
Vandalism 
a, b1, c, e, h, i, j, k
  
Fare evasion 
c, e, f, h
 
a
 Poyner, 1983  
b
 Perone and Tucker, 2003 
c
 ECMTERC, 2003 
d
 Atlas, 2008 
e
 Gladwell, 2002 
f
 Wagers, Sousa and Kelling, 2008 
g
  Feltes, 2003 
h
 Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975  
i
 Scarborough Women’s Action Network and Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women 
and Children, 1991 
j
 Caire, 2003 
k
 Stafford, 2003 
Footnotes that include “1” are sources that did not specifically address public transit but were deemed to 
be relevant 
a1
 Clarke, 2008 
b1
 Zelinka and Brennon, 2001 
c1
 City Planning and Wekerle, 1992 
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Quality of life crimes.  Quality of life crimes (QOL crimes) includes a wide variety of 
acts that differ from traditional crimes as they may generally produce discomfort or fear rather 
than personal or property harm.  A wide variety of acts fall into this category ranging from 
situations that either border on or have the potential to escalate to traditional crime, and minor 
infractions that serve as nuisances, but infractions nonetheless.  This subsection will focus on 
more severe examples of QOL crimes and their relationship with traditional crimes, with 
discomfort and fear being the subject for the next section.  Historically, the topic of QOL crime 
has been discussed in research on “anti-social behaviour” (Cornish and Clarke, 2008), broken 
windows policing (Gladwell, 2002; Wagers, Sousa, and Kelling, 2008; Welch and Yavuz, 2010), 
and incivilities in public space.  Two types of QOL crime appear to exist, QOL crimes that are 
explicitly directed at a specific individual, and QOL crimes that have a more undirected audience. 
Directed quality of life crimes.   Directed QOL crimes, such as public intoxication, 
panhandling/begging, appear to be the second most common and notorious cause of concern for 
public transit patrons and professionals after violent traditional crime.  This dubious honour 
appears to stem from the fact that these crimes may share similarities with traditional crime, with 
select ones also being reasonably capable of escalating into traditional crime. 
 The most serious form of directed QOL crime is public intoxication, which has been 
documented as causing irregular and violent behaviour (Ekblom, 1995; Zelinka and Brennon, 
2001) and subsequently problems for public spaces (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Cozens, 
2008; Ekblom, 1995) and transit patrons (Gladwell, 2002).  Public intoxication is also highly 
relevant to public transit due to its official, and reasonable, advertisement as an alternative to 
impaired driving by advocacy groups and police forces (Pelley, 2016).   Panhandling has also 
been subject to a fairly sustained amount of attention by both public transit professionals 
(Wagers et al., 2008) and patrons (Gladwell, 2002; Welch and Yavuz, 2010).  Although a range 
of explanations exist, some of which will be discussed in the next section, extremely aggressive 
forms of panhandling that impede or threaten patrons may be perceived as bordering on, or being 
analogous to robbery (Gladwell, 2002).  Lastly unwanted attention and less-serious forms of 
harassment is intended to capture a wide range of behaviour that may be perceived by victims or 
are reported as being threats to personal security.  Justifications for this include the fact that these 
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acts may very well border on being criminal forms of harassment or threats, and their potential to 
be used by offenders to identify and target suitable victims.  One issue specific to harassment is 
the fact that the term has been used on occasion to refer to all forms of targeted QOL crime 
(Gladwell, 2002) and this suggests that the term may be more appropriately used as an 
overarching definition of disorder rather than as a distinct subcategory. 
Non-directed quality of life crimes.   Non-directed quality of life crimes consist of 
comparatively benign forms of behaviour that presumably do not, or are not, intended to directly 
threaten general transit patrons.  That being said, these acts have been documented on occasion 
as being problematic in the eyes of transit patrons and professionals.   
Non-directed QOL crimes do not appear to have a ranked hierarchy and thus are not 
listed in any particular order.  Loitering has been frequently listed as a concern (Transportation 
Research Institute: Carneige-Mellon Univeristy, 1975; Welch and Yavuz, 2010; Zelinka and 
Brennon, 2001) and may be differentiated on the basis of whether it involves suspicious persons, 
or suspicious locations.  The former refers to loitering by particularly suspicious, and possibly 
undesirable, types of people (Lewington, 2000; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001), while the latter 
refers to loitering in areas with no reasonable or legitimate reason to do so (Poyner, 1983).  The 
root cause for both of these appears to lie in loitering’s potential to be the prelude for traditional 
crimes as it facilitates a potential or motivated offender’s search for and encounter with a 
suitable victim or an opportunity.  Disorderly conduct and rowdiness between consenting parties 
is the final type of indiscriminate disruptive behaviour that is particularly relevant to public 
transit.  Although this behaviour may be mutual and may not necessarily involve traditional 
crimes, it nevertheless may be alarming and potentially harmful to bystanders or their 
surroundings.  This may occur directly when these individuals or property become inadvertently 
involved or harmed (Ekblom, 1995; Gladwell, 2002), or indirectly as it demonstrates the 
willingness of its participants to carry out seemingly violent behaviour (Transportation Research 
Institute: Carneige-Mellon Univeristy, 1975).  Nuisance behaviour is the final form of non-
directed QOL crime that is relevant to public transit and it involves activities that may agitate 
other individuals and potentially escalate to other forms of crime.  Instances of this would 
include crowded, stressful environments and their associated interactions (Wortley, 2008), and 
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possibly include unwanted broadcasts of loud vigorous music which may incite excitement and 
anxiety (Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).   
Acts Directed Against Transit Property/Employees.  Traditional crimes that are directed 
at transit property and personnel are another potential sign of disorder and cause of concern for 
public transit operators and professionals and possibly for patrons as well.  Displays of a public 
transit operator’s inability to even keep their own employees and assets secure may undermine 
the faith transit patrons have in the degree to which their own security is actually safeguarded 
(Transportation Research Institute: Carneige-Mellon Univeristy, 1975).  These acts presumably 
follow a same scale of severity as traditional crimes, with employee assaults being most severe 
and property crimes being perceived as less severe to varying lesser degrees.  Aside from 
undermining faith, acts directed against transit operators may also affect transit patrons through 
the demoralization of employees (Caire, 2003) as well as the possible facilitation of traditional 
crime and other behaviour (Gladwell, 2002).   
Considerations for Signs of Disorder.   A general shortcoming that was noted with signs 
of disorder was concerned the actual degree to which they affect personal security and the degree 
to which they should be policed.  Barring extraordinary cases of directed QOL crime and crime 
directed against transit property and employees, it may be difficult to determine whether an act 
should be treated as criminal offence that is worth pursuing, or should be treated, and possibly 
dismissed as being minor or benign
4
.  While underpolicing and its potential security 
ramifications have been discussed, overpolicing may be difficult, expensive, and also viewed as 
heavy-handed and controversial in a western context (Transportation Research Institute: 
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975).  Excess attention and resources towards incivilities may also 
backfire by attracting attention away from actual or more serious security concerns 
(Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975).  As will be discussed in 
the next section, this trend remains persistent, especially between public transit patrons and 
public transit operators, and may be a cause for further controversy.   
                                                 
4
 As with any form of policing, discretion plays a key role in these determinations 
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Indirect fear . Indirect fear represents the fact that individuals may feel insecure even in 
the absence of an ongoing or prior experience of threatening behaviour in a particular scenario.  
Public transit, as with other public spaces, continues to be subject to fear due to its accessible 
nature and the significant amount of uncertainty attached to it.  It should also be stressed that this 
usage of fear does not refer to the fear of (re)victimization of individuals who have directly been 
harmed or borne witness to a security incident.  This uncertainty may be felt through aspects 
such as the timing a patron’s trip, and what an individual may encounter while travelling on 
public transit.   
Fear of strangers is not a particularly new phenomenon and arguably runs the gamut of 
being a natural reflex or a coping mechanism.  At its most basic level, strangers may be feared as 
they are unknown variables who may act in a variety of unpredictable ways including criminal 
activities.  Explanations for this phenomenon include its nature as a response to the relatively 
high population density and the subsequent anonymity of urban residents (Jacobs, 2002), as well 
as strangers being symbolic of the constant physical and societal change (Di Serio, 2002; Feltes, 
2002; Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975) experienced by 
cities.  Additionally, certain strangers may be perceived as warranting extra attention based on a 
variety of actual and perceived characteristics that they exhibit.  Aside from similarities to 
reported offenders, these may be based on spontaneous appraisals of attributes such as physical 
ability, numbers, their relationship to the surrounding space, societal conceptions, opinions, and 
biases (such as “usual suspects”).  Examples of spontaneous appraisals include specific cases 
such as teenagers being a cause of concern for seniors (Perone and Tucker, 2003), and more 
general cases such as apprehension twoards individuals that appear to be homeless (Zelinka and 
Brennon, 2001).  Certain appraisals may be particularly problematic, as shown by Perone and 
Tucker (2003) where at least one response used perceived ethnicity and creed as indicative of 
individuals who were “foreign elements” and thus potential threats.  As such, fear based on 
strangers may not necessarily be a problem that can be adequately addressed by public transit 
operators. 
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Uncertainty is also experienced by public transit patrons in the form of the spaces, and 
the respective timings, that they must travel through in order to access public transit.  
Conventional, fixed-schedule and fixed-route bus network dictate when and how an individual 
may reach their destination, and understandably offer significantly less control than private 
modes of transportation (SWAN and METRAC, 1991; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001) and demand-
responsive-transit.  Examples of this uncertainty include travel at earlier and later times to 
account for longer travel times, service unreliability, temporary route diversions, route 
restructurings, service star and end times, the first mile/last mile of trips, and transfers between 
routes.  A fairly well known instance of timing’s relevance concerns the usage of public spaces, 
such as public transit, during after-dark periods (Feltes, 2002; Levine, Rodriguez, Wallace, and 
White, 1999; Perone and Tucker, 2003; SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  Aside from timing, 
uncertainty may also be experienced in the form of the locations that a transit patron will be 
forced to interact with as part of their trip. Certain types of space may also be, or perceived to be, 
attractive to motivated offenders or activities that are associated with potentially threatening 
types individuals.  Heavily trafficked areas (Cozens and Hilier, 2012) such as shopping malls for 
thieves (Bratingham and Brattingham, 2008), areas in the vicinity of major sporting facilities 
with especially rowdy fans (Bratingham and Brattingham, 2008), and adult entertainment areas 
(Anselin, Griffiths, and Tita, 2008; City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Zelinka and Brennon, 
2001) are all examples of this phenomenon.  As was the case with the previous section, these 
ideas may also be communicated via the authorities, the media, and other channels.   
Indirect fear occupies a consistently recognized, but controversial position among the 
literature that was reviewed.  Two debates were encountered, the first being around the 
legitimacy of indirect fear, and the second being around the utility of indirect fear.  For the 
purposes of this paper, both ideas will be treated as both possessing some level of merit due to 
the highly context specific nature of indirect fear. 
The legitimacy of indirect fear appears to be the longest-standing debate concerning fear 
and appears to be heavily divided on the basis of the questioned party’s relationship to public 
transit operations.   
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The supportive position in this debate argues that the indirect fears of patrons should be 
treated as a legitimate source of information for transit agencies.  This perspective is argued on 
the basis that fears are the direct result of the actual day-to-day experiences of public transit users 
(Di Serio, 2003; METRAC, 1992; SWAN and METRAC, 1991) and may be indicative of 
unfamiliarity on the part of transit operators and professionals.  These fears may not be supported 
by statistical evidence due to underreporting as there is indication that crimes may be reported 
unevenly (Atlas, 2008; Walkate, 2005), with sexual assault being a prominent example of 
purported underreporting (City Planning and Wekerle, 2002; SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  As 
such, these strategies may provide a more accurate understanding of public transit’s operations, 
if not an effective way of directly addressing the most pressing issues of patrons and promoting 
increased ridership.   
Detractors base their position on the belief that the indirect fears of patrons may be 
inaccurate and must be verified prior to being acted upon as it may be disproportionate to 
statistical evidence of crime and the actual likelihood of victimization (ECMTERC, 2003).  This 
phenomena has been noted as not being exclusive to public transit and instead being a general 
societal trend (Tulumello, 2016) that is at least partially attributable to the increased speed and 
reach of contemporary forms of media (Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975; Walkate, 2005;) that portray high-profile uncommon crimes.  Indirect fear’s 
vulnerability to misreadings also appears to be reflected by its relationships with assumptions, as 
demonstrated by fear on the basis of relatively uncontrollable traits such as age, ethnicity, and 
creed (Perone and Tucker, 2003).  Proponents of this view generally state that inaccurate 
knowledge, on the part of riders and the general public, of the actual state of security on transit is 
the root cause of indirect fear.  As such, strategies based off of indirect fear will be an inefficient 
usage of resources and may do more harm than good. 
A second, smaller debate that was encountered was centered on the utility openly 
acknowledging indirect fear and fearful scenarios.  Compared to the previous debate, the 
opposing positions on this view do not appear to be based on the lines of patrons versus officials 
such as staff and professionals.  Supporters argue that advertisement of fearful situations fear 
may help guard individuals from falling into a false-sense of security and inadvertently 
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becoming targets (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Welsh and Farrington, 2009; Zelinka and 
Brennon, 2001).  Additionally, these advertisements may serve as public service advisories that 
aid patrons in responding to security incidents as well as deterring offenders.  Detractors argue 
that this can function as negative advertising for public transit by stoking fears and ultimately 
turning passengers away from transit (Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975).   Indirect fear, however, is a difficult and controversial issue to address due to 
these noted divides in the literature concerning the accuracy of fear and the wisdom of acting 
upon these concerns.   
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What Are The Main Theoretical Approaches To Explaining Crime On Public Transit? 
The theoretical roots for understanding crime and public transit appear to be best 
described by western criminology from the 1960s up to the present day.  For the purposes of 
context, the early half of this period was marked by increased societal alarm regarding street-
crime
5
 in inner areas of both American (Cozens, 2008) and British (Cornish and Clarke, 2008) 
cities.   In response, some theorists in this period began placing greater re-emphasis on treating 
crime as an active, individual decision making process as opposed to being the result of longer 
term biological or structural factors (Lilly and Cullen, 2007; Walkate, 2005).  To a certain extent, 
emphasis shifted away from the study and pursuit of (potential) offenders and was instead placed 
on understanding and preventing criminal acts.  This focus on criminal acts rather than criminal 
offenders is particularly important as public transit authorities may have limited resources, 
jurisdiction, or will, to pursue longer-term crime prevention methods that identify and address 
potential offenders through social programs or targeted punishment.  These individual-centred 
theories share a belief that offences are carried out when the benefits of offensive behaviour are 
actively or subconsciously perceived as outweighing their costs and potential risks.  As will be 
explained in the following section, this had a pronounced effect on modern society’s 
understanding of crime, and crime prevention tactics that have developed as a result or 
concurrently with this knowledge.   
Individual-centred theories are thematically linked due to their focus on individuals may 
be contemplating or outright committing security violations.  Three general categories of 
individuals exist relative to potential and actual actions that threaten personal security: offenders; 
victims; and third parties that are nearby enough to witness the event.  An additional category, 
individuals and groups that have ownership or otherwise have control over a space, was also 
                                                 
5
 This alarm may be attributed to either increased crime rates or reporting of crime, but this is another 
academic debate in itself and is only mentioned in the interest of brevity and not misconstruing this 
occurrence 
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encountered in select pieces of literature as being expected (but not necessarily required) to help 
safeguard the occupants of their space.   
The offender.   Offenders, unsurprisingly, are a constant subject of focus in the literature 
that was reviewed.  Consensus appears to exist concerning the idea of offenders as decision 
makers, although the exact nature of their decision making process has been a subject of debate 
that falls into one of the following three theories: 
1. Offenders are calculating decision makers who seek to offend; 
2. Offenders are opportunistic, calculating decision makers; and 
3. Offenders are opportunistic decision makers who operate within bounded rationality 
and can make irrational decisions. 
Offenders are rational decision makers that aim to carry out offensive behaviour.   The 
first, and arguably most stereotypical, perspective argues that offenders are rational individuals 
who purposely seek situations that maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of their 
offensive behaviour.  The earliest roots of this theory arguably date back to classical criminology 
in the 1800s, which sought crime prevention through the creation and advertisement of 
appropriately scaled punishments for offensive behaviour (Walkate, 2005).  In contemporary 
times, this is captured in its simplest form by Rational Choice Theory, which was developed in 
Britain in the 1960s in response to discontent with social preventative and rehabilitative 
treatments for offenders and potential offenders (Cornish and Clarke, 2008).   In its simplest 
form, Rational Choice Theory argues that individuals who intend to offend will seek spaces and 
targets that they have identified through a purposive decision making process (Atlas, 2008; 
Walkate, 2005).   
As it specifically relates to this paper’s topic, rational explanations of crime not only 
view public transit as not only a means but also a destination for motivated offenders to commit 
their acts.  In regards to the former, public transit is a mobility tool that allows individuals, 
including offenders, to travel to comparatively distant targets, and areas accessible by public 
transit theoretically may experience greater levels of crime (Ceccato and Newton, 2015B).  A 
second approach argues that public transit itself functions as a space for motivated offenders to 
stake out, identify, and ultimately victimize their targets.  Documented examples of this include 
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swarm-based, distraction pickpocketing of individuals queuing for public transit in Britain 
(Poyner, 1983) as well as the women waiting for or disembarking from TTC buses who were 
targeted by the “Scarborough Rapist”6 (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  Moving to specific acts, 
characteristics that may be reasonably presumed as being indicative of these rational offences 
include money-based instrumental crimes, and pre-planned attacks targeting a specific victim.  
Although it did not appear to be explicitly mentioned in the literature that was reviewed, offences 
that require specific implements such as purpose-built weapons and spray paint, may be other 
examples of these premeditated crimes. 
Rational choice theory is not without its drawbacks, and arguably is the most critiqued of 
the aforementioned three theories.  This appears to be primarily attributable to the theory’s 
continued popularity and potential likelihood to be misapplied on a more frequent basis (Cornish 
and Clarke, 2008).  An example of this would be the theory’s stronger applicability to specific 
crimes such as instrumental money-based crimes, and presumably other high-risk, high-reward 
crimes that require more planning, when compared to others such as physical assaults and sexual 
crimes (Cornish and Clarke, 2008).  Considering the types of crimes, many of which may be 
classified as petty crime, that may be associated with public transit, rational choice theory may 
not be the most comprehensive way of planning against crime.  That being said, it arguably 
persists as a fairly conventional societal understanding of crime up to this day and serves as a 
foundation for more contemporary theories. 
 
                                                 
6The “Scarborough Rapist” was later identified as Paul Bernado following a series of murders and sexual 
assaults. 
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Offenders are opportunistic, rational decision makers.   A second theme that emerged in 
the literature was the idea of offenders as rational individuals that act on opportunities that they 
have encountered rather than actively sought out.  By extension, this may mean that spaces 
frequented or consistently travelled through by potential and motivated offenders may be more 
liable to personal security incidents.  Cohen and Felson’s routine activities theory was the 
earliest documented example of this theory, and views crime as a convergence in space between 
a motivated offender and a suitable target outside of the presence of a capable guardian (Cozens 
and Hillier, 2012; Felson, 2008; Lilly and Cullen, 2007;  Walkate, 2005).  This theory of 
convergence is also a key point in Brattingham’s (2008) crime pattern theory, which views crime 
being geographically “patterned” around the spaces they offenders travel through or occupy 
during the course of their daily routine.   
Opportunity based theories appear to be a fairly relevant explanation for offences that 
have been documented as being related to public transit.  Public transit serves as an important 
role in the daily routines of its users by connecting them with their destinations and this 
relationship is equally applicable to offenders.  Public transit and its surroundings appear to be 
examples of crime pattern theory’s traverse and occupied spaces as well as routine activities 
theory’s convergence spaces.  Offences that are captured by this theory most likely differ from 
conventional rational choice theory based on a lack of pre-planning and pre-designated victim 
and a reduced targeting phase on the part of the offender.  A possible example of this type of 
offence would be the 1984 New York Subway shooting, where both of the involved parties met 
by chance, and their respective robbery attempt and retaliatory shootings being prepared for but 
not premeditated (Gladwell, 2002). 
No specific criticisms of these opportunism based theories were found in the literature 
that was reviewed.  The exact reason behind this unknown and at the very least, it is assumed 
that these theories are still limited by their emphasis of rationality as a cornerstone of crime.   
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Offenders are semi-rational, opportunistic individuals.   The final offender-oriented 
theory argues that offenders are constrained by the natural limits of human rationality and as a 
result are both impulsive and opportunistic in sating their desires.  Potential and actual offenders 
may not necessarily be calculating decision makers, but instead may be acting in a spur-of-the-
moment fashion on imperfect decisions.   
The first commonly held explanation of these types of crimes sees them as the result of 
the mental effects caused by chemical stimuli.  The most obvious examples of these stimuli 
include drugs as well as alcohol, both of which have can have effects on the restraint, and 
decision making process of individuals and their subsequent actions.  This appears to be at least 
partially supported by a pervasive wariness, if not stigma, towards drug users (Perone and 
Tucker, 2003) and individuals indulging in alcohol (Poyner, 1983), as well as the spaces they are 
perceived as commonly occupying (Cornish and Clarke, 2008; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  
 Stress has also been suggested as being another cause of impairment and crime by 
extension.  This theory states that stressful conditions, be they physical or social, can alter an 
individual’s decision making process and encourage offensive behaviour.   As noted in Wortley’s 
situational crime precipitators theory, a space’s design and operations may produce stresses such 
as crowding and environmental irritants such as odours, noise, and temperature (Clarke, 2008; 
Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975; Wortley, 2008).  These 
conditions may be conducive to expressive crimes that are primarily focussed on the release or 
satisfaction of an emotion, including stress, as opposed to obtaining an instrumental reward 
(Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).   Unplanned physical assaults by unimpaired individuals that are 
unrelated to robbery, and themselves are unrelated, could be perceived as being a likely 
candidate of stress based crimes. 
Although it was not directly noted in any of the literature that was consulted, semi-
rational opportunistic theories may also be particularly relevant for public transit.  Needless to 
say, stressful conditions such as uncertainty, crowding, noise, uncomfortable temperature, and 
poor ventilation may be especially relevant, if not dubiously stereotyped, as an expected 
condition of public transit trips.  Passengers themselves may be another stressing factor, with 
expressive crime possibly being triggered by actual or perceived interactions between patrons.  
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Bounded rationality may also be particularly apparent in intoxicated individuals of which public 
transit may be one of their only legal transportation options. 
The victim.   Victims, as they are the second “constant” of most personal security 
incidents, have also been the subject of some research aimed towards understanding the 
scenarios and locations in which crime takes place.  Strategies that fall under this approach 
suggest that individuals can take measures to avoid making themselves attractive to motivated 
and opportune offenders.   The basis for this approach appears to lie in knowledge of the target-
selection process of offenders
7
, as well as statistics and societal conceptions of individuals that 
are more likely to become victims of crime (Walkate, 2002).Victim oriented strategies may draw 
attention to the occurrence of certain types of crime on public transit and potential forms of 
behaviour that may make an individual an attractive target (Walkate, 2002).  Common examples 
of this “attractive” type of behaviour include the open display of valuables, travelling through 
tertiary routes that are less trafficked and well-lit areas (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992), not 
being aware of one’s surroundings, and not supervising one’s possessions. 
A common critique of these theories lies on its emphasis of a victim’s culpability in the 
harm that befell them.  The biggest critique of these theories is centred on “victim-blaming” and 
its potential alienation of the intended recipients of the message, especially victims, which may 
do more harm than good (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  This is of particular note for public 
transit based on the importance of presenting a favourable public image, and attracting or 
maintaining rather than turning away riders (Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975).   
                                                 
7
 This was not explicitly stated in criminological texts but was extrapolated from treating crime as a rational 
decision making process.  Target selection, however, is discussed comparatively more in urban and 
architectural studies 
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The third party: witnesses and bystanders.  Bystanders may play a role in both the 
occurrence and the course of personal-security incidents by serving as outside factors.  These 
individuals may serve as immediate deterrents, de-escalators, interveners, casual police (Jacobs, 
2002), and ultimately risks for offenders and have been noted as a deciding factor in preventing 
or stopping victimization (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992).  Offenders conducting more 
“rational” crime grounded in the costs and benefits of their actions may see bystanders as a 
variable that increase the effort they will have to expend, the risk of failure, or the risk of capture 
during or after the fact (Stanley, 1977).  In these instances, the potential existence of a witness 
may be sufficient.  Bystanders theoretically may also play a role in countering less rational acts 
of crime, by serving as interveners (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992) that presumably de-
escalation or break up interactions, or assist in an offender’s apprehension.  Bystanders, and 
activity, may also serve as general fear reduction measures (Hennessy, Kim, and Ulfarsson, 
2007) 
It must be remembered, however, that bystanders are also human beings and may react in 
a variety of expected and unexpected and undesirable ways.  Inaction has been noted as not 
being out of the ordinary (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Cozens and Hilier, 2012; Newman, 
1973), with the acknowledgement that bystanders may not necessarily intervene on the behalf of 
a complete stranger.  This problem is possibly best captured by the 1964 murder of Kitty 
Genovese in New York City, which was allegedly witnessed by at least 38 individuals, none 
whom acted on the grounds of apathy, not wanting to get involved, and assumptions that 
someone else would have intervened (Gladwell, 2002).  One potential explanation that was not 
encountered in the literature, but may be relevant in contemporary times, is a fear of being 
defrauded, or otherwise entrapped, during or following one’s involvement in an orchestrated 
incident.  Aside from the likely continued prevalence of skepticism of strangers, there also 
appears to be an increasing number, or reporting and awareness, of cases of rescuers being 
harmed by their rescuees.  One example of this is cases of rescuees launching post-incident 
lawsuits for harms that they actually or allegedly suffered at the hands of their voluntary rescuer 
(or Good Samaritan Fraud) (Bu, 2016), and the possibility of orchestrated fraud through these 
means.   
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North American criminal and civil law texts were briefly explored in order to develop a 
better understanding of the role and responsibilities of bystanders.  One legal commentary 
discussed this issue and noted that strangers outside of a special relationship have no duty to 
rescue in respect of individual rights and the unpredictability of human behaviour (Klar and 
Jefferies, 2017).  Duties to rescue exist to limited degrees in the cases involving special 
relationships, and in other jurisdictions, with the latter only being applicable to situations that do 
not place the rescuer in harm.  The concept of special relationship does not appear to include the 
relationship between a TTC employee and a TTC patron.  Moving on to the issue of rescuers 
being harmed by their rescuees, bystanders that decide to come to the assistance of a stranger 
may be protected from liability through Good Samaritan laws.  As noted by the province of 
Ontario’s iteration of this type of law, the Good Samaritan Act, voluntary rescuers cannot be 
held liable for damages that are caused by reasonable actions associated with their rescue attempt 
(Good Samaritan Act, 2001).  While this does not remove the possibility of a rescuer being 
directly harmed or defrauded through other means, it at least protects would-be-rescuers from 
civil litigation for alleged accidental harms caused by reasonable rescue efforts.  Overall, it bears 
noting that bystanders in the context of a North America should only be presumed to be potential, 
rather than dependable, sources of aid for victims of crime. 
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The third party: property Owners, manager, and occupiers.   Property owners and 
managers, who will be referred to as “occupiers”, were also examined in order to gauge their 
actual responsibility for safeguarding the security of individuals on their respective property.  
The basis for this decision lies in the concept of private property rights, and the fact that 
occupiers not only have the greatest, but sometimes the only, degree of control over the design 
and operation of their property (Atlas, 2008; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  This control may be 
applied to discourage potential offenders, allow potential victims to identify and avoid threats, 
and assist in providing aid to victims or apprehending offenders.  I would also argue that 
occupiers, barring extenuating or monopolistic circumstances, also have a vested interest in 
safeguarding their patrons, and avoiding situations that may generate negative publicity.  This 
belief also appears to be complemented by the continued prevalence of a societal expectation that 
an individual’s security will be protected in contemporary, post-modern society (Feltes, 2003).  
Finally, this practice has also been theorized as being popularized by increasing security 
litigation in the United States (Atlas, 2008), where established third-party occupiers may be a 
more certain source of financial compensation to victims when compared to (often petty) 
criminals (Osborne, 2015). 
Legal commentary on an occupier’s duty, more specifically know as occupier’s liability, 
is convoluted and the following remarks are largely exploratory at best.  At its most basic level, 
occupier’s liability states that occupiers must safeguard entrants and their property from harm at 
the hands of the condition, activities, and possibly the conduct of third parties by extension (Klar 
and Jefferies, 2017; Occupiers Liability Act, 1990; Osborne, 2015).   Clarity issues appear to be 
the result of the fact that occupier’s liability traditionally has been handled by ever-evolving 
common law (Klar and Jefferies, 2017; Osborne, 2015), as opposed to standardized by statute as 
is the case in the province of Ontario (Ministry of the Attorney General, 1980).  Compared to 
case law, which has covered incidents such as trespassing followed by a questionably intentional 
arson (Klar and Jefferies, 2017), Ontario’s occupier’s liability act is noticeably silent on its 
applicability to crime-related incidents.  Case law on occupier’s liability appears to be 
overwhelmingly associated with negligence resulting in safety related incidents such as slips and 
falls rather than security related incidents.  This may be justified by the fact that occupiers may 
neither reasonably foresee, nor control the actions of a third party and thus cannot be held 
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responsible for third parties (Fridman, 2012; Klar and Jefferies, 2017).  At least one of the 
consulted authors, however, argues that occupiers may be held responsible in failing to properly 
take preventative measures against acknowledged, targeted serial offenders or offences, and that 
premises-security litigation has continued room for growth (Osborne, 2015).  Overall, it may be 
safest to presume that occupier’s liability does not necessarily apply to criminal activities, but 
may be relevant depending on the nature of the case at hand. 
 
How Do These Theories of Crime Relate to Our Topic? 
Public transit operators, even when given the authority to operate their own police service, 
arguably have limited ability, and possibly little desire, to engage in longer-term crime 
prevention programs
8
.  Additionally, the discussed theories have a long-standing relationship 
with the prevention of petty crime and street-level violent crime, both of which have been 
identified as being particularly important for public transit patrons.  As such, situational 
explanations of crime, and their salient, smaller scale solutions, may be an especially relevant 
and appealing means of planning against security incidents.   
 
Common Ground: The Spatial Environment and Personal Security 
Spatial planning, the discipline from which this paper is structured, may play an 
important role in safeguarding the security of public transit patrons.  At its most basic level, 
spatial planning concerns the ways the design of a physical environment can promote, facilitate, 
and inhibit different types of behaviour.  Consequently, spatial planning is similar, if not closely 
associated, with disciplines such as urban and environmental studies, environmental psychology, 
urban planning, urban design, and architecture.  The first type of physical elements that may be 
planned for are “direct” as they are necessary assets, or literal barriers, to certain types of 
behaviour.  An oft-cited example of barriers and assets would be a park bench with a centrally 
                                                 
8
 This could take the form of hiring programs or collaborations with local marginalized populations 
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mounted armrest, which encourages individuals to take a seat and loiter in a space, but also 
impedes them from lying down.  A second type of physical element consists of more indirect 
physical elements that focus on indirectly influencing behaviour by modifying a space’s 
conditions, and an individual’s perception and usage of such space.  Returning to the previously 
mentioned park bench, usage may vary on other factors such as whether it is covered with 
graffiti or cosmetic damage, overly exposed to an environmental element, or installed in a 
manner that provides it with a poor interface to its surroundings
9
.  The various parties involved 
in potential or actual personal security incidents, and crime and offensive behaviour by extension, 
may also be affected by the direct and indirect effects of physical elements.   
Three researchers can be credited as being the earliest, key thinkers of contemporary 
efforts aimed at safeguarding security through spatial planning.  Chronologically, these 
researchers were urban theorist Jane Jacobs, criminologist Ray Jeffrey, and architect and city 
planner Oscar Newman, all of whom were studying inner city crime in American Cities in a 
period roughly starting in the 1950’s.   
Jane Jacobs was an American urban theorist who most notably penned The Life and 
Death of Great American Cities in the 1960’s, which critiqued modernist urban development and 
supported preceding forms of development.  As it relates to the topic, Jacob’s most important 
concept concerned casual policing by residents of their surroundings which she termed “eyes on 
the street”.  This theory was based on the ability of certain types of pre-modernist North 
American urban development to generate activity and casual surveillance of public spaces, and 
thereby deterring crime, by their occupants and surrounding individuals (Jacobs, 2002/1962; 
Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).  Jacobs attributed this phenomenon to two main design aspects: 
small, mixed blocks of residential and other land uses (fine-grained mixed use) and urban design 
that provided good visibility.  Fine-grained mixed residential use has also been theorized as 
providing a scale that strikes a balance between being small enough to foster a sense of 
                                                 
9
 William Whyte’s 1979 documentary  “Social Life of Small Urban Spaces” elaborates upon this through 
its analysis of public plazas in downtown areas 
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community (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992), while also being diverse enough to generate a 
relatively consistent amount of activity throughout the day (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; 
Cozens and Hillier, 2012; Jacobs, 2002/1962).  Additionally, it could be presumed that this 
pattern of development also distributes these responsibilities over a population that is not 
excessively high and mitigates the bystander effect.  One note about casual surveillance that 
must be stressed is the fact that it is not only contingent on the provision of physical sight lines 
(Cozens and Hillier, 2012) but also requires sufficient activity in order to attract observers 
(Cozens and Hillier, 2012; Jacobs, 2002/1962). 
Although the concept of eyes on the street, and Jane Jacobs by extension, remain as key 
elements in urban planning, its presumptions have not gone without critique.  Aside from the 
previously mentioned issue of whether bystanders will actually come to the aid of others, eyes on 
the street has also been questioned due to its assumption that certain types of land uses, such as 
residences, will always be occupied and provide bystanders (Cozens and Hillier).  Although it 
was not directly stated in any of the reviewed literature, the theory itself also appears to treat 
crime as a monolithic construct that is at least partially deterred by activity.  Looking at this 
shortcoming, certain types of crime, such as pickpocketing, have been shown to benefit or be 
attracted to public spaces with high activity (Cozens, 2008; Loukaito-Sideris, 1999).   Finally, 
the concept has been criticized for being context specific as it was based on Jacobs’ analysis of 
an inner-city area of a single American city (Cozens, 2008).  That being said, this final critique 
appears to be levelled against contemporary usage of the concept as it was acknowledged by 
Jacobs herself as a limitation (Fraser, 2012).  Nevertheless, eyes on the street remains as an 
influential theory in North American urban design and land-use planning. 
Ray Jeffrey, by direct contrast to his two aforementioned peers, was a criminologist who 
created the concept of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in 1971 (Atlas, 
2008) and also notably differs based controversy surrounding the contemporary relevancy of his 
work.  Jeffrey, viewed criminality as being the end result of a combination of deeper-rooted 
social issues and situational opportunities for otherwise unremarkable individuals, and thus 
advocated for a variety of measures ranging from broader social policies and changes to physical 
design (Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008).  Elaboration on contemporary CPTED, however, is 
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problematic based on the fact that it has been noted, even by Jeffrey himself (Wortley and 
Mazerolle, 2008), as having been redeveloped and thus more closely attributable to other 
researchers, (Atlas, 2008; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001) most 
notably Oscar Newman.  Critical analysis of this theory is also difficult as Jeffrey’s CPTED 
appeared to advocate for a more multi-disciplinary approach that did not heavily utilize a pre-
determined set of solutions.  Ultimately, Ray Jeffrey was included on the basis of his relatively 
common inclusion in the reviewed texts. 
Oscar Newman, also an American, was an architect and planner who developed the 
concept of defensible pace in the 1970s following his research of lower income housing 
developments in the United States.  As a whole, defensible space operates on the basis that 
personal security can be promoted through spatial elements that incorporate the four elements of 
territorial influence; surveillance opportunities; perception (image); and surroundings (milieu) 
(Newman, 1973).  Territorial influence refers to the usage of physical elements that symbolically, 
or literally, divide a space and can be utilized by legitimate users against potentially or verified 
illegitimate users.  Surveillance opportunities is extremely similar, if not a direct extension 
(Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008), of Jane Jacob’s work and is focussed on the provisioning, or 
consolidation, of natural surveillance and casual self-policing opportunities (Newman, 1973).  
Perception refers to the ways an area’s design, construction, upkeep, and its consistency with its 
surroundings can provide positive and negative connotations to individuals and their behaviour 
(Newman, 1973).  This point ideally aims to strike a balance between expensive high-quality, but 
high upkeep environments, and heavily fortified environments that are cheaper and low 
maintenance but may alienate users (Newman, 1973).  Finally, milieu refers to a pair of concepts, 
the ability for certain types of land uses to be conducive (or unconducive) to safety through their 
activities and character, and the diffusion of these characteristics based on interface with 
surroundings (Newman, 1973).   Oscar Newman also differed from Jane Jacobs through the 
attention he paid to the design and planning of interior spaces.  Defensible space ultimately 
merged with and became the primary basis for contemporary understanding of CPTED.   
Criticisms of Oscar Newman’s defensible space theory are largely centred on its 
emphasis of spatial elements.  At its most basic level, concern has been levelled against the 
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theory’s “simple” understanding of social processes (Atlas, 2008) and its emphasis of a 
seemingly deterministic relationship between spatial design and human behaviour (Cozens, 
2008).  Similarly to eyes on the street, Newman himself has attributed these problems to 
misapplications of his theory (Atlas, 2008), and also acknowledged the need for social factors to 
be taken into consideration (Cozens, 2008).  Context specificity is another issue, with the 
relevancy of these strategies to more transient residential areas being questioned (Atlas, 2008; 
Stanley, 1977) and arguably extendable to public transit environments due to their reduced 
access control and transient nature (Ceccato and Newton, 2015A).  Defensible space’s 
understanding analysis and compatibility with the multi-faceted of crime also appeared to be 
somewhat limited in the texts that were evaluated. 
At least four other American researchers, Elizabeth Wood, Schomo Angel, James Wilson 
and George Kelling, also engaged the topic during the same period but have been quoted to a 
comparatively more inconsistent degree.  Elizabeth Wood and her security design work for 
public housing (Cozens, 2008; Cozens and Hilier, 2012) and Schlomo Angel and his study of the 
relationship between land-use intensity and crime (Cozens, 2008; Cozens and Hilier, 2012; 
Zelinka and Brennon, 2001) were two theorists who were also cited by some sources being 
influential, but possibly to a lesser degree.  A multitude of smaller references to contemporary 
theories and researchers building off of the previously mentioned key three thinkers were also 
encountered as part of my research.  A comprehensive review of these newer theories will not be 
included due to the constraints of this paper, the generally singular nature of these references, 
and the lack of critical analysis that was encountered.   
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Security-Oriented Spatial Measures 
As their name implies, security-oriented spatial measures are designed to foster personal 
security and combine aspects and recommendations of the aforementioned criminological and 
planning research.  These measures may function in a variety of ways, but are generally oriented 
towards facilitating security conducive behaviour, policing non-conducive behaviour, or creating 
an image of security.  Many of these measures explicitly or implicitly influence the behaviour of 
one or more of the participants in actual and potential security incidents.  Potential shortcomings 
and concerns associated with these measures will be discussed prior to moving to further 
discussion of these measures and their relevance to public transit. 
Potential shortcomings and concerns.   Although they offer potential benefits, security-
oriented spatial measures are not without their weaknesses, which need to be accounted for in 
order to better apply them.  These drawbacks can be broadly divided into two categories, 
weaknesses that are specific to these design based strategies, and universal weaknesses for any 
attempt at preventing crime.   
Security-oriented measures cannot be presumed to be universally applicable to every 
form of threatening behaviour or in every context.  A general problem associated with all 
measures is their ability to potentially foster a false sense of security when misapplied and 
inadvertently make them suitable targets for victimization (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; 
Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  The second, and arguably most notable shortcoming, is the ability 
for these measures to be counterproductive.  Excessive use of measures, particularly explicit 
measures, can create a sense of fortification and an impression that crime is rampant in said 
space and thereby generate fear (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Cozens, 2008; Zelinka and 
Brennon, 2001).  Lastly, certain measures may also produce negative side effects, risks, or 
operational issues for public transit.   
A second category of shortcomings, general issues, are neither exclusive nor easily 
solved, and have been included for cautionary purposes.  Escalation is the first example and 
refers to the potential for motivated offenders to use more serious means to compensate for 
measures that successfully impair, deprive, or challenge them from using lesser means (Feltes, 
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2003; Stanley, 1977; Welsh and Farrington, 2009).   Displacement is the second potential 
outcome and it refers to the potential for motivated offenders to shift their activities to less well 
defended spaces and softer targets (Cornish and Clarke, 2008; Feltes, 2003).  A clear counter 
argument to both of these issues was encountered in the reviewed text and considers that only a 
small segment of the population, likely already motivated offenders, would be willing to escalate 
or displace their offensive activities (Clarke, 2008).  Nevertheless, both of these types of 
shortcomings of security-oriented spatial measures appear to be relevant considerations. 
How is security-oriented spatial design relevant to public transit?   Security oriented 
spatial design measures may be both highly relevant and attractive for public transit operations 
due to a variety of underlying strategic and operational reasons.   Public transit can be described 
as being a publicly-accessible private space (or semi-public space) at the very least and their 
surface networks may be particularly so as their stops often are located on public streets.  
Additionally, the continued discourse on the right-to-public space in a North American context 
(Atlas, 2008)
10
 presumably also applies to public transit, and limits denials of service to 
individuals with significant, repetitive infractions
11
.  Moving to security, there is also a societal 
expectation that individuals will be reasonably safeguarded from harm, be it from private 
property owners for their legal entrants (Atlas, 2008; Ministry of the Attorney General, 1980), or 
the state with regards to its citizens in public spaces (Atlas, 2008; Feltes, 2003).  Overall, this 
combination of expectations serves as underlying priorities for public transit operators and also 
presents operational issues. 
 
 
                                                 
10
Without going too far back, a historical example of this discourse is Henri Lefebvre’s right to the city.  
Contemporary examples of this could human rights cases and policy measures such as the Accessibility for 
Ontarians with Disabilities Act. 
11
 Examples of these presumably would include restraining orders and outstanding warrants. 
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Security measures may also be necessary to ensure the viability and competitiveness of 
public transit in an expedient and reasonable manner.  Aside from being a societal expectation, 
personal security has been cited as being a significant concern for existing and potential public 
transit patrons and may to their discontinuation of transit usage (ECMTERC, 2003; METRAC, 
1989; METRAC, 1992; Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University,1975).  
This loss of ridership and revenue may be particularly important for for-profit operators, and 
government affiliated operators may also heed this in order to achieve sustainability and 
congestion oriented policy goals.  Although it is not a definitive fact, the financial threats of 
liability for victims of security incidents could also be a relevant motivation for transit operators 
to pursue security measures. 
Operationally, security-oriented spatial measures may serve as practical and attractive 
means for protecting public transit patrons and employees.  Public transit operators may not be 
afforded the resources, jurisdiction, or possibly have the will, to engage in conventional longer-
term forms of crime-prevention.  These latter measures
12
 also suffer from their lack of 
expediency and salience (Walkate, 2005), which may be especially noticeable and detracting to 
the perceptions and modal choices of existing and potential transit patrons.  Independent policing 
via of a corps of transit police, may be an equally if not more visible alternative to spatial 
measures, but requires not only state sanction
13
 but also significant financial and manpower 
resources to even reach partial policing of all but the smallest transit networks.  Spatial measures 
such as changes to surface vehicles and stops, on the other hand, may not be constrained to the 
same degree by these issues yet also offer concrete signs of change.   
For the purposes of this paper, only a selection of these measures will be discussed based 
on their perceived relevancy or their existing usage by public transit operators in Ontario.  Seven 
                                                 
12
 This could take the form of skilled-trades training and employment programs, or quotas, drawn from the 
surrounding community but may be restricted to the procurement of large scale, higher-order transit projects 
such as Metrolinx’s Eglinton Crosstown LRT. 
13
 The Toronto Transit Commission’s special constable program, for instance, required provincial sanction. 
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different categories of spatial strategies were identified in the literature and in the practices of the 
Ontario public transit operators.  These categories were created on the basis of on their primary 
recipient(s), and the degree to which they affect said primary recipient: 
 Passively increasing the risks for offenders; 
 Actively increasing the risks for offenders; 
 Passively deterring offenders; 
 Passively reducing the risks for potential victims; 
 Actively reducing the risks for potential victims/allowing them to seek help;  
 Passive third-party based strategies; and 
 Reducing fear on the part of existing and potential patrons. 
Strategies that were encountered in the reviewed literature or prior experience were 
classified on the basis of the above categories using Table 3.  Certain strategies were noted as 
being relevant to more than one category and subsequently listed more than once. 
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Table 3 Spatial measures that are relevant to public transit 
Purpose Strategy Specific Examples 
Passively 
increase the risk 
for offenders 
Improved lighting 
Bus shelter lights
 
Streetlights and exterior light fixtures 
Translucent wall/roof surfaces 
Unmonitored CCTV 
Vehicle cameras 
Station/stop cameras 
Public street/private property cameras 
Improved sightlines 
Translucent wall/roof surfaces 
Convex security mirrors 
Removal of sight barriers and obstacles 
Siting stops to near/with good interfaces  
Territorialisation by 
operator 
Prohibitory signage and codes of conduct 
Public service advisories 
High quality design and branding
a, a1 
Target hardening 
Vandal resistant elements  
Postering resistant elements 
Barriers (fences/walls/gates) 
Upkeep and repair of damaged/vandalized assets 
Actively increase 
the risks for 
offenders 
Monitoring/surveillance 
equipment 
Monitored vehicle interior cameras 
Monitored station/stop cameras 
Monitored public/private cameras 
Reducing 
behaviour that 
may make 
individuals 
attractive targets 
Reducing risky situations 
Public service announcements 
Awareness campaigns 
Limiting/discouraging access to risky areas 
a1 
Improved lighting and sightlines 
Service information/limiting waiting 
b,c 
Allow victims to seek help 
Vehicle interior/station  passenger assistance alarms 
Pay phones/public telephones 
Siting stops to near/with good interfaces 
Passive third-
party based 
Facilitating third party 
intervention 
Improved lighting 
Improved sightlines 
Siting stops to near/with good interfaces 
Encouraging third party 
intervention 
Public awareness campaigns 
Reducing fear in transit patrons 
Improved lighting 
Improved sightlines 
Presence of CCTV cameras 
Passenger alarms 
Upkeep/repair of damaged elements 
 
a Dixon, 2017 
b City Planning and Wekerle, 1992 
c SWAN and METRAC, 1991 
Footnotes that include “1” are sources that did not specifically address public transit but were deemed to 
be relevant 
a1 City Planning and Wekerle, 1992 
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Overall, spatial security measures play a passive role due to their limitations compared to 
actual policing as well as the limited potential to strengthen access-control on public transit.  
Additionally, a noticeable number of measures were identified as being applicable to more than 
one, if not all, of the participants of personal security incidents.  In order to avoid repetition, 
these measures were further categorized and eight basic components were noted in the majority 
of the identified measures. 
 Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras; 
 Interior, exterior, and street lighting;  
 Public service advisories; 
 Visibility measures; 
 Wayfinding and trip planning measures; 
 Alarms; 
 Interface/siting relative to land uses; and 
 State of repair and target hardening. 
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Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.   Closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras 
are arguably the most iconic and increasingly utilized security oriented spatial element in North 
American public and private spaces (eg: Atlas, 2008).  CCTV cameras are presently 
implemented in one of two ways: cameras that solely record their video feeds (unmonitored); and 
cameras that route their video feeds to a monitoring station for viewing by an occupier or an 
appointed individual (monitored) and may or may not be monitored.  CCTV’s popularity 
primarily lies in its ability to provide evidence that may aid in the apprehension of offenders 
(Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975), and may also allow for 
the detection and addressing of to in-progress or potential offenders when monitored (Welsh and 
Farrington, 2009).  These investigative and responsive capabilities have been considered to not 
only serve as a deterrent for potential offenders (Welsh and Farrington, 2009), but also serve as a 
source of reassurance for legitimate users of a space (Di Serio, 2003; Welsh and Farrington, 
2009).  CCTV has also been popularized due to its application towards terrorism investigations 
(Cavoukian, 2008) as well as counter-terrorism strategies (Atlas, 2008).  Finally, it should be 
noted that CCTV’s popularized is likely affected by its utility towards personal safety, 
specifically providing evidence for issues regarding occupiers’ liability14.  CCTV appears to be 
most closely linked to contemporary CPTED (Atlas, 2008) and presumably rational choice 
theory as well.   
CCTV’s justification and popularity also hold true in the context of North American 
public transit.  At present, CCTV has been installed in the interior, and increasingly the exterior 
of revenue service vehicles as well as in transit terminals and higher-order transit stops
15
.  As 
cited by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPCO) (2015) CCTV has been 
seen in a positive light and associated with decreases in criminal behaviour, disorderly behaviour, 
                                                 
14
 Based on the TTC’s usage of video surveillance under the authority of the Occupiers Liability Act. 
15
 Examples noted firsthand by the author include York Region Transit as well as commuter buses (GO 
Transit).  The TTC has also opted to install new buses with external cameras and began activating them in 
January  2018. 
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and perceived insecurity by transit agencies, and improved investigative capabilities by transit 
agencies and law enforcement personnel.  CCTV also remains a staple, and possibly a best 
practice, in professional and academic texts from North America (Atlas, 2008; Transportation 
Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975; Welch and Yavuz, 2009) and Western 
Europe (Poyner, 1983; Welsh and Farrington; 2009).  Their utilization in public spaces, however, 
may be dependent on local laws and regulations that determine the jurisdiction and power 
afforded to governments and their associated bodies. 
CCTV’s actual effectiveness at reducing crime is somewhat more unclear as relatively 
few statistical studies were documented in the reviewed texts.  This dearth appears to be 
attributable to the difficulty of performing high-quality studies that are able to account for 
extraneous factors of crime (IPCO, 2015; Welsh and Farrington, 2009).  Only two sources (IPCO, 
2015; Wortley and Mazerolle, 2008) were noted as having appreciable discussion of the actual 
effectiveness of CCTV.  Of the studies that were cited, CCTV’s effectiveness at reducing crime 
has varied significantly and also appears to be tied to the spaces where it was deployed.  These 
range from marginal effectiveness in downtown public spaces (IPCO, 2015; Welsh and 
Farrington, 2009) and public housing (Welsh and Farrington, 2009) to high effectiveness in 
parking lots (Cavoukian, 2008; Welsh and Farrington, 2009).  CCTV’s effectiveness on public 
transit, however, is more uncertain, having mixed but modest effects in underground metro 
systems such as Montreal; London; and New York (Welsh and Farrington, 2009), but 
questionable effects in other public transit environments (Cavoukian, 2008).  Elsewhere, CCTV 
appears to be consistently effective in parking lots (Cavoukian, 2008, Welsh and Farrington, 
2009), and only marginally effective in public spaces located in urban centres (Cavoukian, 2008, 
Welsh and Farrington, 2009) and public housing (Welsh and Farrington, 2009).  These findings 
appear to be at least partially supported by findings that CCTV is effective at reducing pre-
mediated and property crimes (Cavoukian, 2008, Poyner, 1983), not very effective against public 
order crimes (Cavoukian, 2008), and relatively ineffective against impulsive crimes and violent 
crimes (Cavoukian, 2008).  There, however, appears to be some belief that CCTV has a universal, 
but varying, deterrent effect on criminal behaviour (Cavoukian, 2008).  What is notable, however, 
is the fact that federal ministries such as the United Kingdom’s Home Office and the United 
States Department of Justice are nevertheless supportive of CCTV as a general security measure 
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(Cavoukian, 2008).  The effectiveness of CCTV for counter-terrorism is unknown, but not 
unheard of as was the case of the investigations such as the London 7/7 (“7 July bombers”, 2010).  
There is also some indication that patrons may not share the same confidence as operators and 
professionals CCTV’s ability to safeguard their security (Welch and Yavuz, 2010).    
CCTV has also been consistently critiqued for its potential threats to personal privacy.  
As summarized by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (2015), CCTV is in its 
simplest form is an indiscriminate form of surveillance of all individuals even if they are 
behaving in a law-abiding manner.  Cited problems include the infringement of the right to 
anonymity in public space (Cavoukian, 2008, Welsh and Farrington, 2009), the right to be secure 
against unreasonable searches (Welsh and Farrington, 2009), and causing individuals to adjust 
even non-offensive behaviour for fear of censure or other reprisal (IPRC, 2015).  Additionally, 
concerns have been raised regarding the protection of data from unnecessary or inappropriate 
access and distribution by employees, the authorities, and third parties (Cavoukian, 2008).  
Monitored CCTV, especially cameras that can be adjusted in pan and zoom by their operators, 
presumably pose a greater risk due to their potential to be abused by operators and monitors.  
Taken together, CCTV should not be taken lightly as a course of action for public bodies. 
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Interior, exterior, and street lighting measures.  Lighting arguably was the simplest 
transit relevant design element that was encountered in the reviewed literature.  Overall, security 
oriented lighting builds off of and generally goes beyond conventional, minimum visibility-
based
16
 lighting in a four tier spectrum.  The first, and lowest, tier calls for the removal of 
lighting, or appreciable lighting, from routes and spaces that are potentially dangerous or not 
intended for usage in order to divert activity to a somewhat safer location (Atlas, 2008; City 
Planning and Wekerle, 1992, Cozens, 2008).  A second, higher tier, sets facial identification 
from a reasonable distance of 20-30 feet at the bare minimum (Atlas, 2008, City Planning and 
Wekerle, 1992) and this presumably is to allow for viewers to gauge intent, determine whether 
their subject is a potential threat, and take appropriate action (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  The 
highest, and arguably most stereotypical, application of security lighting is designed to provide 
maximum visibility, possibly bordering on over-lighting, in order to draw attention and facilitate 
easy surveillance to the occupants of a space.  Theoretically, this latter strategy arguably also 
facilitates surveillance  by casual observers as well as CCTV cameras.  Lighting, whether by 
instinct or actual effects on a person’s sense and ability to navigate space, has also been 
attributed as being an important factor in determining whether a space is secure or insecure (City 
Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Welch and Yavuz, 2010).  Ambient light levels may also be 
increased or adjusted through the application of light-reflective surface treatments (City Planning 
and Wekerle, 1992; METRAC, 1989, SWAN and METRAC, 1991). 
Lighting may be particularly significant for public transit patrons, especially those with 
travel needs that entail transit usage during after-dark periods of the day.  Lighting has been 
consistently viewed as an important element of security for public transit by both professionals 
(City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
                                                 
16
 Including standards set by professional bodies such as the Illuminating Engineering Society of North 
America (IESNA) (City of Toronto’s Best Practices for Effective Lighting (2017), and local government 
bodies such as the City of Toronto’s City of Toronto’s Best Practices for Effective Lighting and the Ontario 
Building Code. 
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University, 1975; Welch and Yavuz, 2010) as well as patrons (METRAC, 1989; METRAC, 
1992; Perone and Tucker, 2003; SWAN and METRAC, 1991).   
Compared to other measures, lighting appeared to have the greatest uncertainty between 
its perceived and actual effectiveness at reducing crime.  Aside from SWAN and METRAC 
(1991) that cite lighting as a security best practice, relighting projects did not appear to cause an 
appreciable reduction in crime in the environments they occurred in (Atlas, 2008;; City of 
Toronto Planning Division, 2017; City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Ekblom, 1995).  There is 
even at least some indication that lighting may inadvertently assist potential offenders in 
selecting targets and impairing victims and potential witnesses (Welsh and Farrington, 2009).  
Although no direct explanation of this significant discrepancy between perceived and actual 
effectiveness was found in the literature, several potential explanations exist.  Personal security 
encompasses both the actual risk as well as the fear of being victimized, and lighting appears to 
be an effective fear reduction measure (Atlas, 2008; City Planning and Wekerle, 1992).  This 
may be based on its ability to offer at least some level of control to individuals in their navigation 
of darker and limited visibility conditions and areas.   
Lighting can also be problematic for a variety of security and non-security related side 
effects.  The former category is based on the ability of lighting to impair the eyesight, especially 
night-vision, of non-offenders when it is deployed in extremely inconsistent and high-contrast 
manners (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992). One specific form of this the production of one-way 
glare on transparent surfaces such as the “fishbowl effect” for transparent bus shelters (SWAN 
and METRAC, 1991).  Additionally natural surveillance by adjacent properties may be 
discouraged by excessive light intrusion or glare (City of Toronto Planning Division, 2017), and 
offenders may also be aided in their target selection process by over-illumination (Welsh and 
Farrington, 2009).  The main non-security related issue with lighting concerns its potentially 
pollutive effects on surrounding human and non-human life (see Atlas, 2008; City of Toronto 
Planning Division, 2017)  when over-applied or when using non-downward facing fixtures (City 
of Toronto Planning Division, 2017).  
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Public service advisories.   Public service advisories (PSAs) consist of patron, and 
general public by extension, oriented messages that may be distributed through audio and visual 
means.  For the purposes of this paper, three broad categories of these measures were identified 
in academic and professional literature.  A fourth, potential category was also identified in the 
practices of the Toronto Transit Commission.  The first type of PSA is aimed at the deterrent of 
potential offenders.  These measures primarily consist of rules and prohibitions that prevent 
offenders citing ignorance as an excuse of their behaviour (Atlas, 2008; Wortley and Mazerrolle, 
2008; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001) and presumably also serve as deterrents through the 
advertisement of punishments
17
.  Potential victims are the main audience of the second type of 
PSA which are intended to help reduce their likelihood of victimization.  Examples of the targets 
of this type of PSA highlight behaviour that may attract or deter offenders (Cozens, 2008; 
Walkate, 2005), available security programs (METRAC, 1989), and unsubstantiated fears 
(Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975).  The final type of PSA 
found during the literature review is the blanket advertisement of security measures to both 
potential offenders and the general public.  The basis for this type of PSA lies in the deterrent of 
offenders through the advertisement of the increased riskiness of their behaviour (Clarke, 2008) 
and the assuaging of the potential fears of non-offenders (Transportation Research Institute: 
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975).  One final type of PSA was noted in personal observations 
prior to and during this research and was aimed at encouraging bystanders to actively or 
passively intervene in security incidents when safe to do so.  These PSAs may use a variety of 
draws including altruism, self-interest such as the ability to prevent a service disruption via de-
escalation, or potential monetary compensation.   
Security PSAs appear to be applicable to public transit based on their relative ease of 
implementation.  The limited infrastructure required for PSAs may already exist and be used for 
personal safety, service reasons, or commercial advertising onboard vehicles, in facilities, and on 
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 As discussed earlier in the paper, the advertisement of punishments is seen by classical criminology as 
being a deterrent to rational offenders. 
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transit or street related elements.  Additionally, the material costs of these programs may be 
comparatively low as well.   
The actual effectiveness of PSAs cannot be accurately commented on due to a dearth of 
previous research.  PSAs were briefly alluded to in one source as one of a series of ineffectual 
measures utilized in England that necessitated a drastic shift in crime prevention measures 
(Ekblom, 1995).  Although it was not stated in any literature, PSA’s may also be considered as 
serving a secondary, passive, role primarily directed at non-offenders that is not expected to 
bring about drastic changes in crime by itself.  By comparison, the effect of PSAs, namely 
patron-focussed cautionary PSAs, on fear of crime has received slightly more attention but has 
likewise drawn unclear findings.  PSAs that offer information on the incidence of crime along 
with prevention and response strategies have been considered as being acknowledgements of 
rider experiences and ultimately positive steps by riders who have been victimized or are 
concerned (Feltes, 2003; METRAC, 1992; Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975).  That being said, this strategy is also problematic as it may serve as negative 
press that may stoke fears and negatively affect public transit usage (Transportation Research 
Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975). 
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Visibility.   As a design measure, visibility refers to the removal or mitigation of visual 
barriers in the physical environment.  Visual barriers are significant as they may provide hiding 
spots for offenders (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; ECMTERC, 2003;SWAN and METRAC, 
1991; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001), and impair the awareness of bystanders and non-offenders 
(City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  Although a significant amount 
of flexibility exists as to how this achieved, visibility improving measures may be described of a 
hierarchy of three “Re-‘s” in the form of removal; relocation; and redesign.  Removal, as its 
name implies, consists of the outright removal of the offending visual obstacle and appears to be 
best suited for non-essential elements such as pillars and foliage (City Planning and Wekerle, 
1992).  Relocation, while applicable for non-essential elements, may be more relevant for 
essential elements such pedestrian-level utility infrastructure (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  
Redesign likewise shares a similar relationship with non-essential and essential elements, but 
was the most-discussed and broadest strategy in terms of the measures it is comprised of.  
Examples include the substitution of translucent material for vertical surfaces (SWAN and 
METRAC, 1991), mitigation for blind corners with corner mirrors, and the compensation of 
unrectifiable issues using technology such as CCTV (Atlas, 2008; Cavoukian, 2008).   
Visibility measures were noted as having an established relationship with public transit 
operations through their consistent inclusion in transit focussed texts and sections of text.  
Visibility, or the lack thereof, has also been previously noted by survey recipients as being a key 
reason explaining why riders largely felt more comfortable riding surface vehicles than below-
grade subways after dark (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  In a similar vein, visibility’s popularity 
also appears to be attributable to its relevance in below-grade terminals and stations that lack 
natural surveillance opportunities and have may have restricted or confined spaces. 
There did not appear to be any significant discussion on the effectiveness of visibility 
measures.  Presumably, visibility measures may enhance the ability of offenders to monitor and 
ultimately select a target (Atlas, 2008).  Although further discussion will be saved for Target 
Hardening and State of Repair, certain visibility measures such transparent surfaces made of 
glass and plastic-derived materials carry the side effect of being more susceptible to both minor 
and major forms of vandalism. 
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Wayfinding measures, public service advisories, and service information.   
Wayfinding measures attempt to minimize the amount of time individuals-especially those who 
are new or unfamiliar with a space-are unnecessarily exposed to potentially risky conditions via 
maps, directional signage, and informational signage.  Although this concept was generally only 
alluded to in the majority of the reviewed works (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; SWAN and 
METRAC, 1991), the intent of this measure can be described as providing individuals with the 
means to control their navigation through a space (Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  The following 
consists of reasonable assumptions as to the value of these measures.  Wayfinding measures 
include directional signage, maps in public spaces, and publicly accessible private spaces (City 
Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Zelinka and Brennon, 2001) that aid individuals in understanding 
and navigating their surroundings.  Public service advisories (PSAs) consist of advertisements or 
releases that raise awareness of information that is in the public interest and may be produced 
and displayed by public entities as well as private entities for the benefit of their entrants.  
Personal security is an example of a matter that arguably is in the public interest and PSAs may 
include information on crime prevention measures, potential security concerns, and contingency 
responses to security incidents (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; SWAN and METRAC, 1991; 
Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  PSAs may also be directed at potential or motivated offenders and 
stress the criminality, and associated punishments of offensive behaviour, or the existent security 
measures and procedures that are ready to frustrate offensive behaviour (Atlas; 2008; Clarke, 
2008). 
As it relates to transit, both wayfinding measures and PSAs may be particularly important 
for public transit patrons.  Wayfinding is relevant as patrons may often have to occupy or travel 
through unfamiliar public spaces in order to access public transit.  PSAs may be useful in 
countering fear of crime on public transit and better equipping passengers for any such scenarios 
(SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  Information measures may serve as means for passengers to 
more easily or rationally navigate public transit systems and plan trips.  These latter measures 
include on-site and electronically accessible information sources for public transit service such as 
routes, operating periods, schedules, and next vehicle arrival times.  With the exception of route 
information, which plays a similar role to conventional wayfinding measures, these trip planning 
measures provide a means for patrons to minimize the amount of time they spend waiting at 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  46 
 
 
transit stops.  Schedule and next vehicle arrival times can provide reasonable estimates, 
especially in the case of the latter, as to when a patron actually has to leave their origin point in 
order arrive at their stop in order to catch the next vehicle. Real-time information may also 
decrease waiting times by allowing passengers to modify their trips in order to account for 
unplanned service disruptions. Both hard and real-time service information may also reduce the 
likelihood of passengers waiting for vehicles that will not show up due to service period changes 
such as peak-service routes and branches, or routes with no overnight service.  All of these 
measures may lessen the likelihood of a potential or a motivated offender coming into contact 
with a suitable target or suitable opportunity to commit offensive behaviour. 
No research on the effectiveness of these measures was cited or conducted in any of the 
surveyed pieces of literature.  Considering the fact that uncertainty has been noted as being a 
significant source of fear, these measures may be more oriented towards fear-reduction and only 
serve as extremely passive crime prevention measures at the very best.  A number of potential 
weaknesses, however, were noted as being worthy of attention.  Non-real time information may 
be difficult or cumbersome to update and serve as potential sources of misinformation or 
misdirection.  Compared to all other measures, wayfinding and service information may also be 
at least partially shift responsibility onto the general public by posting information electronically 
(Spurr, 2016).  Although it is not necessarily a transit operator’s problem, there is no guarantee 
that individuals will or will always have access to such electronics and this directing of patrons 
towards the open display of expensive personal electronics somewhat conflicts with oft-cited 
PSAs on robbery and theft prevention.   
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Alarms.   Alarms are design measures that can be activated by individuals in order to 
summon assistance.  Two main types of purpose-built passenger activated alarms exist, “signal” 
alarms that do not facilitate any form of two-way communication, and alarms that utilize two-
way intercoms. In addition to these specific measures, public telephones and payphones may also 
serve as ways for individuals to summon help (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; SWAN and 
METRAC, 1991; Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975).  
Compared to all but monitored CCTV, alarms appear to be the most reliable way for victims and 
targets to get help in a relatively quick manner regardless of their location.   
A total of three concerns may affect alarms and other assistance measures, one of which 
affects both alarms and payphones, two that are exclusively applicable to payphones, and one 
that was not found in literature but may be relevant to alarms.  The first concern is design 
focussed and stresses the need for a balance to be struck between ease of access and use, and 
resistance against vandalism and misuse (Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975).  The second concern is specific to payphones and posits that they may also 
serve as a facilitators or meeting points in various illicit activities such drug deals and loitering 
and thus a potential threat to security (Zelinka and Brennon, 2001).  Additionally, pay phones, 
may be presumed as being privately installed and operated
18
, and their inclusion into public 
transit environments is largely contingent collaboration with private operators (SWAN and 
METRAC, 1991) and may be less than guaranteed considering their continued decline.  The final 
concern that appeared to be unstated, concerns the difficulty and costs of installing and manning 
a system of alarms over even a small portion of a surface network. 
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 For instance, payphones in Toronto, Canada are both owned and operated by the Bell 
telecommunications company. 
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Interface/siting relative to safe land uses.   Certain types of land uses can have or be 
perceived to have positive or negative effects on personal security in their surroundings.  This 
determination may firstly be based on the types of users and activities associated with their 
legitimate activities. Examples of these problematic side effects include conditions that may 
escalate interactions into signs of disorder, serves as activity generators for unattractive 
behaviour such as loitering or more illegitimate behaviour such as crime.  Respectively, these 
include sporting facilities and drinking establishments with rowdy or intoxicated individuals 
(Poyner, 1983); public streets with loitering youth (Zelinka and Brennon, 2001); and adult 
entertainment districts with drug deals (Cozens, 2008; Loukaito-Sideris, 1999).  Land uses may 
also have ramifications on personal security by sheer virtue of the amount of activity that they 
may or may not generate at different times of day and their subsequent effects on surrounding 
public space.  This characteristic is of particular relevance to concepts emphasizing the need for 
active public spaces and interfaces for security, including eyes on the street and CPTED.   
Interface and siting can be important factors in the placement of public transit stops, and 
waiting patrons by extension, and the identification of potentially suitable and problematic sites.  
Taken to extreme levels, this strategy of giving consideration to adjacent land uses has been 
previously advocated for as a means of better protecting and reassuring female public transit 
patrons (Ligget, Loukaitou-Sideris, and Iseki, 2003; SWAN and METRAC, 1991). Fear 
reduction for a more general target audience has also been viewed as a potential consideration 
for land uses in transit stop planning (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992; Zelinka and Brennon, 
2001).  Conventionally, however, this attention has been largely devoted to minimizing distances 
between stops and activity generators (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992), especially those that 
are most active during after-dark periods (Poyner, 1983).    
Although it was not as widespread as study of CCTV, interface and siting strategies 
appear to be supported, if not viewed in a favourable light.  There is at least some study of 
common environmental factors in sexual assault sites (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992), and at 
least one study determined associations between certain land use characteristics and crime rates 
at bus stops (Ligget et.  al, 2003).  That being said, rigour and sample size both appear to be 
issues for analysis and the risk of correlation not being indicative of causation also remains.  A 
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potential general drawback of these measures may be their reliance on location and relocation by 
extension. Existing transit stops may embody a significant amount of investment that is 
associated with their passenger amenities and less noticeable investments such as concrete stop 
pads, bus bays, and passenger alighting areas. Location can also notably conflict with other 
priorities such as stop spacing, and is arguably also contingent and slow to respond or adapt to 
the comparatively more fluid changes of surrounding land-uses. 
 
Target hardening/state of repair.   Target hardening and state of repair concerns the 
caused financial, operational, and image issues caused by vandalism and disrepair.  In regards to 
the latter, damage may be viewed as signs of tolerance of disorder and opportunity for motivated 
and potential offenders (Cozens, 2008; Walkate, 2005), and be subsequently feared by non-
offenders (Cozens, 2008; Gladwell, 2002), Although state of repair technically is more of a 
policy and operational issue, design and planning can have an impact through the ability of 
certain types of materials and designs to be more resistant or vulnerable to wear and damage.   
The public nature of public transit means that its environments and facilities are often 
occupied by individuals that neither have the responsibility nor the authority to manage them.  
Signs of disrepair may be symbolic of neglect (Heimsath, 1977) on the part of transit operators, 
or related operating bodies, and the legacy of previous instances of offensive behaviour.  Certain 
forms of damage, such as seat-slashing (Transportation Research Institute: Carnegie-Mellon 
University, 1975), may also interfere with the functionality of transit environments or passenger 
comfort, if not serve as sources of fear (ECMTERC, 2003).   
Target hardening measures are controversial as they have widely differing levels of 
support among professional and non-professional literature.  Outside of reducing vandalism, 
target hardening’s actual effectiveness in reducing crime is unclear as no primary or secondary 
references to statistical evaluations were encountered.  Target hardening’s utility to fear 
reduction is also contested but at the very least appears to be supported on a somewhat greater 
basis.  Overall critiques of the theory include its alienating effect on users of a space (Cozens, 
2008) and its vulnerability to misapplication, and its financial prudency (Zelinka and Brennon, 
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2001).  More seriously, excessive, explicit applications of target hardening have been cited to 
actually raise doubts and generate fear (Atlas, 2008; City Planning and Wekerle, 1992) and 
escalate offences by serve as challenges to offenders (ECMTERC, 2003). 
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Context: Public Transportation in Toronto 
Toronto in the 20th Century: The Toronto Transit Commission and Surface Routes 
Public transit service in Toronto is a comparatively more recent development that has 
nevertheless been subject to variety of radical reorganizations.  Service first began in 1861, under 
franchise, by a private company utilizing horse-drawn streetcars and sleighs, and by 1920 service 
was provided by a plethora of private electric streetcar companies.  (Toronto Transit Comission, 
n.d.B).  This arrangement appears to have been inadequate, as a 1920 municipal election 
referendum would see the consolidation of public transit under the banner of the newly created 
municipally controlled transit authority known as the Toronto Transportation Commission on 
September 1, 1921 (Filey, 1997).  Although streetcars would remain as the main mode of public 
transit, buses would be introduced on an experimental basis in 1922 and would increasingly be 
used in the 1930s for routes serving outlying areas of Toronto-proper (Filey, 1997) as well as 
surrounding communities (TTC, n.d.B).  As will be discussed later, buses would experience 
continued, if not increased, utilization and become increasingly important in serving the city.  
1954 would see the service being renamed to its present day name of Toronto Transit 
Commission (TTC, n.d.B) and in a coincidental call back to 1921, the TTC would also assume 
sole responsibility for public transit in Toronto’s neighbouring suburban communities as part of 
the creation of the regional municipality of Metropolitan  Toronto (Figure 1) (TTC, n.d.B).  The 
final relevant developments in the TTC’s history would be creation of the overnight blue night 
surface network in 1987, and the amalgamation of the municipalities making up Metropolitan 
Toronto in 1998 to form the present day City of Toronto (TTC, n.d.B). 
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Figure 1. A map of the various communities that made up Metropolitan Toronto just prior to amalgamation 
 
Contemporary Surface Public Transportation in Toronto 
Bus operated surface transit makes up a significant portion of the TTC’s contemporary 
network.   Buses are particularly important to Toronto’s former inner suburbs, especially in their 
geographical extremes, where rapid transit and streetcar lines only make limited ingresses.  
Currently, the TTC operates over 140 bus routes (Toronto Transit Commission, n.d.A) that span 
a combined distance in excess of 6,000 kilometres over the entire city (Toronto Transit 
Commission, 2017A) (Appendix B: Toronto Transit Commission System Map (TTC, 2018)).  
These routes serve over 10,000 on-street surface transit stops, of which roughly 67% are on the 
approach to intersections (near-side), 22% are after intersections (far-side), and 11% are between 
intersections (mid-block) (Toronto Transit Commission, 2006).  Surface bus stops are largely 
consistent in Toronto, being located streetside along mixed-traffic thoroughfares.  The stops 
themselves are relatively conventional in nature, possessing stop markers in varying 
combinations with averaged sized transit shelters and general street furniture.  Additionally, all 
but two of the TTC’s daytime bus routes connect with at least one subway or rapid transit station.  
As will be discussed later, the TTC’s daytime bus network is structured so as to ensure that 90% 
Municipalities of the Former Metropolitan Toronto 
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of Toronto’s inhabitants and employers are within 400m, or roughly a 5 minute walk, of a bus 
stop (TTC, 2017B).  Taken together, buses are the most used vehicle mode in the TTC system, 
accounting for just under 49% of the network’s 533 million riders in 2017 (TTC, 2017B).  
Streetside bus service is also particularly important for the TTC’s overnight network, which 
lacks rapid transit service and sees buses serving 27 of the city’s 31 overnight routes.  In addition 
to providing overnight service on the system’s backbone in the form of the line 1 and line 2 
subway lines, all but one of the overnight routes serving the city’s inner suburbs are operated 
using buses. 
Personal Security and the TTC 
Relatively little literature has been written about the TTC’s historical security levels.  The 
only, and possibly most infamous, incident that was encountered was the Scarborough Rapist’s 
activities in the Scarborough district of Toronto during the mid-late 1980’s.  The culprit, serial 
rapist and later serial killer Paul Bernado, carried out a series of successful and unsuccessful 
sexual assaults of young women and girls, many of whom were travelling alone at night and had 
recently disembarked from a TTC bus (SWAN and METRAC, 1991).  This incident spurred 
action on the issue of personal security, especially for female transit users, by residents, non-
profit organizations, the TTC, and the Toronto Police Service, and included security audits of 
surface and rapid transit stops.  The most notable products of this research include the 
Designated Waiting Area at rapid transit stations, and the request stop program (METRAC, n.d.), 
which allows patrons travelling alone by bus during late-night and overnight periods to 
disembark between regular stops if they feel vulnerable (Toronto Transit Commission, n.d.D). 
Moving to contemporary times, discussions of personal security levels on the TTC have 
generally been restricted to reports of smaller cases of assault, sexual assault, and harassment 
through the local media.  The most significant contemporary development was the TTC’s launch 
of its “This Is Where” anti-harassment campaign and associated smartphone reporting 
application on September 6
th
 of 2017 (TTC, 2017B). 
Information on the incidence of offensive behaviour on the TTC system is difficult to 
access.  At the most basic level, TTC statistics on crime and offensive behaviour are occasionally 
released to the general public through the media via investigative reporting, requests for 
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comments, and official statements by TTC representatives.  Otherwise, data is only publicly 
accessible, outside of a Municipal Freedom of Information Request, through the TTC’s annual 
reports on transit enforcement rather the commission’s standard annual reports.  This data, 
however, is somewhat constrained based on its presentation in largely aggregate form as well as  
year-to-year stylistic and reporting changes.  Statistics were not found in the publicly accessible 
and academic subscription-based databases that were consulted. 
As the intent of this paper is not based on the statistical analysis, data on crime and 
offences will only be briefly discussed.  Overall, the TTC has consistently experienced an 
increasing number of reported and documented security incidents from 2015 to 2017 (Toronto 
Transit Commission, 2016; Toronto Transit Commission, 2017A; Toronto Transit Commission, 
2018).  Starting with the latter, the TTC has consistently experienced occurrences and 
apprehensions over this three-year period, having 3,050 occurrences and 403 apprehensions 
during the latest annum (Table 4).  This increasing trend also exists with regards to security 
related calls, which differ as they are divided by transit mode.  Although surface transit only 
makes up 14% of the total 15,919 calls, the figure has consistently increased over this 3 year 
period when compared to all other modes (Table 5).   
 
Table 4 Security occurrences on the TTC in 2015-2017 (TTC 2016; TTC 2017A; TTC 2018A) 
 2015 2016 2017 
 Total 
Occurrences 
Arrests and 
Apprehen. 
Total 
Occurrences 
Arrests and 
Apprehen. 
Total 
Occurrences 
Arrests and 
Apprehen. 
System wide 2,022 240 2,511 306 3,050 403 
 
Table 5 Security occurrences on the TTC by mode (TTC 2016; TTC 2017A; TTC 2018A) 
 2015 2016 2017 
SRT 181 126 204 
Subway 11,581 11,502 13,420 
Surface 1,184 1,898 2,295 
Total 12,946 13,526 15,919 
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Offences that were previously identified, or presumed to be, particularly relevant for 
surface transit patrons constituted up to 2,573 (84%) of total occurrences in 2017 (Appendix A: 
Reported Offences on the TTC (2016, 2017A, 2018)).  In respective order, assault, fraud, 
vandalism, and theft were identified as being the most common offences (Figure 4) reported on 
the TTC (2016; 2017A; 2018A).  Fraud
19
 of patrons and the TTC, surprisingly was the second 
most common relevant offence on the TTC following a drastic increase between 2016 and 2017.  
Vandalism, theft and crimes outside of the system’s top 4 categories appear to have remained 
relatively stable and the frequency of the former two is not particularly surprising. 
 
Figure 2. The Top 4 Relevant Reported Offences on the TTC (TTC 2016; TTC 2017A; TTC 2018A) 
The hierarchy of less-frequent crimes on the TTC contained several surprising statistics.  
While sexual assault’s frequency relatively matches the level of infamy attached to it, robbery is 
a surprisingly infrequent crime by comparison (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992) (Figure 5).   
Quality of life crimes, although they could include disturbances of the peace, and employee 
related crimes comprised a surprisingly small share of offences.  Moving on to the relevance of 
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 Fraud is presumed to refer to fraudulent monetary transactions, including the usage of fraudulent fare 
media, with the TTC and possibly include the defrauding of TTC patrons. 
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crimes, the top 4 types of offences that directly affect passengers are assault, theft, disturbances 
of the peace, and sexual assault.   
 
Figure 3 Other offences that may be particularly relevant to perceptions of personal security (TTC 2016; TTC 2017A; 
TTC 2018A) 
Two points should be stressed in regards to the interpretation of these figures.  Firstly, 
these crimes are categorized on the basis of interpretation and discretion rather than official 
convention or best practices.  Simply put, crimes may have been grouped or separated crimes in 
non-standard or potentially incorrect manners.  Additionally, and as oft-cited in literature, the 
discrepancy between reported figures and transit user sentiment may be attributable to 
underreporting (Walkate, 2005) or partially conflated perceptions of insecurity. 
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Policy Context 
As dictated in the City of Toronto Act, a statutory document that sets out the powers of 
the City of Toronto, the TTC is classified as a City board that has been provided exclusive 
authority
20
 for the management of local passenger transportation in the City of Toronto.   That 
being said, a variety of both municipal and private partners are involved in the planning and 
provisioning of streetscape elements that are directly attributed or indirectly contribute to 
streetside stops.  Public transit has also increasingly been posited as a vital component of 
sustainability and competitiveness in the Greater Toronto Area, and the City of Toronto by 
extension (see: Metrolinx, 2008; Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2017; 
Ontario Ministry of Transportation, 2012). 
General stop placement standards.   The TTC, presumably in a similar fashion to other 
transit operators, considers stop placement to be a balancing act between the needs of passengers 
and transit operators.  TTC (2017C) service planning standards dictate key considerations, 
including convenient access, efficiency, safety, and community impacts, which are put into 
practice via minimum standards for coverage and access.  The TTC’s day-time network is 
designed so that 90% of Toronto’s inhabitants and employers are within 400m-roughly a 5 
minute walk-of local bus stops that are be spaced roughly 300 to 400 metres apart (TTC, 2017C).  
This emphasis on coverage and walking times can be traced back to the weighting system used in 
the TTC’s transit modelling process (TTC, 2017C), and data that implies that walking is viewed 
by riders as the second most inconvenient component of their trip.  As was previously stated 
however, a stop may not be implemented if the weighted benefit of this change does not 
outweigh or match the additional travel time added to other riders’ trips. 
Aside from ensuring a basic level of access, the facilitation of seamless transfers between 
routes and modes is the other major factor that informs TTC surface stop planning (TTC, 2017C).  
This is reasonably presumed as increasing the likelihood of stops being located in the vicinity of 
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 A small number of exceptions exist, primarily towards different modes (eg.  Rickshaws and pedicabs) or 
services with affiliations to schools or other levels of government are excepted  
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intersecting streets that have transit service.  As it relates to our topic, basic level of connectivity 
is the fundamental feature of surface stop planning. 
Land-use and stop placement.  Land use has been factored to varying degrees during 
service planning and placement of surface transit stops.  The service standard’s discussion 
network connectivity, for instance, emphasizes the need to ensure that transit service is provided 
in a manner that meets customers’ travel needs by connecting residential, employment, and 
institutional land uses (TTC, 2014; TTC, 2017C).  It can be reasonably assumed that stop 
planning will be partially informed by surrounding land uses, and route and stops may be located 
in the vicinity of access points to major trip generators.  This appears to be supported to a degree 
by the inclusion of certain civic institutions, secondary and post-secondary schools, regional 
transportation stations, and large shopping facilities by electronically accessible route schedules 
as well on-board next stop announcements.   An additional instance of service planning directly 
acknowledging land use concerns differences in stop placements between high-speed arterial 
roads and residential areas.  Bus routes operating in residential areas, are stated to be warranted 
exceptions to minimum stop spacing standards as they are expected to emphasize connectivity 
rather than operate at an high overall speed (Toronto Transit Commission, 2014).  Although this 
document predates the service standards, the traffic characteristics of residential streets have 
remained relatively unchanged and the document appears to remain relevant.  Overall, land use 
may dictate how service is routed, the type of service that will be provided, and the specific 
locations of stops. 
Technical considerations.   The final set of considerations guiding surface transit 
planning are largely technical in nature and concern the ways bus stops may negatively impact 
the operations of surrounding land uses and traffic flows.  Three broad concerns regarding 
vehicular traffic, pedestrian traffic, and physical space were identified in the materials that were 
consulted.   
The TTC has historically planned bus stops in the interest of minimizing situations that 
may result in unsafe vehicular traffic movements.  This firstly can be seen in their avoidance of 
farside non-bus bay stops due to their potential to create intersection blocking queues of 
motorists behind stopped buses (TTC, 2001A).  That being said, farside stops have more recently 
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been viewed by the commission as being more conducive to vehicle travel times (TTC, 2003), 
possibly due placement after traffic signals.  Of the two points, it could be argued that the former 
drawback may have more to do with driving etiquette and a police concern as opposed to a 
public transit operator priority.   
Pedestrian safety, specifically a bus stop’s interface with pedestrian crossing points on 
roadways, has been another factor in the positioning of surface transit stops.  Midblock stops are 
preferably placed in the vicinity of existing traffic signals and pedestrian crossovers, or 
pedestrian refuge islands in order to discourage unnecessary, unprotected midblock crossings by 
transit users (TTC, 2006; TTC, 2014).  In the case of pedestrian crossovers, there is also a further 
requirement to place stops in buffered nearside orientations in order to prevent buses from 
obscuring crossing pedestrians from approaching motorists (TTC, 2006). 
Finally, the TTC appears to give some regard for the availability of space for stops and 
their elements where possible during their siting.  Historically, the TTC has preferred to locate 
stop markers within reasonable distance of transit shelters (TTC, 2006), which themselves are 
preferably placed in areas with sufficient non-sidewalk municipal property.  Although it was not 
find in any of the consulted sources, bus stops also have consistently been observed to be sited in 
locations that will not result in stopped buses blocking private driveways. 
Legal Responsibility for Passenger Well-Being 
As will be discussed later, surface transit and its various environments are owned or 
maintained by a variety of bodies whose involvement may not be readily apparent at face value.  
While the TTC is responsible for its stations, properties, and occurrences that are directly related 
to its vehicles and their occupants, streetside transit stops and their shelters are not the TTC’s 
responsibility and instead are managed by the City, and in rare cases by private property owners.  
For the purposes of this paper, attention will primarily be focussed on the question of whether 
the TTC is liable for the security of its patrons. 
As noted by then-Ontario Privacy Commissioner Cavoukian (2008), safety and security 
are fundamental components of the TTC’s operations and fulfillment of its duty as set out in the 
City of Toronto Act.  This criterion was also observed as basis of the deployment of CCTV on 
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transit properties in York Region
21
 and is presumably a standard phenomenon for public transit 
operators.  An operator’s liability to transit patrons that become victims of crime, however, is far 
less straightforward as it is comparatively less discussed.  Rudimentary, exploratory research of 
this topic was conducted in order to develop a marginally better understanding of the topic. 
The first step is an evaluation of the powers and immunities granted to the City of 
Toronto and its public bodies through the City of Toronto Act (2006).  Section 398(2) of the Act 
states that the TTC is not immune to being sued and can be sued due to its activities, such as the 
maintenance, operation, and management of its properties.  Ontario’s Occupier’s Liability Act 
(OLA) was the next consulted document as it is prominent displayed on external vehicle decals 
as the justification for the usage of CCTV cameras on TTC buses.  As noted previous, the 
existence of the OLA codifies certain aspects such what constitutes occupier, regulated premises, 
types of entrants, and the duty of care owed to the respective classes of entrants when compared 
to common law.  No specific remarks on liability for personal security were found in the act, 
although an occupier’s duty is ensure that entrants are reasonably safe from the condition of their 
premises or an activity carried out on it (Occupier’s Liability Act, 1990).  No further elaboration 
was found on the topic and it is presumed that the act is more oriented towards liability for 
personal safety incidents including accidents such as slips and falls. 
Only one publication on this topic was found and it placed significant emphasis on 
context specificity. Various rulings have previously been made on the basis of differing 
relationships between the agency and victim, responsibility and the nature of the exact failure or 
omission, as well as the foreseeability of the security incident in question (Waite, 2006).  Overall, 
liability for third party crime involves a significant division of labour between multiple 
stakeholders and a high degree of context specificity.  Erring on the side of caution, it may be 
prudent for TTC and the City to audit and take preventative measures in areas with documented 
reoccurring incidents and concerns.  Ultimately, however, this issue may be more effectively, 
                                                 
21
 Based on observations of CCTV related signage in York Region Transit properties such as BRT stations 
and their connecting pathways. 
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and responsibly, addressed by a legal scholar or professional, and will also be contingent on the 
scenario or case at hand. 
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What Spatial Elements May Affect Security at TTC Surface Stops? 
Although the ultimate responsibility for stop elements arguably falls under the City of 
Toronto, responsibility is actually divided among a variety of both public and private entities that 
notably include: 
 Astral Media (advertising company); 
 The City of Toronto: Transportation Services Division; 
 Toronto Hydro Energy Services (Toronto Hydro); and 
 The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC). 
Further elaboration on these arrangements will be provided during individual analysis of 
each of the security relevant surface stop elements.  One point that will be noted now to avoid 
repetition is the relationship between Astral Media and the City of Toronto.  These parties have 
entered into a 20 year contract whereby Astral purchases, installs, and maintains street furniture 
elements, and also provides a series of monetary and other benefits
22
 for the duration of their 
contract in exchange for advertising rights (City of Toronto, 2015).  This style of agreement has 
historically been used in Toronto (TTC, 2001B) and is also used in other municipalities both in 
Canada and elsewhere in North America (York Region Transit, 2009). 
                                                 
22
 These benefits include designated payments, a designated amount of free advertising space, and funding 
for community programs. 
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Stop Lighting 
Ambient street lighting.   Stop lighting can be divided into two components, ambient 
light levels associated with streetlights and light levels associated with shelter specific lighting 
fixtures.  Ambient street lighting, as in other jurisdictions, is primarily intended to facilitate the 
visibility and safety of road users (City of Toronto, n.d.A).  Toronto Hydro Energy Services Inc.  
(Toronto Hydro) has owned and operated Toronto’s street and expressway lighting ever since it 
entered into purchase and service agreements with the City in December 2005 (City of Toronto, 
2009).  Toronto’s streetlights include a variety of wattage and light distribution patterns (Toronto 
Hydro, 2016)
23
, which are optimized on the basis of road type, pole location and predominant 
surrounding land use (Toronto Hydro, n.d.).   Variations also exist with regards to mounting 
height and fixture style.  Although no direct allusions were found, Toronto’s streetlights appear 
to be primarily focussed on providing oblong illumination patterns that are focussed on their 
respective right of way as well as a small portion of their immediate vicinity (Saskpower, 2017).  
Further information regarding streetlighting standards could not be found and may not be 
publicly accessible or in publicly digestible formats.    
Although critiquing of technical lighting standards falls outside of the scope of this paper, 
some brief commentary will be given to the ramifications of streetlighting standards.  While 
reasonably limiting light intrusion on adjacent properties, streetlights may not be as effective for 
sidewalks that are heavily buffered from streetlights and even less effective on public and private 
areas beyond them.  Additionally there may be discrepancies between light levels that are 
conducive to road safety versus personal security. 
 
                                                 
23
 Toronto follows the Illuminating Engineering Society’s (IES) standards for wattage and light distribution 
patterns. 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  64 
 
 
Shelter specific lighting.   Transit shelters in Toronto may also include lighting elements 
that are intended to supplement ambient street light levels and to provide interior illumination.  
Dedicated shelter mounted lights and illuminated shelter advertisement panels were both 
considered to be forms of shelter specific lighting.  Three different patterns of shelter lights, and 
two different types of shelter advertisement technology are currently employed in Toronto’s 
transit shelters.  The two organizations that play key roles in the deployment of shelter specific 
lighting are Toronto Hydro Energy Services and Astral Media via the coordinated street furniture 
program (CSFP). 
Toronto Hydro’s involvement in shelter lighting stems from its responsibility for 
managing electricity distribution in the city, including the supply of electricity to hard-wired 
lighting fixtures and advertisement panels (City of Toronto, 2013).  Toronto Hydro’s current 
importance is somewhat unclear, and possibly decreased, following its refusal to provide 
electrical connections to its street lighting system (City of Toronto, 2013).  No resolutions to this 
impasse were found in future status updates, although hardwired fixtures, particularly ad panels, 
continue to exist and this suggests that some form of resolution may have been reached.  That 
being said, the introduction of solar panels on shelters also suggests that at least some efforts are 
being made to compensate for difficulty in obtaining hardwired electricity. 
The design, installation, and maintenance of shelter lighting, similarly to all CSFP 
elements, are the responsibility of Astral Media up until the expiration date of its 20-year 
contract.  Possibly in response to the aforementioned problems with securing hardwired 
electricity, Astral appears to have transitioned from hardwired dual-light shelter lights to two 
different patterns of solar powered shelter light fixtures.  The City has stated that all non-canopy 
shelters are to be provided with illumination (City of Toronto, 2013), although the existence of 
fixture-free shelters imply that this policy may not actually be in effect or is a goal for the final 
years of the CSFP.   
Shelter advertisement panels were also considered to serve as lighting fixtures as a means 
of offering the CSFP the benefit of the doubt.  Although it may be an unintentional circumstance, 
three different types of advertisements were encountered: conventionally lit hard-copy 
advertisements (Figure 4), as of yet unlit hard-copy advertisements, and static copy digital 
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advertisement panels.  Digital advertisement panels are the rarest of the patterns and have only 
seen limited deployment due to their increased regulations, relative newness, (City of Toronto, 
2013; City of Toronto, 2014) and presumably higher capital and operational costs.  
Advertisement panels are generally powered via hardwired electrical connections (City of 
Toronto, 2013), although a select number of conventional advertisements are inexplicably in 
shelters equipped with solar panels but lacking lighting fixtures.   
 
Figure 4. An illuminated hard copy shelter advertisement panel 
 
Wayfinding 
Wayfinding measures assist individuals in navigating the public transit system and public 
streets in a relatively confident, expedient, and accurate manner.  Similarly to other transit 
systems, the TTC uses a mixture of both hard and electronic based wayfinding measures for its 
patrons.  Hard measures utilized by the TTC at transit stops include stop markers, shelter maps, 
and public notices.  Electronic measures have increasingly been deployed by the TTC and 
include direct measures such real-time next vehicle information screens in shelters and indirect 
measures such as notices advertising SMS and data accessible next vehicle predictions and 
tracking. 
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Stop markers.  Stop markers are the essential element of all surface transit stops in 
Toronto and are installed and maintained by the TTC
24
.  Two main types of stop markers are 
currently being used by the TTC.  The first consists of legacy markers that indicate the stop’s 
mode of service (bus or streetcar), whether the stop receives overnight service, and whether the 
stop is accessible.  Certain legacy models also include the number of the route(s) serving the stop, 
along with advertisements of trip planning services and the TTC’s request stop program (Figure 
5a).  The TTC’s belief in these stop marker information advertisements appears to have 
diminished and motivated redesigns on the grounds that legacy markers “give useless 
information” (Kalinowski, 2012).  The TTC appears to have attempted to rectify this perceived 
problem via an incremental update using decals that indicate routes that serve the stop in 
question, and a phone textable stop number that for next vehicle arrival times (Figure 5b).  These 
updated markers are relatively uncommon and will be considered to simply be a limited-
deployment interim design. Contemporary-style stop markers are a fairly substantial shift from 
pervious legacy models (Figure 5c).  These markers eschew route mode
25
 and general service 
detail advertisements in favour of a standardized template of stop specific service information.  
This information includes the routes serving the stop in question, a more explicit explanation of 
overnight service, and phone textable information for next vehicle arrival times.   
                                                 
24
 Based on the TTC’s stop marker modernization program. 
25
 Route mode is technically signified through a route’s number, with streetcar lines having 3 digit route 
numbers starting with a 5 such as 501. 
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Figure 5a, b, c. Three styles of stop markers, in order of age, are currently used by the TTC.  The newest stop marker (7c) 
includes the stop’s respective routes and textable next-vehicle information as standard features. 
A portion of the stop markers on the TTC surface system are also accompanied by an 
information placard holder (Figure 6).  These holders historically contained service information 
for their respective routes, such as a map and schedules, as well as general information regarding 
the request stop program and TTC contact information.  The TTC has largely completed a 
modernization program that replaces these placards with standardized models list contact 
information for the TTC as well as third-party trip planning applications.  As noted by Spurr 
(2016) this change directs passengers to service information sources that are both easier and 
cheaper to maintain with frequent service changes, but is contingent on individuals possessing 
cellular texting or data.  That being said, this problem may be somewhat isolated as cell 
ownership appears to continuing to grow, with up to 92% of Canadian households owning 
cellular phones (Statistics Canada, 2017).  A small, and somewhat ironic, additional consequence 
of this change is its deviation from the oft-recommend security PSA of avoiding the use and 
display of valuables such as cell phones (Poyner, 1983; TTC, n.d.D). 
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Figure 6a, b. Stop marker placards are installed at a number of TTC stops and have transitioned from providing routing 
and scheduling information (6a) to directing passengers to first and third-party trip planning services (6b).  
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Shelter maps.   Shelter maps offer less-stop specific but wider ranging service 
information of the TTC system and consist of large format printouts of the TTC’s system map 
(Figure 7).  These maps include information on the routing and service levels of TTC routes 
within Toronto, interregional transit hubs, commuter rail routes, and points of interest/landmarks 
within or adjacent to the city’s borders (Figure 7).  Shelters maps may be intended to be a 
standard feature of transit shelters as they are included in the cross-sectional diagrams of all 
shelter types in the City’s (n.d.B) manual of comprehensive street furniture program elements.  A 
transition towards stop specific shelter maps that provide information on the shelter’s respective 
route, connecting routes, and the local street grid were trialled in 2013 (TTC, 2013) but were 
ultimately not implemented.   Shelter maps have arguably become more important for trip 
planning following the aforementioned discontinuation of route information placards (Pelley, 
2016).  Although the maps are created and published by the TTC
26
, Astral Media is responsible 
for their maintenance, and the maintenance of their displays
27
. 
 
 
Figure 7. Transit shelter maps provide an overview of the TTC’s ystem. 
  
                                                 
26
 Based on copyright information and changes made and trialled by the TTC. 
27
 Based off of prior knowledge from communications with TTC staff. 
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Next vehicle information system screens.  Next vehicle information system screens 
(NVISS), provide real-time information on the routes serving the transit stop in question (Figure 
8).  This includes information on routes and route branches that are in service and real-time 
information on their next vehicle.  Additionally, these screens also intermittently provide the 
telephone number for the TTC’s information phone line.  NVISS are the responsibility of the 
TTC, but are contingent on the installation of a transit shelter through the CSFP and an available 
hard-wired electrical supply. 
 
Figure 8. An image of a next vehicle information system screen installed in a bus shelter.  Note that only a portion of the 
screen’s orange text is visible due to the technical limitations of the photographing camera.   
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Methods 
Subjects of Analysis  
The primary-research portion of the paper evaluates the design of surface transit stops 
with respect to their strengths, shortcomings, and effectiveness relative to documented concerns 
and policies.  This was accomplished via stop audits that were partially inspired by the stop 
audits previously conducted by METRAC (1992; SWAN and METRAC, 1991), but designed to 
collect more detailed information.  Three main aspects were covered by the audit: ambient street 
lighting levels at stops; stop assets and their state of repair; and finally the interface between 
stops and their surroundings.  Interviews with representatives of advocacy groups, such as 
METRAC, and city staff were initially also planned but these were eschewed due to a lack of 
interest from any of the parties. 
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Ambient street lighting levels at stops.   Lighting evaluations were conducted for 
both streetlight-based ambient lighting and shelter specific lighting fixtures.  These evaluations 
were qualitative in nature due to a lack of access and unfamiliarity with lumen meters.  A 
preparatory set of observations were undertaken in order to familiarize myself with sufficient 
lighting levels.  The starting point for these observations was an evaluation of the feasibility of 
the 15-20 metres facial visibility, or Canadian Standards Association .4 foot candles value, 
advocated for by a previously reviewed municipal document (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992).  
In the absence of a volunteer, a printout of Toronto Mayor John Tory’s face on a standard piece 
of A4 paper was the benchmark for testing facial visibility.  The first finding of this preparatory 
exercise was that visibility from 15m for open-air areas may be possible, but visibility from 10m 
appears to be a more realistic expectation as it also accounts for facial visibility of individuals 
occupying transit shelters.  This exercise also provided qualitative benchmarks for sufficient, 
passable, and insufficient ambient street lighting levels in the absence of a waiting transit patron.  
The distribution of these qualitative ambient light levels in a streetlight’s footprint were roughly 
measured at another streetlight and were assigned basic range bands up to the threshold of 
sufficient lighting, which was identified as being over 25 metres.  This range band was later 
utilized during the data verification stage in order to gauge the accuracy of recorded stop lighting 
ratings relative to their actual distance to their nearest streetlights.   
It was impossible to determine the actual IES Light Distribution pattern and wattage of 
the streetlights illuminating the stops that were evaluated.  That being said, the two patterns that 
are used in Toronto (Toronto Hydro, n.d.) share an elliptical light footprint that is wider to areas 
left and right of a light when compared to areas in front and behind of a light (Saskpower, 2017).   
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Stop assets and state of repair.   The stop audit also accounted for the various dedicated 
lighting and wayfinding stop elements that were identified in the previous section and included: 
 Dedicated shelter lighting; 
 Shelter advertisement panels; 
 Stop markers; 
 Shelter maps; and 
 Next vehicle information system screens. 
The stop survey also accounted for the model or type of asset in question (where 
applicable) as well as their state of repair (with regards to signs of vandalism).  Shelter lighting 
fixtures had their operability recorded where possible due to the differing technologies that are 
used to activate them.  While it was a relatively straightforward process, a small concession had 
to be made with regards to certain stop assets such as shelter maps, dedicated shelter lighting, 
and electricity related shelter components.  Depending on the facing their shelter, these elements 
were sometimes obscured and were thus sometimes counted on the basis of mounting hardware 
and structural components.  Conversely, electricity related components were difficult to 
catalogue on the basis of functionality due to the aforementioned facing issue (NVISS) or due to 
a lack of patrons (motion sensor dedicated shelter lighting).  Additionally, it was impossible to 
differentiate between malfunctioning illuminated advertisement panels and non-illuminated 
advertisement panels. 
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Interface.   The interface between surface transit stops and their surroundings was 
divided into four separate elements in order to compensate for its complexity.  These included 
the surrounding property’s land use type, its buffering from its respective stop, its relative facing, 
and the existence of any barriers between it and said stop.  The land use categories that were 
utilized during observations were based on a combination of the City’s zoning and a property’s 
perceived attributes.  A condensed list of 10 broad land use categories and 53 distinct 
subcategories of land use were created in order to simplify the land use designation process 
(Table 6).    
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Table 6 Land-use designation table 
Residential 
RD Single-detached/semi-detached 
RCC Single-detached/semi-detached/duplex with commercial use 
RM Duplex/townhouses 
RA Residential apartment 
RS Senior’s residence 
Commercial 
CG Gas station 
CA Auto-related uses (dealership/garage) 
CO Office building 
CR Retail operations and eating establishment 
CS Commercial strip/small multi-unit commercial property/strip plaza 
CSM Commercial strip mall 
CM Indoor/ outdoor shopping mall 
CP Professional building 
CSN Casino 
CF Religious building/place of worship 
CL Hotel/motel 
CLR Hotel/motel with ground-floor commercial operations 
CPC Professional building with ground-floor commercial operations 
COC Office building with ground-floor commercial operations 
SPEC Public attraction (Ontario Science Centre) 
Mixed residential-commercial use 
MCR Low-rise mixed commercial residential building 
MCRS Low-rise mixed commercial residential multi-unit property/strip.   
RAC Residential apartment with ground-floor commercial operations 
Open areas intended/programmed/easily capable of supporting use 
O Grassy open area/sections of lots 
OP Public park 
OA Urban farm/allotment garden 
UTR Utility corridor with recreational trails 
OG Golf course 
OC Cemetery 
OR Private recreation facility (basketball and tennis courts) 
Industrial 
I Industrial property in standalone or multi-unit format 
IC Standalone industrial property with commercial functions and areas (sales) 
ICS Multi-unit industrial property with commercial functions and areas (sales) 
(continued) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Vehicular 
PL Parking lot 
PG Parking garage/structures 
ROW Public/private roadways 
HWYA Highway on-ramp/off-ramp 
ROWA Roadway on-ramp/off-ramp 
ROWI Intersection 
Community 
SCH Elementary/secondary school 
SCHY Elementary/secondary schoolyard 
PSCH Post-secondary institution 
COM Community centre/library/public/ theatre/recreation center 
COME Emergency services facility (fire hall/police stations/ambulance station) 
HOSP Hospital 
Public transit 
GO GO (commuter) rail/bus Station (and their related facilities) 
TTE TTC rapid-transit station entrance 
TTC Inaccessible facing of a TTC bus terminal/rapid transit station 
Other 
UB Utility building (ie: electrical substation) 
DVL Development parcel/construction site 
Open areas that are not intended for or comprehensively able to facilitate use 
OH Man-made stormwater management channel/culvert 
ON Wooded area or area with medium-heavy foliage 
ONR Ravine land 
UT Utility corridor 
 
Distance buffering was based on a combination of estimated distances and perceived 
characteristics such barriers that would reasonably and impair visual and audio recognition 
(Table 7).    
Table 7 Land-use buffering categorization table 
Barrier Class Acronym Basis 
Adjacent ADJ Property is located directly beside public sidewalk 
Slightly Buffered SLB 
Property is distanced far enough from public sidewalk to permit line 
abreast movement of one to five individuals 
Buffered BUFF 
Property is more than five abreast individuals from its sidewalk but 
is still perceived to be within range for audio recognition and facial 
recognition 
Setback SBK 
Property is a significant distance from sidewalk and is perceived to 
be out of range of audio recognition and all but the most basic 
levels of visual recognition 
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Facing was perceived to be relatively straightforward and was determined on the basis of 
building characteristics.  Front facings would possess the primary entrance(s) for a property,  
back facings would possess servicing areas or be opposite of a front face and side facings would 
represent all remaining faces and presumably be perpendicular to front faces.  As will be 
discussed later, categorization was somewhat less straightforward and ultimately several changes 
were made to account for these developments.   
Barriers were categorized based on their perceived origin, effects on movement, and 
effects on sightlines.  10 different classes of barriers were identified and ultimately used during 
the course of this research (Table 8).   
Table 8. Land-use barrier categorization table 
Barrier Class Acronym Examples 
Hard Movement HM 
Low (shin-height) concrete walls 
Picket fences 
Metal fences 
Crash barriers 
Guardrails/bridge edges 
Hard Movement Potential 
Sight 
HMPS 
Medium height walls (knee height or greater) 
Medium height wood slat fences  
Hard Potential Movement 
Sight 
HPMS Parking lots (with cars serving as barriers) 
Hard Movement Sight HMS 
High wooden slat fences 
High walls 
Soft Movement SM 
Slopes 
Low foliage 
Soft Potential Movement 
Sight 
SPMS Medium height foliage (weeds, grasses) 
Soft Movement Sight SMS 
Hedges 
Thick foliage 
Combination Movement 
Potential Sight 
CMPS Light-medium shrubbery/hedges with see-through fences 
Combination Potential 
Movement Sight 
CPMS 
Light-medium shrubbery and foliage in enclosed planting 
beds 
Combination Movement 
Sight 
CMS 
High walls with foliage 
See-through fences with heavy foliage 
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The final type of observations that were made were of patrons and any physical 
observations of the stop in question that could be relevant to perceived and actual personal 
security.  These observations were recorded and categorized during data entry and analysis.   
 
General Aspects 
At least two sets of observations, one daytime and one after dark, were made from a TTC 
bus for each of the routes.  Where possible, after dark audits were conducted during periods of 
good visibility with no-to-low levels of snowfall and from the rearmost, curb side seat in order 
ensure the greatest possible viewing distance from a stop
28
.  Certain observations were also made 
from other seats on the raised rear area vehicles
29, and in certain cases the first (set) of driver’s 
side seat(s)
30
, in order to compensate for crowding, differing interiors associated with different 
models of vehicles, and dirty windows.  These observations had viewing angles through the front 
windows of the bus in question and had similar viewing distances.  
Observations utilized a prepared form (Table 9) that included columns for the subjects of 
analysis as well as all of the stops for the relevant branches of the respective routes.  These stop 
lists were compiled from the TransSee web application (O’Connor, n.d.) in the interest of 
expediency and were verified for accuracy through comparisons to route information from the 
TTC website.  
 
                                                 
28
  This provided a stationary viewing distance of approximately 11 metres for conventional buses and 17 
metres for articulated vehicles. 
29
 The original series/generation of Orion VII buses with 38 seats restricts visibility from the rearmost curb 
side seat, but this contingency was also enacted for other models on an as needed basis. 
30
 For standard length (40ft) and articulated (60ft) Novabus LFS buses with dirty windows  or to account 
for crowding. 
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Table 9 The layout used for stop audit sheets 
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Data was verified using the after dark verification, additional trips along the route, and 
satellite and streetview imagery from Google Maps.  Google Maps was used due to its relatively 
lower time costs as well as the significant amount and detail of the information it offered.  This 
imagery was used to verify survey sheet entries, better gauge the interface of adjacent properties, 
and the previously mentioned distance measurement between stops and their nearest streetlights.   
This method had a clear limitation in its reliance on secondary data that could be susceptible to 
accuracy issues through outdated images or other imagery errors but was ultimately used as no 
reasonable alternatives were available. 
  
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  80 
 
 
Route Selection 
A selection process was created in order to account for the fact that it would extremely 
difficult to survey every single TTC bus operated surface route running in Toronto’s inner 
suburbs within the constraints of the MES program. A basic set of rules was used to select routes 
and is listed in order of relative importance:  
 Avoiding routes that operate along borders or areas where other municipalities are 
responsible for stops or adjacent land uses; 
 Not choosing express routes; 
 Prioritizing routes that have overnight (blue night) service on at least a portion of their 
route; 
 Not choosing the Eglinton East or Eglinton West bus routes on the basis of their 
upcoming (partial) replacement by Light Rail Transit;  
 Ensuring that the chosen routes are geographically distributed, and spaced, among 
Toronto’s inner suburbs; 
 Choosing routes that have been documented as experiencing significant amounts of 
criminal and other by-law offences; 
 Choosing routes that provide a cross-section of the City’s land uses, as well as major 
trip generators/attractions; 
 Ensuring that chosen routes are distributed between low-ridership and high-ridership 
routes; 
 Preferring routes where the majority of the route serves areas outside the “old” City of 
Toronto; and 
 Preferring routes that serve or are located in the vicinity of Neighbourhood 
Improvement Areas.   
15 routes were subsequently chosen through a combination of the above criteria and 
discretion (Table 10) (Figure 9).  Criteria that require further explanation, and selected routes 
that may not fully conform to them, will follow. 
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Table 10 The routes and route branches that were selected for study. 
# 
Route 
Number 
and Branch 
Letter 
Route Name 
Origin 
(Rapid 
Transit 
Station) 
Terminus and Routing for 
Branches   
1. 36 Finch West Finch Humberwood Loop  
2. 52A 
Lawrence 
West 
Lawrence Pearson Airport Terminal 3 
3. 54A Lawrence East Eglinton Starspray Loop 
4. 
35A 
Jane Jane 
Pioneer Village Station 
35B 
Pioneer Village Station via 
Hullmar Rd. 
5. 25 Don Mills Pape Freshmeadow Rd.  at Don Mills 
6. 
39A 
Finch East Finch 
Neilson Rd./Baldoon 
39B 
Old Finch Rd.  and Morningview 
Ave. 
7. 
37A 
Islington Islington 
Humberwood Loop via 
Bergamont Ave., Rexdale Ave, 
Queen’s Plate Dr, Woodbine 
Racetrake, Humberwood Blvd. 
37B 
Islington Loop (Steeles Avenue 
West) 
8. 129B 
McCowan 
North 
Scarboroug
h Centre 
Steeles Avenue East 
9. 
86A 
Scarborough Kennedy 
Toronto Zoo Loop 
86C 
Meadowvale Loop (Sheppard 
Avenue East) 
10. 16 McCowan Warden Scarborough Centre Station 
11. 110C 
Islington 
South 
Islington Lakeshore Boulevard West 
12. 112C West Mall Kipling Carlingview Road at Disco Road 
13. 113 Danforth Rd. Main Street  Kennedy Station 
14. 97C Yonge Lawrence Yonge Street at Steeles Avenue 
15. 15 Evans Royal York Sherway Gardens Bus Terminal 
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Figure 9. The routes that were selected for the study relative to the boundaries of Toronto’s former municipalities. 
Avoiding routes that operate along or outside of municipal borders.   This criterion 
was designed to mitigate the inclusion of stops and adjacent areas that are outside the jurisdiction 
of the City of Toronto and its respective partners.  This rule also disqualified of secondary route 
branches that operate outside of Toronto, routes that primarily operate along Toronto’s borders, 
as well as the exclusion of bus stops on or outside of municipal borders.  That being said, a 
comparative analysis between the planning of bus stops and their amenities between 
municipalities of the Greater Toronto Area could be a topic of further research. 
This rule disqualified bus routes operating on Steeles Avenue, the city’s northernmost 
east-west arterial road, which serves as its municipal border with the neighbouring municipality 
of York Region.  As will be discussed in the route spacing discussion, this, along with the 
Eglinton exclusion, had significant effects on the spacing of the chosen east-west routes.  The 
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exclusion of route branches that operate outside the city was fairly straightforward with the 
exception of the 52 Lawrence West, that has a main branch terminus in the adjacent city of 
Mississauga.  In this instance, and other instances, where routes had a small number of stops 
along or outside of municipal borders, the offending stops were excluded from inclusion and 
analysis. 
Not choosing express routes.   Notwithstanding their significance for public transit 
riders and the surface transit network, express routes were not included due to their service 
characteristics.  The first of these is the fact that express routes only serve a limited number of 
stops that are highly trafficked by transit users, along major thoroughfares, or are in vicinity of 
major activity generators.  Compared to local routes, express routes can be described as 
providing service to a smaller proportion of the city and its population through their omission of 
local stops that are less-trafficked or in lower activity areas of the city.   All of these 
characteristics presumably make these stops preferred sites for investment in stop elements and 
amenities due to their ridership and their visibility in the case of on-street advertising.  Another 
potential shortcoming associated with these routes is the fact that they are generally in operation 
for fewer service periods of the day, if not peak-period exclusive, compared to their local 
counterparts.  There were no notable issues with the enforcement of this criterion. 
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Preferring routes that also have overnight service on at least a portion of their route.   
This criterion was added due to the fact that after-dark periods of the day have consistently been 
associated with increased feelings of insecurity.  The TTC provides overnight service
31
 through 
its “Blue Night network”, which is a simplified transit network operated exclusively using 
surface vehicles (Figure 10).   Compared to its daytime network, the Blue Night network has a 
somewhat looser access standard, being structured so that 95% of the city’s population and 
employment is within a 1,250 (15 minute walk) as opposed to the daytime standard of 90% 
within a 400m (5 minute) walk (TTC, 2017C).  This simplification and service standard also 
mean that routing in certain areas differs from the daytime network.  Additionally, the Blue 
Night network has significantly less frequent service, with virtually all routes save for those 
replicating the Yonge portion of Line 1 and Line 2 BD having 30 minute service possibly due to 
their relatively low ridership
32
.  Overall, the Blue Night network merits attention due to its after-
dark nature, reduced number of routes and stops, lower coverage, and generally reduced service 
frequency.   
                                                 
31
 With trips starting after 02:00 and last trips generally departing between 06:00 and 07:00. 
32
 As with other “chicken or the egg” transit planning issues, whether this is representative of lower 
overnight commuting/travel or overnight transit being less competitive and thus having a lower modal share 
is debatable. 
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Figure 10. The routes that were elected for study relative to Toronto’s overnight bus network. 
The Blue Night Network was a particularly problematic aspect that ultimately required 
concessions.  At its most basic level, a dedicated survey of the network was questionably feasible 
due to the amount of time that would be required to reach and travel on routes selected for study 
and the limited duration of the service period.  Additionally, the timing of this service period 
presented compatibility issues with other academic and non-academic commitments.  Finally, 
certain stops, particularly Bloor Street, do not have daytime service and would be comparatively 
more difficult to survey during the daytime.  As such, it was decided that preference would be 
given to routes, and areas, that receive overnight service and could be evaluated during after-dark 
hours.  Certain routes and branches were included due to routing discrepancies between the 
TTC’s daytime and overnight transit systems.  Finally, and as previously mentioned, it should be 
noted that the blue night network has comparative lower ridership than most daytime routes 
(Table 11) (City of Toronto, 2016).   
 
 
__   Primarily E-W Routes 
__   Primarily N-S  Routes 
__   Approximate Boundaries                  
       of  Old Toronto 
 
Image created by author in QGIS using the February 2018 Toronto 
Transit Commission Blue Night Network Map 
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Table 11. Routing and ridership information for the TTC’s overnight bus routes 
# 
Surface 
Route 
Ranking 
Route 
Number 
Route Name 
Equivalent 
Daytime 
Route(s) 
Typical 
Business 
Day 
Ridership 
(2016)* 
1. 131 300 West Mall 112, 113 1,577 
2. 138 320 Yonge 97 1,285 
3. 152 336 Finch West 36 338 
4. 157 335 Jane 35 233 
5. 159 325 Don Mills 25 222 
6. 160 334 Eglinton East 86 215 
7. 161 337 Islington 37, 110 205 
9. 163 354 Lawrence East 54 196 
10. 168 302 McCowan 16, 129 125 
11. 169 339 Finch East 39 122 
12. 173 352 Lawrence West 52 79 
N/A N/A 315 Evans 15 New Route 
          *City of Toronto, 2016B 
Ensuring that the final list of routes is as evenly spread out as possible (at least one 
arterial road of spacing) and covers both fringe and core areas.   This criterion was included 
to compensate for the unfeasibility of carrying out a comprehensive survey of every single 
daytime and blue night route within Toronto’s inner suburbs.  As such, selected routes would 
preferably be geographically spaced out from one another by a distance of at least one arterial 
road where possible.  A second priority was to include routes that reached or ran along the 
furthest stretches of Toronto’s inner suburbs33 without encroaching on municipal borders.   
Two issues were encountered with regards to the even distribution of the routes selected 
for surveying.  Convoluted routes, such as the 16 and 86, that operate north-south as well as east-
west both broke this rule but were included as they satisfied other requirements.  The minimum 
spacing rule inadvertently also created larger than normal gaps between the selected routes, 
specifically between routes running on Finch Avenue and Lawrence Avenue.  A maximum 
                                                 
33
 The “gap” in the north eastern portion of Toronto, and Scarborough by extension, is due to the Rouge 
River National Park. 
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spacing of one arterial road could have been beneficial to avoid similar situations if this study 
was revisited or further research was carried out. 
Choosing routes that have been documented as experiencing significant amounts of 
criminal and other by-law offences.   Targeting routes with the greatest incidence of crime and 
disorder was deemed to be an effective and efficient way of understanding and addressing 
insecurity on surface transit.  Route-based incidence data, however, does not appear to be open 
data and may only be accessible through a Municipal Freedom of Information request.  The only 
readily available publicly accessible source of data was a slightly dated local newspaper article, 
which only provided aggregate statistics (Robinson and Davis, 2016).  This data is summarized 
in   
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Table 12 and Table 13. 
The routes with the highest total number of criminal and by-law offences were given 
preference on the grounds that they could be the most efficient target for resources and 
preventative strategies.  Three of the identified five routes 35; 36; and 52, were ultimately chosen 
following the application of other route selection rules.  Routes with the highest rate of offences 
on a passenger basis proved to be more problematic as many of them appeared to only gain their 
status due to their extremely low ridership.  Although this issue also applies to the 300-series 
blue night routes on this list, they also warrant further attention based on their overnight nature 
and crime as well as fear of crime.  The daytime equivalents of the 300, 320, 352, 354 were 
subsequently chosen on these grounds.  Rates with high numbers of offences in tandem with high 
rates of offences such as routes 35 and 36 were also further prioritized due to their reappearance 
on this list. 
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Table 12 Criminal and by-law offence data for TTC bus routes (Robinson and Davis, 2016) 
Routes with the highest total number of criminal and by-law offences  
Rank Route Number of 
Offences 
Most Frequent 
Offence 
Other Offences 
1 36 Finch West 322 Fraud  12 assaults of patron  
36 Assaults on operator 
2 35 Jane 260 Fraud 20 assaults of patron 
36 Assaults on operator 
3 32 Eglinton West 164 Operator 
Assault 
Not listed 
4 41 Keele 161 Fraud Not listed 
5 52 Lawrence West 123 Fraud Not listed 
 
Table 13 Criminal and by-law offence data on a per rider basis for TTC bus routes (Robinson and Davis, 2016) 
Routes with the highest number of criminal and by-law offences on a per rider basis 
Rank Route 
Number 
of 
Offences 
Offences Per 
10,000 
Riders (2014 
Ridership) 
Most 
Frequent 
Offence 
Number of Assaults on a 
Patron or Operator  
1 
354 Lawrence 
East 
9 92 Not listed 
1 Assault on patron 
1 Assault on operator 
2 316 Ossington 5 79 Not listed 2 Assaults of an operator 
3 
307 Eglinton 
West 
8 74 Not listed 
1 Assault on patron 
0 Assaults of an operator 
4 
352 Lawrence 
West 
2 63 Not listed Not listed 
5 320 Yonge 54 52 Fraud 
7 Assaults on patron 
13 Assaults on operator 
6 171 Mt.  Dennis 1 44 Not listed 1 Assault on patron 
7 
161 Rogers 
Road 
60 41 Fraud 23 Assaults on operator 
8 35 Jane 260 40 Fraud 
36 Assaults on operator 
20 Assaults of a patron 
9 
139 Finch-Don 
Mills 
8 40 Not listed 3 Assaults on patron 
10 329 Dufferin 5 40 Not listed 
1 Assault on patron 
1 Assault of an operator 
11 
145 Downtown/ 
Humber Bay  
1 40 Not listed Not listed 
12 
300 Bloor-
Danforth 
31 37 Not listed 
5 Assaults on patron 
5 Assaults of an operator 
13 319 Wilson 3 35 Not listed 1 Assault of an operator 
14 36 Finch West 322 36 Fraud  
12 Assaults on patron 
36 Assaults of an 
operator 
15 89 Weston 115 34 
Operator 
Assault 
5 Assaults on patron 
19 Assaults on operator 
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One potential shortcoming of this criterion is the fact that its data is both relatively 
incomplete as well as dated. Additionally, many offences, specifically fraud in the context of 
altered and counterfeit fares, may only be viewed as being signs of disorder at best by passengers 
when compared to more violent or passenger specific crimes such as passenger assaults. 
Choosing routes that provide a cross-section of the city’s land uses, as well as major 
trip generators/attractions.   Toronto’s land uses were also factored into route selection process 
due to their likely influence on ridership and their interactions with adjacent stops.  Considering 
the urban structure of Toronto’s inner suburbs, emphasis was placed on including routes that 
serve large employment, mixed-use, commercial, and residential apartment areas, all of which 
could be considered to be activity generators.   Additionally, some prioritization was given to 
routes that serve major destinations such as Woodbine Racetrack/Casino Woodbine; the Toronto 
Zoo; the Toronto Science Centre; and Toronto Pearson International Airport (located in the 
neighbouring municipality of Mississauga).  Post-secondary facilities were not explicitly chosen 
as an unaffiliated major postsecondary student focussed research project (Student Move TO) was 
in progress at the time of research and writing. 
No significant limitations were associated to the inclusion of varied land uses.  Finer 
detailed, rudimentary, non-scale transects of the land uses surrounding the selected routes were 
created to compensate for the large scale of Figure 11, and are included in Appendix C: Land 
Uses in the Vicinity of the Selected Bus Routes. 
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Figure 11. The bus routes selected for study relative to Toronto’s land-use zoning. 
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Ensuring that chosen routes are distributed between low-ridership and high-
ridership routes.   The final criterion was chosen to gauge whether my research was overly 
focussed on routes of a specific level ridership; as there were merits to including routes at both 
ends of the ridership spectrum.  Lower ridership routes may be presumed to be in lower density 
and traffic areas with limited varieties of human-oriented land uses and may have comparatively 
less service and thus longer waiting times to match.  Taken together, these points of isolation and 
limited activity, and extended periods of waiting in public spaces are potential causes of concern 
from a security perspective.  Conversely, high ridership routes may also be a financially efficient 
target for improvements due to the sheer number of riders that could benefit or be brought into 
problematic interactions with one another.  Some effort was made to ensure that the selected 
routes were somewhat distributed among high and lower ridership routes (Table 14). 
Table 14. Selected routes relative to their typical weekday ridership 
# 
Surface 
Route 
Ranking 
Route 
# 
Route Name 
Typical 
Business Day 
Ridership* 
Area(s) Served 
1. 3 36 Finch West 43,952 North York, Etobicoke 
2. 4 52 Lawrence West 43,882 Old Toronto, North York, Etobicoke 
3. 10 54 Lawrence East 36,277 Old Toronto, East York, Scarborough 
4. 11 35 Jane 32,479 Old Toronto, York, North York 
5. 21 25 Don Mills 39,066 Old Toronto, East York, North York 
6. 25 39 Finch East 23,745 North York, Scarborough 
7. 33 37 Islington 17,087 Etobicoke 
8. 39 129 McCowan North 14,787 Scarborough 
9. 40 86 Scarborough 13,717 Scarborough 
10. 46 16 McCowan 11,279 Scarborough 
11. 58 110 Islington South 9,168 Etobicoke 
12. 67 112 West Mall 7,297 Etobicoke 
13. 86 113 Danforth Rd. 5,272 Old Toronto, Scarborough 
14. 96 97 Yonge 4,175 Old Toronto, North York 
15. 114 15 Evans 2,810 Etobicoke 
*City of Toronto, 2016B  
The low priority of this rationale was due to the difficulty in consistently balancing routes, 
specifically east west routes.  Virtually all of the city’s east-west routes, especially those with 
overnight service, are within the highest ridership routes in the city.  Lower ridership routes also 
appear to be provided with overnight service less frequently, presumably for the purposes of 
efficient resource allocation. 
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Results and Analysis 
Initial Findings 
1,324 bus stops within the city of Toronto’s borders were surveyed during the course of 
this research.  Of these, 1,294 were identified as actually being unique, street-side, or street-
related, stops that were eligible for inclusion in my research and further analysis (Table 15). 
Table 15 The types and number of stops for the selected routes 
Route Actual 
Number of 
Stops Within 
Toronto 
TO 
Road -
side 
Stops 
TO 
Loop 
Station TO 
Special 
Stops Shared By 
A Preceding 
Route (Non-
Unique Stops) 
Total Number of 
Unique, Non-
Station Stops (Total 
Number of Stops) 
15 69 68 0 1 0 0 68 
36 125 121 1 3 0 0 122 
37 139 136 1* 1 2 1 Loop 137 
52 114 111 0 3 0 0 111 
110 41 40* 0 1 0 1 Road 39 
25 109 106 0 3 0 0 106 
35 109 107 0 2 0 0 107 
97 67 65 0 2 0 0 65 
16 67 65 0 2 0 0 65 
39 119 118 0 1 0 0 118 
54 171 166 1 3 1 0 168 
86 91 89 1 1 0 0 90 
113 57 55 0 2 0 0 55 
129 45 44* 0 1 0 1 Road 43 
Totals 1324 1291 3 26 3 3 1294 
* Indicates that one stop is shared with a preceding route in the list 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  94 
 
 
Shelters 
Stops with shelters.   Fewer than 71% (916 of 1294) of the surveyed stops were 
provisioned with their own transit shelter and 17 of these shelters were non-standard or slated to 
be replaced in the coming future.  Of these, one longer-than average CSFP style shelter and 
thirteen to-be-replaced legacy shelters were included for analysis.  The seeming existence of two 
private shelters, respectively at a casino and a commuter rail station, was surprising but was 
explainable in hindsight as they were identified as were both located along private roads and on 
private property.   The final deviating shelter was a large, fully enclosed high-order shelter (86 
WB) associated with the TTC’s Access Hub project for transfers between the conventional and 
paratransit network (TTC, 2018B).  These latter three shelters were excluded from the 
calculations made in this section and will be discussed where appropriate.  Total results are listed 
in Table 16. 
 
Table 16 Shelter information for the selected routes 
Route Shelters Yes No 
Basic Res. Narr. Mini Half Wide Half 
(B) 
Wide 
(B) 
OFL OBL Spec Priv-
ate 
15 12 20 0 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 38 30 
36 22 77 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 104 18 
37 43 31* 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1^ 80 57 
52 41 15 8 1 3 5 0 0 1 0 1 0 75 36 
110 3* 9 0 0 4 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 20 19 
25 29 38 2 0 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 76 30 
35 30 40 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 75 32 
97 25 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 33 32 
16 12 32 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 17 
39 50 37 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 92 26 
54 53 66 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 128 40 
86 23 43 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 70 20 
113 14 15 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 19 
129 31 9 0 0 0* 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 41 2 
Total 388 434 20 3 19 22 6 7 3 10 2 2 916 378 
* Indicates that one stop has been omitted as it is shared with a preceding route in the list 
^ Indicates that one stop has been omitted as it is shared with two of the route’s stops 
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Only two observations were made concerning general shelter characteristics. 
Contemporary models of transit shelters have consistently minimized non-advertisement visual 
barriers (Figure 12a, b) that were previously cited as being concerns (SWAN and METRAC, 
1991).  These shelters also appeared to offer higher interior lighting levels than older legacy 
models possibly due to their use of less opaque roofing materials.   
   
 
Figure 12a, b.   Contemporary CSFP transit shelters (12b) have notably done away with the potentially problematic 
opaque skirting (SWAN and METRAC, 1991) found on previous designs such as the over 50-year old Ancaster model 
(12a.). 
Transit shelters were noted to be the most consistently vandalized TTC surface stop 
element and were subject to graffiti, scratchitti, and postering.  As vandal resistant materials and 
surface treatments are presumably already applied to these elements, these issues may be more 
attributable to maintenance policy rather than design. 
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Advertisements.   Advertisements were the most prolific shelter element encountered 
during surveying.  Just under 65% of all transit shelters had advertisement panels, with all but 
one route having an advertisement rate at or above 50% (Table 17).  This finding was not 
altogether unexpected considering the fact that these elements are vital to the sustainment and 
viability of the CSFP, and other Astral supported city programs. 
Table 17. Shelter advertisement installation information 
Route  Left Back Back Towards 
Street (Front) 
Yes None N/A 
15 68 20 0 2 22 16 30 
36 122 65 1 1 67 37 18 
37 137 54 2 0 56 23* 58 
52 111 62 5 0 67 8 36 
110 39 5* 3 0 8 12 19 
25 106 57 3 2 62 14 30 
35 107 45 2 0 47 28 32 
97 65 26 0 3 29 3 33 
16 65 23 1 0 24 24 17 
39 118 50 1 1 52 40 26 
54 168 86 1 0 87 40 41 
86 90 36 1 0 37 33 20 
113 55 24 0 0 24 12 19 
129 43 22 0 0 22 19* 2 
 1294 575 20 9 604 309 381 
* Indicates that one stop has been omitted as it is shared with a preceding route in the list  
Two potential problems were noted with regards to contemporary shelter advertisements.  
The first of these concerns the placement of certain types of shelters equipped with 
advertisements due to their ability to visual obscure important sections of bus stops.  Non-canopy 
shelters with advertisements should ideally not be sited in locations that are in between a street’s 
sidewalk and vehicle travel area and are in the immediate vicinity of stop markers (Figure 13a).  
Additionally, canopy style shelters with advertisements should not back onto roadways (Figure 
13b) as they appeared to have greater than normal negative effects on pedestrian and transit 
patron visibility.  An additional problem was noted in narrow model shelters as their 
advertisement panel mounts were larger than normal and had a far greater impediment on the 
sightlines of individuals waiting in their vicinity (Figure 14a,b). 
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Figure 13a, b. Shelter advertisements continue serve as visual obstructions for waiting transit patrons and pedestrians, 
especially when placed in close proximity to stop markers (13a) and parallel back facings to streets (13b). 
 
Figure 14a, b. Narrow transit shelters (14a) had notably obtrusive advertisement panels when compared to all other 
contemporary shelters (14b). 
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Ambient Street Lighting 
Lighting evaluations were divided into ambient levels around stop markers and shelter-
specific levels as these two stop elements were not necessarily adjacent to one another.  
Furthermore, even transit shelters comprised of translucent materials were noted as reducing the 
amount of light travelling into their interior and potentially having higher requirements for 
lighting.   Ambient street lighting of transit stop markers was largely sufficient (Table 18), with 
roughly 98% (1272) of stops having ambient light levels that were sufficiently high to identify a 
streetside person’s face from 15m.  Additionally, these stop marker areas did not appear to be 
overlit compared to their surrounding streetscapes.  Of the stops that were not guaranteed to 
provide visibility of an individual’s face from 15m, approximately 2% (20) were deemed to 
passable as they bordered on providing sufficient ambient lighting, while less than 0.2% (2) were 
unsatisfactory.  These results were unsurprising considering the amount of emphasis paid 
towards after-dark lighting levels by both general literature and Toronto-specific texts. 
Table 18 Perceived ambient lighting levels of the selected routes 
Route Total Number of Stops Perceived Lighting Rating 
Fair Passable Dim 
15 68 68 0 0 
36 122 118 4 0 
37 137 134* 3 0 
52 111 110 1 0 
110 39 38* 1 0 
25 106 106 0 0 
35 107 104 2 1 
97 65 65 0 0 
16 65 65 0 0 
39 118 114 4 0 
54 168 168 0 0 
86 90 89 0 1 
113 55 54 1 0 
129 43 39 4* 0 
Total 1294 1272 20 2 
* Indicates that one stop is excluded as it is shared with a preceding route in the list 
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Passable and unsatisfactory stops could be improved via the installation of streetlights 
within 25m of their stop markers (Appendix D: Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).  Six 
passable stops and one unsatisfactory stop are good candidates for streetlight installation as they 
are already within 25m of an existing utility pole of suitable height.  Additionally, five passable 
stops are in close proximity of an existing pole of unsuitable height or perceived carrying 
capacity, that could replaced with a streetlight compatible pole.  Four stops were not in sufficient 
proximity of existing streetlights or poles and would likely be best improved via the erection of 
streetlights. Finally, five stops were in locations that could be improved via either the erection of 
a streetlight or even their relocation to the immediate vicinity of an existing streetlight.  That 
being said, all of these final stops already have sunk costs such as bus bays or bus shelters, which 
could serve as barriers to relocation. 
Limitations associated with ambient lighting observations consisted of foreseen universal 
problems and unforeseen seasonal limitations.  The former category consisted of “fishbowling” 
from the interior lighting of the surveying bus, and was a constant and unavoidable factor that 
may have reduced the perceived lighting of stops.  This limitation was taken into account and 
partially mitigated by the ambient lighting familiarization process.  Moving to the latter category, 
the first limitation consisted of the occasional accumulation of winter related dirt and grime on 
the surveying vehicle’s windows and this further exacerbated fishbowling.  A second limitation 
was the fact that the research was conducted in the absence of foliage on deciduous street trees, 
which may interfere with street-lighting in temperate seasons.  Both of these were unavoidable 
due to the timing of the research. 
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Shelter Specific Lighting 
Shelter specific lighting was gauged on the presence, or absence, of dedicated lighting 
fixtures as opposed to their perceived adequacy.  “Bar” and “rib” style shelter elements were 
occasionally observed as being installed without actual lighting fixtures, and the varied 
placement and facing of shelters meant that their respective totals are maximum values.  31% of 
all city transit shelters have a dedicated lighting fixture and no routes had an individual rate 
exceeding 50% (Table 19).  Five routes have dedicated lighting fixture rates below 30%.  At face 
value, this falls significantly short of the City’s intention for comprehensive shelter lighting, but 
is should be noted that this goal may only be directed to enclosed shelters associated with the 
CSFP  (City of Toronto, n.d.B).  Non-enclosed and to-be-condemned transit shelters, however, 
only make up only slightly more than 7% of the surveyed municipal transit shelters and their 
removal only had a limited effect on dedicated lighting fixture rates.  Even after excluding them, 
the dedicated lighting fixture installation fixture rate for enclosed to-be-retained shelters only 
increased to 33% (Table 20). 
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Table 19 Shelter specific lighting 
Route Total 
Num.  
of 
Stops 
Shelter Lighting Shelter Lighting 
Fixture Types 
Advertisements 
 
Number of Shelters With Illuminated 
Advertisements (Total Number of 
Shelter With Advertisements) 
Yes No N/A Rib SolM SolB Left Back None N/A 
15 68 12 26 30 2 8 2 14 (21) 0 (2) 15 30 
36 122 41 63 18 6 25 10 46 (65) 1 (2) 37 18 
37 137 16* 63 59 3 10* 3 40 (54) 1 (2) 23* 59 
52 111 8 67 36 3 3 2 44 (62) 5 (5) 8 36 
110 39 7 13* 19 0 7 0 4 (6) 2 (3) 11* 19 
25 106 13 63 30 2 8 3 24 (57) 3 (5) 14 30 
35 107 26 49 32 6 18 2 32 (45) 0 (2) 28 32 
97 65 1 31 33 1 0 0 19 (26) 0 (3) 3 33 
16 65 18 30 17 1 16 1 17 (23) 1 (1) 24 17 
39 118 45 47 26 23 15 7 33 (50) 2 (2) 40 26 
54 168 41 86 41 17 20 4 31 (86) 1 (1) 40 41 
86 90 34 36 20 15 15 4 31 (36) 0 (1) 33 20 
113 55 6 30 19 0 5 1 17 (24) 0 (0) 12 19 
129 43 19 22* 2 14 4 1 3 (22) 0 (0) 19* 2 
Total 1294 287 627 382 93 154 40 355 (577) 16 (29) 307 382 
* Indicates that one stop is excluded as it is shared with a preceding route in the list 
Table 20 Shelter lighting fixture installation rates 
Route 
Percentage of 
Shelters 
Equipped With a 
Lighting Fixture 
Percentage of 
Shelters That 
Will Retained 
and are  
Equipped With a 
Lighting Fixture 
15 32% 38% 
36 39% 42% 
37 20% 21% 
52 11% 9% 
110 35% 50% 
25 17% 17% 
35 35% 34% 
97 3% 4% 
16 38% 39% 
39 49% 50% 
54 32% 34% 
86 48% 49% 
113 17% 18% 
129 46% 48% 
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Moving to discussion of the fixtures themselves, “Bar” and “mid” shelter fixtures were 
noted as being motion-sensor operated and effective at clearly illuminating their occupants while 
also not excessively powerful to impair said occupants from observing their surroundings.  By 
direct contrast, the “rib” style fixtures associated with Enseicom model shelters were 
automatically illuminated and consistently noted as having little, if any effect, on interior shelter 
lighting levels.  Although state of repair was not thoroughly analyzed, “rib” fixtures were also 
noted as malfunctioning on a more frequent basis, although this could be due to their age rather 
than design.  A universal finding for shelter lighting fixtures was their usage of white, daylight, 
hue bulbs, which starkly contrasted with the yellow hue cast by Toronto’s streetlights34 (Figure 
15). 
 
Figure 15. Dedicated shelter lighting fixtures cast a sufficient, but distinct hue compared to ambient streetlighting in 
Toronto. 
 
                                                 
34
 Daylight hued streetlights are utilized in Toronto on an extremely limited basis in the city’s LED 
streetlight pilot project areas, none of which are in the vicinity of the surveyed routes.  
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Shelter advertisement panels were also considered as part of a broad, liberal 
interpretation of shelter-specific illumination elements.  Advertisement panels appear to be a 
fairly common shelter element as 76% of the surveyed public transit shelters were equipped with 
at least one advertisement panel (Table 21).  Additionally, advertisement installation rates 
outstripped lighting fixture rates on a route per route basis, with all but one route having a rate 
below 50% and also had a higher average installation rate of 65%.  That being said, only 60% 
(365) of advertisements were actually lit after-dark, and thus roughly 40% of all surveyed transit 
shelters were equipped with a lit advertisement.  Overall, the surveyed routes had an average 
illuminated advertisement installation rate of 28%.    
Table 21  Shelter advertisement and lighted advertisement installation rates 
Route Percentage of 
Shelters 
Equipped 
With 
Advertisement 
Panel(s) 
Percentage of To-Be-
Retained Enclosed 
Shelters Equipped 
With Advertisement 
Panel(s) 
Percentage of 
Shelters Equipped 
With Illuminated 
Advertisement 
Panel(s) 
Percentage of To-Be-
Retained Enclosed 
Shelters Equipped 
With Illuminated 
Advertisement 
Panel(s) 
15 61% 66% 27% 44% 
36 64% 63% 31% 45% 
37 71%* 71% 34% 53% 
52 89% 94% 40% 67% 
110 45%* 42% 23% 25% 
25 82% 83% 26% 35% 
35 63% 60% 31% 46% 
97 91% 93% 37% 68% 
16 50% 52% 27% 39% 
39 57% 57% 28% 38% 
54 69% 69% 20% 25% 
86 53% 54% 23% 31% 
113 67% 73% 32% 52% 
129 54%* 55% 13% 15% 
*Indicates that one stop is excluded as it is shared with a preceding route in the list 
 
 
Shelter advertisements are illuminated using one of two technologies, with fluorescent 
tube backlights being more commonly used and LED screens being less frequently deployed and 
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only found in three shelters.  Although hardwiring serves as the conventional means of powering 
advertisements, there is potential evidence of fluorescent advertisements being powered by the 
same models of solar panel as used for rib and back style light fixtures.  Fluorescent 
advertisements were extremely inconsistent on an overall basis and often were only capable of 
indicating the presence of occupants within a shelter.  LED advertisements, by direct contrast, 
offered consistently high brightness.  That being, said, the sideward facing of advertisements 
meant that were not necessarily able to facilitate facial recognition compared to downward 
facing lighting fixtures.  Additionally, particularly bright advertisements, namely LED adverts, 
reflected off of other shelter panels and seemingly caused a fishbowling effect on the vision of 
shelter occupants (Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16. Example of a fairly well illuminated shelter advertisement. 
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After accounting for shelters that had both illuminated advertisements and dedicated 
fixtures, just under 71% of all of City of transit shelters had shelter-specific lighting.  If all 
existing advertisements were illuminated, almost 94% of all City transit shelters would 
technically have some form of illumination.  (Table 22) Although this situation suggests that the 
City and Astral Media are on-track to satisfying their shelter lighting goal, this would only be in 
a somewhat effective fashion. 
Table 22 Maximum illumination rate of shelters 
Route Shelters 
Equipped 
With Any 
Illumination 
Percentage of 
To-Be-
Retained 
Enclosed 
Shelters That 
Have Any 
Illumination 
Shelters That 
Could Have 
Illumination If 
Advertisements  
Were 
Illuminated 
Percentage of To-
Be-Retained 
Enclosed Shelters 
That Could Have 
Illumination If 
Advertisements  
Were Illuminated 
15 66% 78% 87% 97% 
36 85% 88% 98% 99% 
37 71% 73% 90% 90% 
52 75% 74% 97% 100% 
110 60% 75% 75% 92% 
25 53% 52% 97% 99% 
35 80% 80% 93% 93% 
97 68% 71% 94% 96% 
16 75% 77% 88% 91% 
39 85% 85% 98% 99% 
54 57% 59% 95% 97% 
86 77% 79% 97% 99% 
113 64% 70% 83% 91% 
129 61% 63% 98% 100% 
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Both of the private shelters and the TTC access hub shelter did not have advertisement 
panels and only the latter was equipped with dedicated shelter lighting fixtures.  This shelter was 
well lit enough to the point of bordering on indoor lighting levels and somewhat overlit when 
compared to the undeveloped areas to the rear of the shelter (Figure 17).   As with other shelters 
the lighting fixtures associated with this higher-order shelter emitted a white-hued light that 
starkly contrasted with the yellow-hue of streetlights in Toronto. 
 
Figure 17. Example of a high-order TTC owned access hub shelter. 
A variety of potential courses of action can be carried out for shelter specific lighting.  At 
the very least, the underperformance, if not seeming rampancy of operational issues, of rib lights 
should be investigated and may necessitate the retrofit of Enseicom model shelters with better 
performing fixtures.  Additionally, installation of bar and mid style solar fixtures in shelters must 
be aggressively pursued if the city intends to meet its shelter lighting goal.   
Advertisement panels should also be improved as they are likely to remain as a 
component of transit shelters.  Despite their extremely limited benefits to shelter interior lighting, 
the city and Astral should continue to pursue lighting for existing and future shelter 
advertisements.  Considering the documented problems with providing hardwired power, 
alternative off-grid the solutions such as solar panels and energy storage should be considered if 
they are financially more efficient.   
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Brightness is another issue that should be addressed with advertisement panels.  Contrary 
to face value, lower-medium advertisement brightness may actually more conducive to security 
due to reduced reflections on shelter walls.   Finally, it may be beneficial to convert shelter 
lighting fixtures to yellow-hued light bulbs fixtures in order to reduce their glare when compared 
to conventional streetlights.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  108 
 
 
Shelter Features: Shelter Maps 
Shelter maps appeared to be the second most common transit shelter element, with at 
least 72% (652) of the surveyed transit shelter, and 50% of surveyed TTC stops by extension, 
being equipped with a system map (Table 23).  All but 6 routes had installation rates at or above 
50%, with the lowest rate being just under 25%.  Compared to all other stop elements, state of 
repair appears to be a particularly problematic issue for system shelter maps.  Up to 12% (110) of 
all transit shelters have visible remnants of a previously installed map display, such as grey 
backing surfaces or glue residue or a fallen map display, or were equipped with an empty map 
display (Figure 18a, b).  Although the exact cause of these missing maps is unknown, the 
existence of intact fallen displays appears to suggest natural wear-and-tear as opposed to 
vandalism.  Less frequent maintenance issues included illegal third-party postering, such as 
adhesive posters or advertising handouts slipped into map displays, which obscured maps and the 
continued prevalence of outdated system maps. 
Table 23 Shelter map installation rates 
Route Shelter Map 
Yes Missing No 
15 30 1 7 
36 66 21 17 
37 54* 15 10 
52 57 14 4 
110 15* 3 2 
25 62 8 6 
35 50 18 7 
97 16 6 10 
16 31 8 8 
39 61 19 12 
54 101 14 12 
86 45 17 8 
113 31 3 2 
129 35 3* 4 
 654 146 112 
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At the very least the City of Toronto should explore, or more widely implement, map 
displays that are more securely fixed to shelters.  The prevalence of postering also suggests that 
postering-resistant map display surfaces and better secured map display housings may be 
necessary changes.   
 
Figure 18a, b. Examples of shelter map issues. 
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Shelter Features: Next Vehicle Information System Screens 
Next vehicle information system screens were undoubtedly the least common shelter 
element included in the surveyed surface stops.  Just over 8% (76) of all shelters were equipped 
with a NVISS display, and on a stop-wide basis, less than 6% of all surveyed stops had a NVISS 
(Table 24).  This phenomenon does not appear to be specific to the surveyed routes as the TTC’s 
latest statistics, from 2016, indicated that only 106 shelters were equipped with a next vehicle 
screen (TTC, n.d.C).    NVISS were primarily deployed on high-ridership frequent service routes 
and this is arguably both sound and problematic from a security perspective.  This strategy is 
reasonable due to the ability of these screens to serve the greatest number of riders and the fact 
that their overnight counterparts, with the exception of routes served by the 300 Bloor and 320 
Yonge blue night routes, generally see far less-frequent service.  Less frequent routes, however, 
have the greatest likelihood of passengers being forced to wait for their vehicle at all times of 
day and potentially having less trafficked stops due to their lower ridership base.   
Table 24 Next vehicle information system screen installation rates 
 Next 
Vehicle 
Information 
Screens 
(NVISS) 
Route Yes No 
15 0 38 
36 12 92 
37 1 77* 
52 19 56 
110 0 20* 
25 9 67 
35 9 66 
97 4 28 
16 1 47 
39 4 88 
54 12 115 
86 2 70 
113 0 36 
129 0 41* 
 76 841 
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NVISS were also noted as never being installed in tandem with dedicated shelter lighting 
fixtures.  In the event that these two types of elements are mutually exclusive, due to electrical or 
engineering considerations, this would pose a problem if the stated policy of universal lighting 
fixtures in transit shelters remains in effect. The relevancy of NVISS to security, however, may 
be less important when compared to NVISS’ importance to non-security considerations such as 
passenger experience and convenience.   
NVISS should continue to be deployed in order to further assist transit patrons. Aside 
from continued deployment, the seeming mutual exclusivity of these screens with dedicated 
lighting fixtures may need to be addressed if it is in fact true.  At least one other municipality in 
the Greater Toronto Area, York Region, has conventional transit shelters that sport both next 
vehicle information screens and dedicated lighting fixtures (Figure 19).  The City should explore 
revisions to one or both of the elements in order to ensure compatibility. 
 
Figure 19. York Region’s shelter mounted next vehicle information system screens can be mounted simultaneously with 
shelter lighting fixtures and appear to be powered to some degree by solar technology (top right corner). 
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Stop Markers 
82% (1064) of the surveyed stops had modernized stop markers, with a route average of 
77% (Table 25).  This average was heavily skewed by three routes (110, 97, 86) that largely still 
utilize generic, legacy stop markers that lack route or stop information.  The existence of nine 
stops that were missing stop markers was surprising. A revisit at a later date suggested that this 
removal was temporary as eight of the nine stops were subsequently equipped with 
contemporary markers, although one stop marker, 25 SB at Rochefort, was still inexplicably 
missing. 
Table 25 Stop marker installation rates. 
Route Stop Markers 
 Modern Modified Legacy Legacy None /Missing 
15 63 0 5 0 
36 119 0 1 2 
37 136* 0 1 0 
52 111 0 0 0 
110 1* 0 38 0 
25 105 0 0 1 
35 89 1 16 1 
97 2 1 62 0 
16 64 0 1 0 
39 115 0 0 3 
54 145 0 22 1 
86 15 2 73 0 
113 55 0 0 0 
129 43* 0 0 0 
 1064 4 219 8 
 
No significant recommendations could be offered for stop markers.  If they are 
determined to be useful or necessary, the TTC could divert its advertising of its request program 
to transit shelters, stop placards, or onboard vehicles.   If the contemporary stop marker 
installation process has stalled, legacy markers should be updated to the modified legacy 
standard through next-vehicle prediction and route number decals. 
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Surrounding Land Use 
As noted during the literature review, land use can influence the types of interactions that 
occur in surrounding public space and contribute to perceptions of security (ie: Loukaito-Sideris, 
1999).  Just over 94% of the surveyed surface stops were adjacent to land uses that were either 
designed for or easily capable of accommodating human activity.   The three most common land 
use categories adjacent to the surveyed transit stops were residential (46%), commercial (29%), 
and open uses intended or easily capable of supporting use (5%) (Table 26).  Approximately 6% 
of all surveyed stops were adjacent to land uses that are neither designed for nor particularly 
conducive to human activity.  As noted in  
Table 27, residential detached, low-rise multi-residential and commercial properties are 
the most numerous neighbouring land use subcategories to the surveyed transit stops. 
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Table 26 Stop adjacent land uses. 
Route R C 
O 
Use 
O 
Not 
MCR I VHL COM TRNS Other 
15 32 14 1 1 2 12 2 3 0 1 
36 54 34 5 8 3 4 2 9 2 1 
37 62 32 8 10 4 8 4 5 2 2 
52 54 33 5 0 4 2 5 7 0 1 
110 15 10 5 1 0 6 1 1 0 0 
25 44 30 5 8 6 1 5 4 0 3 
35 59 27 6 5 5 0 0 3 1 1 
97 11 28 1 1 17 0 3 0 4 0 
16 41 11 4 2 1 0 2 3 1 0 
39 75 19 4 4 0 8 0 4 0 4 
54 72 56 8 11 8 0 3 6 1 3 
86 37 40 3 2 2 0 3 2 1 0 
113 12 29 4 1 7 0 0 1 0 1 
129 22 7 3 2 0 4 3 1 0 1 
1294 590 370 62 56 59 45 33 49 12 18 
 
Table 27. The three most common land uses for each land use category 
R C O Use O Not-
use 
MCR I** VHL COM TRNS** 
46% 29% 5% 4% 5% 3% 2% 4% 1% 
RD 
(317*) 
RM  
(93) 
RA3  
(82) 
CR  
(89) 
CS  
(87) 
CG  
(46) 
OP 
(24) 
O  
(20) 
OC  
(8) 
ONR 
(32) 
UT  
(11) 
ON  
(8) 
MCRS 
(22) 
RAC3 
(17) 
MCR 
(13) 
I  
(37) 
ICS  
(6) 
IC  
(2) 
PL  
(17*) 
HWYA 
(6) 
ROW (3) 
SCH 
(27) 
COM 
(10) 
SCHY 
(7) 
 
TTE  
(8) 
GO  
(3) 
TTC  
(1*) 
* Indicates that one repeated value has been omitted 
** These land-use categories only have three subcategories 
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Exterior lighting levels.   Land uses were also anecdotally observed to correlate with a 
property’s after-dark exterior lighting levels as well as their activity levels at various points of 
the day.   Although it may not be a dependable policy (City Planning and Wekerle, 1992), certain 
types of land uses may be conducive and unconducive to security through their contributions to 
ambient lighting conditions.  Average lighting ratings for all land-use subcategories were 
developed on the basis of the existence and brightness of their exterior illumination.  The 
respective benchmarks for lighting were recognition of a person’s silhouette for low-sufficient, 
and facial recognition for sufficient-good.  Observations of the lighting conditions of stop 
adjacent land uses were recorded and are summarized in Table 28. 
Table 28 Rough exterior lighting conditions for each land use subcategory 
Generally Low Inconsistent, Average & Sufficient Generally Good 
O 
OA 
OH 
ON 
ONR 
UT 
UTR 
OG 
OC 
OR* 
DVL 
RD 
RCC 
OP 
UB 
SCHY 
PL 
RM 
CA* 
CF 
 
 
RA 
RS 
CS 
CP 
OR* 
MCR 
RAC 
CPC 
I 
ICS 
IC 
PL 
HWYA 
SCH 
CG 
CA* 
CO 
CR 
CSM 
CM 
CSN 
CL 
CLR 
MCRS 
COC 
SPEC 
PG 
ROW* 
ROWA* 
ROWI 
PSCH 
COM 
COME 
HOSP 
GO 
TTE 
TTC 
110 363 Up to 156 406 Up to 291 
9% 28% Up to 12% 31% Up to 22% 
*These lands uses had significant variation 
The most immediate and unsurprising finding was the fact that outdoor natural recreation 
and utility land uses were poorly lit.  More specifically, these consisted of virtually all O uses, 
schoolyards, and utility corridors.  Two exceptions were noted in the form of one OR (a private 
outdoor tennis facility) and OG uses that had sufficient lighting, albeit only in a small portion of 
their property.  Overall, these uses served as benchmarks for poor lighting.   
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Residential uses were characterized by the fact that their lighting levels had a positive 
correlation to density.  Single detached residential uses (RD and RCC) often had more extreme 
variations but generally poorer lighting, while townhomes and duplexes (RM) had modestly 
more consistent and sufficient lighting.  Residential apartments and seniors residences generally 
had consistent all-around lighting of sufficient brightness.   
Public access, for individuals that neither live nor work at a property, appeared to be 
another determining factor for the sufficiency of a property’s external lighting.  Commercial, 
mixed commercial-residential, and community oriented uses were among the best lit uses that 
were encountered during the survey.  This phenomenon may be attributed to occupiers liability 
and the need to exercise a duty to safeguard a property’s entrants from threats to their well-being 
and their property.  This by extension also appears be applicable to residential apartments and 
seniors residences, where occupiers must maintain communal areas that fall outside the control 
of residents.  The most significant outliers to this trend consisted of places of worship (CF) and 
auto-repair garages (CA), which generally had poorer lighting. By stark contrast, automobile 
dealerships (CA) had lighting levels and directed lighting fixtures that starkly contrasted with 
streetlighting levels and thus overlit. 
Vehicular areas were generally sufficient with the exception of large dedicated or distant 
parking lots (PL).  Roadways (ROW, ROWA, ROWI, HWYA) more consistently had better 
lighting than open areas and low-density residential but were sometimes surpassed by 
commercial and community uses.  Of note for roadways, major arterials appeared to have better 
lighting than highway accesses and lower order collector and local roads. 
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Activity levels.   Relative activity was gauged on the basis of three aspects, intra-traffic, 
inter-traffic, and visible signs of traffic.  Intra-traffic was constituted by visible activity restricted 
to a property’s interior and exterior areas, while inter-traffic refers to be vehicular and pedestrian 
movement to and from a property.  Visible signs of traffic referred to objects that symbolized the 
occupation of space such as parked vehicles and unsupervised possessions.  For discussion 
purposes, days were divided into three periods: daytime (Table 29); evenings (Table 30); and late 
night (Table 31). 
 
Table 29 Relative activity (weekday working hours and daytime) [08:00-19:00] 
Generally Low Inconsistent but 
Sufficient 
Generally High 
OH 
ON 
ONR 
UT 
UB 
DVL* 
O 
OA 
OC 
RD 
RCC 
CF 
SPEC 
UTR 
OG 
RM 
RA 
RS 
CL 
RAC 
OP 
OR 
I 
ICS 
IC 
PL 
PG 
 DVL* 
SCH 
SCHY 
CG 
CA 
CO 
CR 
CS 
CSM 
CM 
CP 
CSN 
CLR 
MCR 
MCRS 
CPC 
COC 
ROW 
HWYA 
ROWA 
ROWI 
PSCH 
COM 
COME 
HOSP 
GO 
TTE 
TTC 
*These land uses had significant variation 
Table 30 Relative activity (weekday evening) [19:00-22:00] 
Generally Low Inconsistently 
Sufficient 
Generally High 
OA 
OH 
ON 
ONR 
UT 
UB 
SCH 
DVL* 
CO 
CP 
CF 
CPC 
SPEC 
O 
UTR 
OG 
OC 
DVL* 
SCHY 
RD 
RCC 
CA 
COC 
OP 
OR 
I 
ICS 
IC 
PL 
PG 
RM 
RA 
RS 
CL 
RAC 
PSCH 
COM 
COME 
CG 
CR 
CS 
CSM 
CM 
CSN 
CLR 
MCR 
MCRS 
ROW 
HWYA 
ROWA 
ROWI 
HOSP 
GO 
TTE 
TTC 
*These land uses had significant variation 
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Table 31 Relative activity (weekday late night) [22:00-00:00] 
Generally Low Inconsistently 
Sufficient 
Generally High 
CA 
CO 
CR* 
CP 
CF 
CM 
COC 
CPC 
SPEC 
All O 
UB 
DVL 
SCH 
SCHY 
COM 
PL 
PG 
RCC 
RS 
I 
ICS 
IC 
 
RD 
RM 
CSM 
CS 
ROW 
ROWA 
ROWI 
 
MCR 
MCRS 
RA 
CL 
CLR 
RAC 
ROW* 
ROWA* 
HWYA* 
PSCH 
COME 
 
 
 
CG 
CR* 
CSN 
HOSP 
TTE 
TTC 
*These land uses had significant variation 
The most immediate finding was the fact that open land uses and utility land uses had the 
least overall activity during the course of a standard weekday.  This finding for late-night 
observations was not particularly surprising due to both the documented lack of lighting in most 
of these spaces as well as the fact that overnight usage of parks is criminalized by Toronto’s 
municipal code (Toronto Municipal Code, 2004). 
Moving on, the nature of the activity that was observed on a property appeared to be 
strongly linked to their physical design.  Properties that were directly accessible from ground 
level access points were more likely to have all three types of activity through internal activity in 
interior and exterior spaces, traffic with surrounding spaces, and markers of activity.  Higher-
density uses that had accesses mapped along interior corridors, such as malls and communal 
hallways in both apartments and offices, were more likely to lack internal activity in their 
exterior spaces.  Parked vehicles were often the most visible marker of activity at a property. 
Residential uses were characterized by their somewhat unstable but constant activity 
throughout the day.  This could be linked to conventional working hours that generally left these 
uses less occupied during weekday daytime periods. 
Commercial properties were one of the most animated weekday land uses.  Four subtypes 
were noted as being activity generators throughout the day: most gas stations (CG); restaurants, 
particularly quick-service restaurants (part of CR); lodging establishments (CL and CLR): and 
the city’s sole casino (CSN).   The vast majority of these uses were 24-hour operations and they 
addressed basic functions such as food, accommodation, and mobility.  Standard commercial 
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uses (CR in both standalone and MCR variants), and commercial automotive (CA) uses were 
observed as having somewhat reduced hours of activity that generally subsided during the 
evening period.  Additionally, indoor malls were noted as having earlier cut-offs in activity, 
generally before the late evening, when compared to outdoor facing commercial strips and 
commercial strip malls.  Professional offices and employment based offices often experienced 
reduced activity outside of conventional working hours (09:00-17:00).  Places of worship were 
characterized by the fact that only a limited number of them saw activity, and this appeared to be 
concentrated in short bursts. 
Industrial land uses were generally less active than commercial uses during the daytime 
and were similar to employment and professional offices as they often also experienced a drop in 
activity following standard working hours.  That being said, a portion of industrial uses were still 
active during the evening and a smaller portion also appeared to be active during the late night 
period. 
The categorization of the outstanding land uses was fairly straightforward and reasonable 
although a select few exceptions bear some further explanation.  Development parcels (DVL) 
were not necessarily undergoing construction at the time of surveying, with some appearing to 
still be locked in the application process, and thus experienced significant differences in activity.  
The amount of activity associated with vehicle right of ways also had differing levels of activity 
that correlated with their relative capacity and role they play in the road network, with local 
roads having less activity and vice-versa. 
Similarly to lighting, density appeared to have positive correlation with activity for 
residential and commercial properties.  While this phenomenon operated in a blanket fashion for 
all higher density residential uses throughout the day, higher density commercial properties were 
more contingent on the nature of their use. 
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Summary.   Two general themes were noted in the above comparison of lighting levels 
and activity.  The first of these was the fact that exterior lighting is not necessarily synonymous 
with activity.  This was evidenced by observations that open uses and most commercial uses 
often had drastically different lighting levels yet equally low activity during the late night period.  
Conversely, low-density residential uses had low-medium average exterior lighting levels but 
generally had signs of internal activity.  Secondly, density appears to have a positive correlation 
to lighting and activity levels, with higher density generally equating to more lighting and more 
activity. 
Returning to theoretical discussion from earlier sections of this paper, lighting has been 
criticized as being incorrectly viewed as a preventative measure for general crime as opposed to 
property crime.  This discrepancy, however, may stem from the fact that lighting often is a 
necessary component for actual usage of a space after-dark and serves as an important fear 
reduction measure.  At the very least, lighting can draw attention to a space and serve as a means 
of making  a means of increasing the visibility of both legitimate and illegitimate uses.  Moving 
to practical matters, lighting from private properties may contribute, and sometimes supplement 
ambient street light levels and aid users of public spaces such as pedestrians on public streets.  
There are limits, however, as excessively higher powered or misdirected lighting may interfere 
with the night vision of pedestrians and casual observers of public space.   
Similarly to lighting, activity appears to be another popular security measure that has also 
been questioned on the grounds of its actual, universal effectiveness against crime.  At its most 
basic level activity is sought after for its potential introduction of interveners or witnesses that 
may frustrate offenders and also serve as sources of help for victims.  Conversely, this 
concentration of individuals may also provide more opportunities for other forms of crime such 
as theft as well as conflicts that may escalate into expressive assaults or quality of life issues.   
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Prior to providing recommendations, several limitations associated with this analysis 
must be stated.  At the most basic level, analysis was based on the combined averages of both 
extremely short-term and qualitative observations.  Additionally, it must be stressed that the bulk 
of these observations occurred in fairly conventional suburban environments and may thus differ 
from higher density environments.  The emphasis placed on adjacent land uses also means that 
these observations do not account for non-adjacent surrounding land uses, land uses across the 
street from bus stops, and the right of way of which the bus stop is on the streetside of. 
Without making sweeping statements, certain land uses may not be the best neighbours 
for waiting transit patrons.  Open and utility uses are the most obvious example due to their 
limited lighting, activity and visual barriers.  Schoolyards and dedicated parking facilities are 
also candidates due to their limited night time activity.  Finally, car dealerships often bordered on 
or were overlit and had poor night time activity and may be problematic.    
165 stops were identified as having potentially problematic adjacent land uses, with 86 of 
these stops being improvable via relocations or removals.  80 of these stops could be relocated a 
short distance away, either to the opposite side of their respective intersection or further on to 
another midblock location, to be adjacent to a better lit or more active land use.  Breaking this 
figure down with regards to their expected benefits, 44 of these movements would be marginal, 
30 of these movements could have noticeable changes and 7 could offer significant improvement 
(Appendix D: Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).  13 of these movements, 12 marginal; 
and 1 noticeable, could introduce potentially problematic side effects on the basis of adjacent 
property facing or buffering and would require further analysis. A further 5 stops, 3 marginal; 1 
noticeable; and 1 significant, appear to be potentially good candidates for removal as they do not 
have suitable alternative sites nearby and were within 500m of an existing stop that could, or be 
made to, take over their function (Appendix D: Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).  3 of 
these removals, 2 marginal and 1 noticeable, require further review as they could have 
problematic side effects.  79 stops did not have any nearby suitable alternative sites and are 
better oriented for spatial measures or policing and are listed in Appendix E: Unrectifiable 
Potentially Problematic Stops. 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  122 
 
 
Several considerations, both public and private, must be made with respect to any attempt 
at implementation.  These locations will likely have to be reviewed in order to determine their 
compliance with transportation services standards, impact on transit service, and in order to 
prioritize resources on stops of problematic and concerning stops.  Additionally, property owners 
adjacent to proposed stops will have to be consulted for concerns and general feedback and to 
determine whether the benefits of these moves will outweigh their costs.  In particular, changes 
would entail increased contact between transit services, transit users, and properties that are 
hoped to have diffusive, positive benefits on the operation, and surveillance, of transit stops.   
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Interface with Surrounding Land Use: Facing 
A land use’s relative orientation can also affect the levels of lighting, casual surveillance, 
and activity afforded to and around its surroundings.  Roughly 44% of all stops were in front of 
their adjacent property, 29% were on a side face, and 13% were to the rear of their respective 
property (Table 32).  Additionally approximately 14% of the surveyed stops were beside land 
uses that didn’t have a specific facing, or structures for that matter.   
Table 32 The facing of general stop adjacent land uses 
Route R C MCR I  COM O-
USE 
O VHL TRNS OTHE
R 
Totals 
F 142 165 40 14 7 n/a n/a n/a 4 0 372 
FC 100 71 9 7 8 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 195 
S 170 71 9 9 11 n/a n/a n/a 8 1 281 
SC 57 27 0 8 13 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 105 
B 99 17 0 4 2 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 120 
BC 22 19 1 3 1 n/a n/a n/a 0 0 46 
N/A n/a n/a n/a n/a 7 64 56 32 0 17 174 
Totals 590 370 59 45 49 64 55 32 12 18  
 
Front facings were relatively straightforward to categorize and were based on the 
existence of a main, or publicly, accessible entrance.  Front facings were the most common 
facing, fronting 44% of the surveyed stops.  These facings were consistently the most active 
facing with regards to inter-traffic through their entrance, and intra-traffic as seen through their 
often high number of windows.  These faces were also generally better lit at night.  Some land 
uses such as commercial malls and strip malls, and high density uses with commercial podiums 
had multiple, or separate entrances and had more than one front facing.   
Side facings and back facings proved to be somewhat more difficult than expected to 
differentiate.  Side facings were conceived to be either perpendicular to the main entrance or 
possess a secondary entrance on an extensively multifaceted building. Back facings were 
presumed to be directly opposite of a building’s front facing and house servicing areas.  These 
distinctions, particularly for back facings, proved to not always be true in real life and some 
discretion was exercised for labelling building faces.  Low-to-high rise commercial and 
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residential buildings, for instance, often had similar faces and side and back facings were 
assigned on the basis of structural elements.   
Side facings were the second most common stop facing and were found along roughly 
29% of the surveyed stops.  These facings often had the least inter-traffic due to their lack of 
entry ways but nevertheless often had a respectable number of windows compared to back faces 
and generally had sufficient lighting.  Certain land uses such as (M)C(R)S and I(C)(S), and 
residential uses on rare occasion, had blank side facades.  Additionally, residential uses often had 
poor or no lighting for side faces that lacked public or common accessways.   
Back facings surprisingly were not only the least common facing, at 13%, but also had 
the greatest amount of variation.  Six different “tiers” of backs differentiated by their 
combinations of entryways, viewing-height windows, and servicing areas were encountered ( 
Table 33).  Windows, entryways, and service areas anecdotally appeared to be superior in 
both lighting and activity when compared to covered façade openings and blank facades.    As 
with side and front faces, low density residential back faces generally had drastically inferior 
lighting, and higher density residential uses had somewhat inferior lighting.  Certain land uses 
such as CSN, SPEC, COME, HOSP were excluded due to their extremely small sample size. 
 
Table 33 Types of back facings by land use subcategory 
Back Facings 
with Usable 
Windows and 
Entryway 
Back Facings 
with Usable 
Windows, 
Entryways, and 
Servicing Areas 
Back Facings 
With Usable 
Windows 
Back Facings 
with Entryways 
and Servicing 
Areas 
Back Facings 
with Blank 
Facades (With 
or Without 
Opaque 
Emergency 
Exits) 
Back Facings 
with Covered 
Windows 
and 
Entryways 
RD 
RCC 
RM 
RA(C) 
RS 
CO(C) 
CP(C) 
CL(R) 
MCR(S) 
CF CG 
CR* 
CM 
I(C)(S) 
COM* 
CR* 
CM 
COM 
CF* 
COM* 
CR* 
CS 
CSM 
*These land uses had significant variation 
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Figure 20 An example of a isolated stop at the back corner of a commercial mall. 
One final observation was the apparent correlation between the facing of certain types of 
land use and the installation of barriers.  In the case of low-density residential, barriers were only 
absent in siting arrangements where a stop was adjacent to the front of a RD property and was 
only slightly reduced for side facings.  Barriers, aside from HPMS, were also anecdotally 
observed as being less frequently installed or having access ways when installed along front 
facings. 
The majority of surface stops in Toronto are sited beside land uses with potentially 
conducive interfaces. Aside from offering a blanket recommendation that attention be paid to 
stops with back facings to adjacent land use and stops with documented concerns and problems, 
it may be useful to pay attention to back facings with entryways and servicing areas, blank 
facades, and covered facades.  Approximately 42 stops were located at the rear face of their 
adjacent property, with 21 of these stops having alternative sites for stops (Appendix D: 
Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops) and the remainder not being easily rectifiable 
(Appendix E: Unrectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).    
Interface with Surrounding Land Use: Barriers 
Just under 58% (749) of all surveyed stops had some form of barrier between them and 
their adjacent land use (Table 34).  The three most common barriers were HPMSs at 28% of all 
barriers (213), HMs at 22% of all barriers (167), and HMSs at 20% of all barriers (148).  While 
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all barriers could impair mobility, 77% (579) of all barriers, could potentially impair the lines of 
sight between individuals at bus stops and occupants of the adjacent property.   
Table 34 Breakdown of barriers between surface stops and their adjacent land uses 
H
M
 
H
M
P
S
 
H
P
M
S
 
H
M
S
 
S
M
 
S
P
M
S
 
S
M
S
 
C
M
 
C
M
P
S
 
C
P
M
S
 
C
M
S
 
N
o
 B
ar
ri
er
s 
167 54 213 148 3 54 11 0 59 2 38 545 
 
Barriers were noted to have effects depending on their inherent characteristics.  Barriers 
with definite obstructions to movement and sight, such as HMS; SMS; and CMS, were largely 
perceived to have the strongest negative effect on pedestrians.  Conversely, HPMS were not 
always in effect and technically were the only form of barrier that was directly linked to, or a 
generator, of activity (Figure 21).  Soft barriers made up of plants were also considered to be a 
potentially problematic in light of concerns in the literature regarding the permeable but partially 
opaque nature of foliage.   
 
Figure 21. Parking areas were noted as creating potential movement and sight barriers for pedestrians and patrons 
waiting at transit stops but also housing activity. 
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The contexts in which barriers are installed also appear to have ramifications on their 
performance and perception.  Negative side effects were fairly easily noticed and more prevalent.  
ADJ barriers were noted as having a significant ability to limit the mobility of pedestrians, 
especially in areas with limited sidewalk width and buffering from their adjacent street.  
Adjacent and slightly buffered placements for sight-obscuring hard barriers were also noted as 
being particularly effective at fully obscuring pedestrians from their adjacent properties.  The 
same hold true for soft-foliage based sight obscuring barriers, which could be feared as being 
potential hiding spots for motivated offenders.  Positive ramifications were also noted in certain 
deployments of barriers.  Hard barriers appeared to buffer pedestrians from potentially 
threatening or fearful spaces such as poorly lit sections or isolated sections of adjacent properties, 
and open areas not designed for use (Figure 22).  Additionally, these barriers were anecdotally 
perceived to actually have small positive effect, possibly due to light reflection, on ambient 
lighting when placed in close proximity to sidewalks.   
 
Figure 22. Hard barriers may serve as buffers between transit patrons and potentially insecure surroundings. 
While the design and implementation of barriers on private and public land uses are not 
the focus of this paper, some basic recommendations may be made for surface stop siting.  Hard 
barriers that only have limited or no negative effects on sight lines are preferable and barriers 
with at least some buffering are preferable.  If visually obscuring and soft barriers are necessary, 
they may be best deployed at buffered to setback distances (Figure 23).   
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Figure 23. Hard-movement-sight barriers often created a visibly isolated interface for transit stops. 
Land use appears to be a supplementary means of identifying existing and proposed stop 
locations that may require more attention and investment due to their potential isolation or 
restriction via barriers.  Certain types of barriers appear to be correlated with both general 
categories (zones) and specific uses (zone categories).  Residential zones accounted for the 
largest share of all barriers, at 52% (390) and also had the greatest barrier installation rate at 66% 
(590).  Particularly problematic examples of barriers that were generally found in R zone areas 
include 87% (129) of HMS barriers, 89% (34) of CMS barriers, and 66% of CMPS barriers.  
Moving to specific uses, HMS and CMS were primarily found in RD areas (Figure 24), while 
CMPS were somewhat better distributed but often found in RD and RA3 areas.  Commercial 
land uses were the both the second largest owner of barriers, accounting for 28% (210) of all 
barriers, and had the second highest installation rate at 57% (370).  That being said, 69% (145) of 
their barriers were of the HPMS barriers and as such may be less problematic from a security 
perspective.  All other land uses accounted for a relatively smaller percentage of barriers and also 
had substantially lower installation rates and are not particularly noteworthy.   
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Figure 24a, b Examples of combination-movement-sight barriers found on residential-detached properties. 
Notwithstanding their potential negative side effects, it must be borne in mind that 
barriers have utility value for the properties on which they are installed.  At their most basic level, 
all barriers may serve as access control measures for both pedestrians and vehicular traffic and 
may serve aesthetic purposes.  Level-grade sight impeding measures go further in their ability to 
provide visual privacy, serve as a buffer for noise pollution
35
, or to provide screening for utility 
areas and other potentially unappealing areas.  Sight impeding measures based on differences in 
grade, such as retaining walls and slopes, may be an unavoidable effect of geography or be 
associated with slightly or fully below grade structures or sections of a property.  As such, 
barriers may not feasibly be fully removed on a comprehensive basis. 
Barriers are arguably the most fluid of all the examined land use aspects and it may be 
questionably valuable to focus on stops possessing these elements.  Basic recommendations on 
stop placement and planning will be offered in lieu of a comprehensive list of stops that may 
benefit from reworking.  These recommendations will firstly be from an as-of-right perspective 
where stops are sited in isolation of changes to the urban fabric.  Overall, lower-density 
residential areas may be presumed to require further attention for site placement if barriers, 
particularly sight-blocking barriers, are to be avoided.  If stops are to be sited near these areas, 
                                                 
35
 Based on an instance where sound-barrier walls were erected along a section of right-of-way and its  
respective stop. 
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they would benefit from being placed adjacent to the front or front-side area of a property due to 
the decreased likelihood of sight obstructing barriers and barriers.  Although HPMS barriers 
were the second most common barrier, their characteristics suggest that they may not be the most 
problematic type of barrier and the same may likewise be said for commercial areas.  Sufficiently 
buffered hard movement barriers in the vicinity of poorly lit, utilized, or generally inducing 
spaces may also be fairly benign or even somewhat beneficial.  Soft-foliage based barriers were 
not particularly correlated with any specific use but did not appear to be particularly conducive 
to perceived security.  Land use planning controls, while in a separate sphere, could also mitigate 
the occurrence of barriered facings by ensuring that front and other active frontages do not face 
public streets or higher order streets.   
 
Interface with Surrounding Land Use: Distance 
Buffering was the final aspect of land use that was considered to impact a property’s 
interface with its surrounding public spaces and surface transit stops by extension.  The 
classification process deviated somewhat during the surveying phase, with discretion being used 
to account for the design and level of activity in physical setbacks, the scale of the property’s 
main uses, and the existence of barriers.  Land such as open-not-for-use that had no clearly 
demarcated activity areas or structures were generally counted as adjacent unless they possessed 
a visible maintained buffer of grass or man-made material.  In respective order, buffered setbacks 
were the most common physical setback at 39% (508); followed by slightly buffered at 34% 
(442); adjacent at 15% (191) and setback at 12% (153) (Table 35).   
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Table 35 Breakdown of buffering between transit stops and their adjacent land uses 
Route Distance 
Adjacent Slightly Buffered Buffered Set back 
15 8 36 16 8 
36 12 44 49 17 
37 14 51 58 14 
52 8 75 24 4 
110 6 19 12 2 
25 19 30 38 19 
35 25 19 42 21 
97 34 8 12 11 
16 7 24 32 2 
39 8 45 53 12 
54 28 30 86 24 
86 5 29 49 7 
113 16 25 13 1 
129 1 8 24 10 
 191 443 508 152 
 
Distance setbacks were host to a number of relatively surprising negative findings.  The 
most obvious observation was the fact that setback bufferings could be unconducive to security 
as they could impair both hearing and sight between the property’s occupants and pedestrians.  
Additionally, certain properties such as residential high-rise buildings more frequently had 
perimeters enclosed with barriers the further they were from their surrounding streets, with 
setback examples being the most notable offenders.  Extremely close proximity was surprisingly 
also noted to not be without its faults.  Adjacent multi-unit high-rises provided sightlines 
between pedestrians and a comparatively limited number of units when compared to slightly or 
fully buffered properties.  There also does not appear to be a correlation between proximity and 
facing for single and multi-unit low-rise commercial operations, with a notable number of these 
uses actually having worse interfaces as they would turn their backs onto their adjacent street in 
order to better cater to their rear parking areas (Figure 25).  Finally, adjacent and slightly 
buffered land uses were noted to occasionally have situations where their occupants would 
encroach on surrounding public space on extremely temporary or longer-duration periods of time.  
Although this phenomenon could be fairly benign, the consulted literature appeared to indicate 
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that this appropriation of space could border on being as anti-social or potentially threatening 
behaviour depending on the individuals involved and the observer. 
 
Figure 25. Proximity does not always translate to good interfaces as this slightly buffered commercial building turns its 
back to its adjacent stop. 
The respective benefits of land use facings were relatively straightforward.  Setback 
properties did not appear to offer any tangible benefits with the exception of natural not-for-use 
open areas.  In these instances setbacks and buffering actually appeared to be beneficial to 
perceived security as they helped to increase a pedestrian’s awareness space as they isolated 
pedestrians from visually obscuring foliage and geographical features and also allowed for 
further light distribution.  Barring the aforementioned possible issues, adjacent bufferings were 
generally perceived to reduce feelings of isolation and thus be a security conducive interface 
(Figure 26). Close bufferings could theoretically also bring stops and their surrounding public 
realm into the monitoring area of CCTV cameras on private properties and this phenomenon 
persisted would likely diminish with increased buffering.  Although buffering was primarily 
based on perceived distance, barriers (specifically sight obscuring ones) were found to influence 
the perceived distances of the land uses beyond them.   
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Figure 26. Land uses with little buffering, such as this high-rise residential apartment with ground floor retail, provide 
casual surveillance opportunities and activities in close proximity with surface transit stops. 
114 stops were identified as being potentially problematic.  12 of these stops could be 
improved through a short distance relocation to another property in their vicinity, with 8 of these 
possibly producing noticeable changes and 4 of these producing marginal changes (Appendix D: 
Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).  26 stops could be provided with a better interface at 
the cost of a less-conducive land use or facing, with 4 producing noticeable changes and 22 
producing marginal changes. 1 stop could be removed and replaced by a nearby existing stop 
with noticeable improvement (Appendix D: Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops).   75 stops 
could not be improved via relocation and potentially require further analysis and investment 
(Appendix E: Unrectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops). 
Observed Occurrences 
A limited number of incidents that either were a documented cause of concern or could 
be viewed as potentially threatening were encountered during surveying (Table 36).  For the 
purposes of this study, discussion will be limited to general comments.  Incivilities made up the 
bulk of observed occurrences and may the most common form of negative interaction 
encountered on the TTC.  The utility of prohibitory signage in discouraging petty offences 
appears to be somewhat questionable as certain acts such as illegal entry at terminals and 
smoking occurred in the immediate vicinity of their respective prohibitory signs.  In these 
instances, active policing by police officers, peace officers, or other employees may be the only 
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solution.  Only four of the encountered scenarios, being aggressive panhandling; touching; 
unwanted attention; and smoking, had interactions between patrons and an a clear basis for 
passengers to become involved. 
Table 36 Observed occurrences 
Scenario Frequency Potential Class of Incident 
Group of youths loudly talking about 
firearms, gangs, and gang activity in a 
favourable light 
Once Potentially  threatening behaviour 
Disturbing the peace/nuisance behaviour 
Escalated fare dispute and verbal exchange 
between an operator and a boarding patron 
which resulted in the calling of transit 
enforcement/police 
Once Fare Dispute 
Common operator assault 
Potentially threatening behaviour 
A patron boarding from the rear door of a 
bus and being ordered off the bus 
Once Fare evasion 
Nuisance Behaviour 
Patrons illegally boarding from the rear 
doors 
Several Fare evasion 
Nuisance Behaviour 
A pair of youths aggressively panhandling 
by the stairs of Kennedy Station 
(obstructing path during solicitation) 
Once Panhandling 
Potentially threatening behaviour 
Nuisance Behaviour 
Loud broadcasts of music Numerous  Nuisance Behaviour 
Scenario Frequency Potential Class of Incident 
Passengers  illegally entering and exiting 
bus terminals 
Numerous Fare Evasion 
TTC Bylaw 
A passenger being ordered off a bus due to 
their previous illegal entry into the bus 
terminal 
Once Fare Evasion 
Passengers seating in manners that resulted 
in them touching or nearly touching the 
seated passenger in front of them 
Several Nuisance Behaviour 
Male passenger talking to themselves, 
purposely moving to stand beside a female 
passenger and carrying out an increasingly 
one-sided conversation with said female 
passenger 
Once Interfere with enjoyment 
Passengers illegally smoking at bus 
terminals 
Numerous Smoking on TTC property 
Medium-large groups of youths 
loitering/waiting in the vicinity of stops 
Numerous Potentially  threatening behaviour 
Disturbing the peace/nuisance behaviour 
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Remedial Measures for Potentially Problematic Stops 
175 stops were deemed to remain as potential problems due to a lack of nearby security 
conducive or technically feasible alternative sites.  These stops could benefit from further 
evaluation in order to determine whether they suffer from actual or perceived insecurity 
presently from the perspective of their users or from the perspective of a reasonable observer or 
occupant.  If they require improvement, one of three spatial elements should be explored based 
on the nature of their insecurity, the amount of traffic they experience, and available funding. 
Surface stops, at the time of this study, were one of the only locations on the TTC that 
consistently lacked any form of security oriented PSA.  Although these PSAs could theoretically 
help to deter crime, they presumably  would be more reasonably effective at better equipping 
passengers on the best course of action for mitigating and responding to security issues that they 
either experience first-hand or witness.  An example of this form of PSA was the TTC’s “This is 
Where” campaign which was aggressively advertised onboard vehicles using advertisements and 
decals from a period of roughly 2017-2018 (Figure 27a).   Shelter decals have also been used to 
provide information regarding personal security on transit as part of a long-term campaign in the 
neighbouring municipality of York Region (Figure 27b).  Shelter PSAs could utilize decals 
similar to York Region and could potentially use a share of the free shelter advertisement panels 
provided to the City by Astral Media.  Their conspicuity to the general public could potentially 
serve as negative, but arguably necessary, advertising, and the recommendation should be 
subject to further analysis.   As noted earlier, these measures may have limited impact or 
perceived value but they may be the least cost-intensive and most expedient upgrade for 
potentially problematic as well as general surface stops. 
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Figure 27a, b. The TTC’s security PSA campaign,  as shown on one of its various advertisements onboard a TTC bus 
( 27a), is solely absent at surface transit stops.  Additionally, basic security information, such as but not necessarily 
including prohibitions in this instance at York Region bus stop (27b), is also absent at surface stops. 
In the context of remedial measures, alarms and other assistance summoning measures 
primarily refer to public payphones and two-intercom systems. These are relatively higher-order 
solutions and may only be appropriate for stops with more pressing issues.  The basis for these 
elements is their identification in previous studies as being conducive to security (METRAC, 
1989, SWAN and METRAC, 1991) and their standard-issue nature at the designated waiting 
areas at TTC rapid transit stations.  Emergency two-way intercoms are also used outside the city, 
particularly at and in the vicinity of higher-order transit stops and terminals (Figure 29).  Both of 
these elements could be considered as already being supplanted by cellular phones, particularly 
after the introduction of the TTC’s harassment and crime reporting phone app.  That being said, 
these measures may still be able to have a significant effect on the perceived security of surface 
transit stops.  Notable barriers to deployment, however, will have to be overcome with 
payphones needing to be justifiable expenses by their operating company and emergency alarms 
requiring higher expenditures and potential logistical issues. 
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Figure 28.  Payphones may useful amenities or reassuring sights to passengers at isolated stops. 
 
Figure 29a, b. Emergency assistance measures, such as these installations at a bus rapid transit stop (29a) and at a 
walkway linking sections of an intermodal hub (29b) in York Region.  
CCTV cameras are the final security element that could be deployed but may be 
restricted to extenuating circumstances or private areas due to their drawbacks.  Currently, 
unmonitored CCTV cameras are deployed on the interior of most TTC vehicles and increasingly 
on the exterior of newer surface vehicles.   Monitored CCTV is restricted to rapid transit stations, 
and the commission’s new fleet of streetcars as an operator aid.  CCTV cameras appear to be 
deployed in a similar manner in neighbouring municipalities, and were also noted at higher-order 
surface transit stops such as BRT stops in York Region (Figure 30).  
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Figure 30. This security camera (top of image) is one of several cameras that are standard equipment at York Region’s 
bus rapid transit stops . 
 CCTV surveillance of surface stops may be significantly more complicated due to their 
nature as general public spaces as opposed to public transit properties.  As noted previously, this 
measure may only be reasonable in circumstances where all other reasonable options have been 
exhausted in order to satisfy Ontario’s privacy regulations.   Additionally, this measure may be 
more closely with the Toronto’s police service and their policing of the city, themselves having 
only used unmonitored cameras with a now-finished pilot project.   CCTV cameras installed on 
the basis of occupier’s liability could theoretically also contribute to security but are also 
presumed as having to satisfy privacy regulations.  Overall, security cameras may be deployed at 
some point in the future but they are not as recommended as the two previous remedial measures. 
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Conclusion 
Security oriented spatial planning in Toronto’s suburban transit stops continues to be 
oriented towards the facilitation of patron awareness, visibility, and fear reduction.  Personal 
security continues to be a challenge affecting the Toronto Transit Commission and its patrons.  
Transit specific elements have undergone noticeable, albeit not yet comprehensively 
implemented, changes.  Significant advancements and improvements have been made to surface 
stop elements but they are being rolled out in a comparatively more piecemeal manner.   
Additionally, it is somewhat questionable as to whether progress has been made in evaluating 
and accounting for neighbouring land use interfaces in the siting of stops.  Further research with 
transit users, their advocates, and stakeholders should be carried out in order to analyze the 
contemporary effectiveness of elements and potential shortcomings that may be improved. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Reported Offences on the TTC (2016, 2017A, 2018) 
Act Target Act 2015 2016 2017 
Assault 
Against 
patron 
Aggravated Assault-Patron 2 / / 
Assault Bodily Harm or W/Weapon-Patron 13 22 / 
Common Assault - Patron 148 225 / 
Against 
employee 
Assault Peace Officer 6 8 15 
Assault with Intent to Resist Arrest / / 1 
Assault Bodily Harm or W/Weapon-Operator 1 2 / 
Assault to Resist Arrest / 1 1 
Common Assault - Misc. Employee 1 1 / 
Common Assault - Operator 123 75 / 
Common Assault - Route Supervisor 3 1 / 
Unknown 
victim 
Assault 239 385 442 
Aggravated Assault 1 1 1 
Assault Bodily Harm 1 1 18 
Assault with a weapon 10 30 / 
Common Assault / / 182 
Consensual Fight / / 1 
Fight on TTC Property 1 / / 
Uttering Threats / 170 180 
Uttering Threats To Cause Death or Bodily 
Harm 
22 / / 
Non-Capital Murder / 1 / 
Uttering Threats(Threatening for 2015 and 2016) 82 106 45 
Sexual 
assault 
Unknown 
victim 
Sexual Assault 6 16 14 
Sexual Assault 63 72 94 
Sexual 
crimes 
Unknown 
victim 
Voyeurism 2 2 2 
Potential Sex Offender / 1 / 
Indecent Act 16 34 19 
Voyeurism 6 3 2 
Robbery 
Patron 
Armed Robbery Patron 1 1 / 
Attempt Robbery Patron 5 5 / 
Attempt Armed Robbery Patron / 2 / 
Robbery Patron 4 12 / 
Robbery Patron - Mugging 7 4 / 
Robbery Patron - Swarming 9 7 / 
Employee Robbery Employee / 2 / 
Unknown 
victim 
Attempt Robbery 1 2 / 
Robbery / / 32 
Robbery 6 9 15 
Attempted Robbery / / 7 
(continued) 
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Reported Offences on the TTC (continued) 
Act Target Act 2015 2016 2017 
Criminal 
harass- 
ment 
Unknown 
victim 
Contact with a Vulnerable Person / 1 / 
Criminal Harassment 9 3 5 
Criminal Harassment 2 1 3 
Theft and 
fraud 
Patron 
Attempt Purse Snatch 1 / / 
Purse Snatch 2 1 / 
Theft from Patron <$5k 17 28 / 
Theft from Purse <$5k 5 3 / 
Theft of Bicycles / / 2 
Pickpocket <$5k 2 4 / 
Employee Theft from Employee <$5k 13 5 / 
Unknown 
victim 
Fraud Transportation / 1 1 
Fraud Transportation 393(3) 4 11 10 
Attempt Fraud  (under$5k for 2016) 2 17 1 
Theft / / 43 
Theft >$5k / 1 1 
Theft <$5k 87 94 89 
Theft <$5k Attempt / / 1 
Attempted Fraud 1 12 4 
Attempt Theft 1 / 5 
Fraud 145 235 635 
Employee 
related 
Employee 
Obstruct Peace Officer 3 2 1 
Fail to Comply with Instructions of a Proper 
Authority 
/ 1 / 
Fail to Comply 2 6 6 
Substance related 
LLA Intoxicated in Public Place 16 39 49 
LLA Open Container 2 1 3 
Possession for the Purposes of Trafficking 1 / / 
Possession of Cocaine / 1 1 
Possession of Hashish Under 1 Gram / 2 / 
Possession of Marihuana under 30g 1 / 1 
Possession of Methamphetamine / / 1 
Smoke on TTC Property 1 / / 
Pos. of Cocaine 1 1 1 
Possession Controlled Drugs 1 / / 
Possession of Narcotic 1 / / 
Trafficking Controlled Drugs / 1 / 
 
(continued) 
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Reported Offences on the TTC (continued) 
Act Target 2015 2016 2017 
Vandalism 
Arson: Damage to Property 1 / 1 
Mischief 188 59 121 
Mischief <$5k 15 107 134 
Mischief >$5k 2 5 2 
Mischief Endangering Life / 1 1 
Possession of Coin-operated Device Breaking 
instrument 
3 4 12 
Arson 4 1 / 
Mischief 209 205 142 
Poss. Instrmts Break Into Coin Op Device 1 / / 
Disturbance related 
TPA Fail to Leave When Directed 13 13 17 
Cause a Disturbance 18 3 8 
Common Nuisance / / 1 
Cause a Disturbance 5 6 5 
Fail to Control Animal On Transit System / 1 / 
Improper Language 1 / / 
Behave in Indecent (Offensive) Manner on TTC 
Property 
/ 1 2 
Interfere with Ordinary Enjoyment of Transit System 6 2 1 
Cause Disturbance 60 101 80 
Indecent Exposure 14 22 12 
Fare related 
Bylaw Enter Premises Where Entry is Prohibited 10 5 5 
Bylaw Fare Related 11 16 85 
Panhandling Unauthorized Solicit 27 16 26 
Misc. quality of life crimes 
Urinating / 1 2 
TPA Engage in Prohibited Activity on Premises 20 5 7 
Fail to Comply With Posted Sign 9 3 4 
Lying Down on TTC Property 1 / 1 
Travel on Exterior of Vehicle / 1 / 
Unauthorized Use of Transit System Equipment / / 1 
Personate Peace Officer 1 / / 
General threats (weapons 
and non- specific 
Possession of a Weapon for Dangerous Purpose 2 2 13 
Possession of Offensive Weapon Dangerous to the 
Public Peace 
1 / / 
Non-specific Threat / 1 / 
Possession of Prohibited Weapon / / 1 
Bomb threat 6 9 6 
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Appendix B: Toronto Transit Commission System Map (TTC, 2018) 
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Appendix C: Land Uses in the Vicinity of the Selected Bus Routes 
 
The following images (of unknown but relatively consistent scale) in Appendix C were created by the Author in QGIS using Toronto 
Zoning By-Law Shapefile, City of Toronto Centreline Shapefile, TTC Subway Shapefile and Google Earth. 
The shaded buffer around routes represents areas that are within a roughly 200m direct line distance of the respective route 
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15 Evans 
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16 McCowan 
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25 Don Mills 
 
 
 
(continued) 
 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  165 
 
 
25 Don Mills (continued)  
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35 Jane 
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36 Finch West 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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36 Finch West (continued)  
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37 Islington 
 
 
(continued)  
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37 Islington (continued) “A” branch 
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37 Islington (continued) “B” branch 
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39 Finch East 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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39  Finch East (continued)“A” Branch 
 
 
39 Finch East (continued)“B” Branch 
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52 Lawrence West 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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52 Lawrence West (continued) 
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54 Lawrence East 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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54 Lawrence East (continued)  
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86 Scarborough 
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97 Yonge 
 
 
 
  
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  180 
 
 
110 Islington South 
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112 West Mall 
 
 
(continued) 
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112 West Mall (continued)  
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113 Danforth 
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129 McCowan 
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Appendix D: Rectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops 
Ambient Streetlighting Changes 
Change 
Available 
existing 
pole? 
Sunk Costs 
Bay/ 
Shelter 
Rating Route Stop Comments 
Install Yes Yes DIM 35 SB 
Alliance 
Avenue 
Nearest pole offset across 
street 30m away. 
Install Yes Yes PASS. 35 NB 
Lambton 
Avenue 
North Side 
Nearest streetlight offset 
over 25m away. 
Install Yes Yes PASS. 37 NB 
Allenby 
Avenue 
Nearest pole sameside 25m 
away. 
Install Yes No PASS. 37 SB 
Riverbank 
Drive 
Nearest pole same side 
roughly 25m away, in evenly 
spaced 1-none-1 gap. 
Install Yes Yes PASS. 39 WB 
Finchdene 
Square West 
Side 
Nearest poles offset across 
street roughly 20-25m away. 
Install Yes Yes PASS. 39 EB 
Scottfield 
Drive 
Nearest pole offset across 
street 25m away. 
Install Yes Yes PASS. 110 NB 
Bering 
Avenue 
North Side 
Nearest pole offset across 
street 20m away. 
Erect No Yes PASS. 36 EB 
Kipling 
Avenue 
Random gap in opposite pole 
spacing, nearest opposite 
pole more/about 25m away, 
same side pole just under 
25m away. 
Erect No Yes PASS. 37A NB 
Queens Plate 
Drive at 
Janda Court 
Nearest pole across street 
roughly 25m away. 
Erect Yes Yes PASS. 39 WB 
Winlock 
Park 
Nearest pole offset across 
street 20m+ away. 
Erect Yes Yes PASS. 52 EB 
Glen Rush 
Boulevard 
Nearest poles offset across 
street 20m+ away. 
Erect No No DIM 86 WB 
Kingston 
Road at 
Beechgrove 
Drive 
Roughly between 35m 
spaced median streetlight 
poles. 
Erect Yes Yes PASS. 129 NB 
Kenhatch 
Boulevard 
Streetlight pole directly 
across over 25m away, no 
available height poles in 
vicinity of stop but traffic 
light pole could be swapped. 
(continued) 
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Ambient Streetlighting Changes (continued) 
Change 
Available 
existing 
pole? 
Sunk Costs 
Bay/ 
Shelter 
Rating Route Stop Comments 
Erect Yes Yes PASS. 129 NB 
Sandhurst 
Circle South 
Streetlight pole directly 
across over 25m away, no 
available height poles in 
vicinity of stop but traffic 
light pole could be swapped. 
Erect Yes Yes PASS. 129 SB 
Commander 
Boulevard 
Nearest pole offset across 
street by 20m+. 
Erect No Yes PASS. 129 SB 
2050 
McCowan 
Road 
Nearest pole offset across 
street 25m away. 
Relocate/ 
Erect 
No Yes PASS. 36 WB 
1150 Finch 
Avenue West 
Middle of evenly spaced 
same-side poles but 
recessed, roughly 25m, 
shelter far but near pole. 
Relocate/ 
Erect 
No Yes PASS. 36 WB 
Albion Road 
South Side 
Pole directly across street 
but 7 lanes of traffic and 
median. 
Relocate/ 
Erect 
No Yes PASS. 36 EB 
Ancona 
Street 
In between same side poles, 
25m+ one, just 20-25 other. 
Relocate/ 
Erect 
No Yes PASS. 39 WB 
Old Finch 
Avenue at 
Baffin Court 
Streetlight pole angled 
across at/ just under 25m 
away. 
Relocate/ 
Erect 
No Yes PASS. 113EB 
Danforth 
Road at 
Landry 
Avenue 
Streetlight poles angled 
across at/just under 25m 
away No poles nearby. 
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Land Use Change 
 
 (continued) 
 
 
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
25 SB 
Duncan Mills 
Rd (South) 
Yes Move Sig. 
Farside, 
ONR/ON 
Nearside, 
RA3/RA3 
Yes 
36 WB Dufferin St Yes Move 
Sig. Nearside, 
O/ON 
Farside, 
CPO2/CG 
Yes 
37B NB Elmhurst Dr Yes Move 
Sig. Nearside, 
UT,CF 
Farside, 
RA2/CR 
Yes 
37B SB Golfdown Dr Yes Move 
Sig. Nearside, 
UT/RD 
Farside, 
RA1/RD 
Yes 
39B WB 
Old Finch Ave 
at Baffin Crt 
(West) 
Yes Move 
Sig. 
Far-farside, 
ONR/ON 
Farside, 
RD/ON 
Yes 
52 WB 
Dixon Rd at 
Carlingview Dr 
Yes Move 
Sig. Nearside, 
PL/CL 
Farside, 
CLR PL/CL 
Yes 
52 EB 
Hickory Tree 
Rd 
Yes Move 
Sig. Far-nearside, 
OP/ONR PL 
Farside,  
RD/RD 
Yes 
54 EB 
Victoria Park 
Ave (East) 
Yes Remove 
Sig. Nearside,  
OC/CR 
/ Yes 
16 NB 
Danforth Rd at 
Savarin St 
Yes Move Notic. 
Far-farside, 
O/RA2 
Nearside, 
RD/RA2 
Yes 
16 NB St Andrews Rd Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
UT/UT 
Farside, 
UT/RD 
No 
25 NB 
Graydon Hall 
Dr 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
ONR/ONR 
Farside, 
RA3/RA3 
Yes 
25 NB 
Sheppard Ave 
East (North) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Far-farside, 
PG/CG 
Nearside, 
RA3/RM 
No 
25 SB Finch Ave East Yes Move 
Notic. Farside, 
OP/RA3 
Nearside, 
CG/RA3 
Yes 
25 SB York Mills Rd Yes Remove 
Notic. Nearside, 
ONR/ONR 
/ Yes 
35 NB 
Lambton Ave 
(North) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Farside, 
ON/SCHL 
Nearside, 
CS/RD 
Yes 
35 SB Troutbrooke Dr Yes Move 
Notic. Far-nearside, 
O/O 
Farside, 
ON/RM 
Yes 
35 SB Haney Ave Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
OP/RA2 
Farside,  
MCRS/RA2 
Yes 
36 WB Wilmington Ave Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
ONR/RD 
Farside, 
ONR/RA2 
Yes 
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Land Use Change (continued) 
 
(continued) 
 
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
36 EB Beecroft Rd Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
OP/RD 
Farside, 
RA3/RAC3 
No 
37A NB 
Queens Plate Dr 
West at Janda 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
PL/CM PL 
Farside,  
RM/PL 
No 
39 EB 
Bridletowne 
Circle West 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
OH/CF 
Farside, 
RA2/CS 
Yes 
39 EB Warden Ave Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
OC/PL 
Farside, 
CP1/RA2 
Yes 
39B EB Neilson Rd Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
O/CF 
Farside, 
RM/CO1 
Yes 
52 WB Varna Dr (West) Yes Move 
Notic. Farside,  
SCHY/RD 
Nearside, 
RM/RD 
Yes 
52 WB Jane St Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
CA/CSM 
Farside, 
CSM/CS 
Yes 
52 WB 
Dixon Rd at St 
Phillips Rd 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
OC/CF 
Farside, 
OP/OC 
Yes 
52 EB Brookview Dr Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
SCHY/RA1 
Farside,  
RD/RA1 
Yes 
54 WB 
Opposite 4125 
Lawrence Ave 
East 
Yes Move 
Notic. 
Midblock, 
OP/CP1 
Midblock 
(West) 
RA2/CO1 
Yes 
54 WB 
Brimley Rd 
(West) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Farside, 
UT/UT 
Nearside,  
UTR/CR 
Yes 
54 WB Gooderham Dr Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
CA/CSM 
Farside, 
RS2,CSM 
Yes 
54 EB 1125 Leslie St Yes Move 
Notic. Midblock, 
ON/ONR 
Midblock, 
CO2/ONR 
Yes 
54 EB 
Bellamy Rd 
North 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
CA/CS 
Farside, 
CS/CG 
Yes 
86 EB 
Eglinton Ave at 
Midland Ave 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
CA/CSM PL 
Farside, 
RA1/CSM 
Yes 
110 NB Titan Rd Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
UT/CSM PL 
Farside, 
UT/CR 
Yes 
113 WB 
Kennedy Rd at 
Kenmark Blvd 
Yes Move 
Notic. Far-nearside, 
UT/CS 
Nearside, 
RA2/CS 
Yes 
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Land Use Change (continued) 
 
(continued) 
 
 
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
113 EB 
Danforth Rd at 
Warden Ave 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
CA/CA 
Farside, 
CA/RD 
Yes 
113 EB 
375 Danforth 
Rd 
Yes Move 
Notic. Midblock, 
 
Nearside, 
CA/RD 
Yes 
129 NB McNicoll Ave Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
UTR/UTR 
Farside, 
RD/RD 
Yes 
25 NB 
Leith Hill Rd 
(North) 
Yes Move Marg. 
Farside, 
PL/RA2 
Nearside, 
PG/RA3 
Yes 
25 NB Bedle Ave Yes Move 
Marg. Far-nearside, 
UT/UT 
Nearside,  
OR/RD 
Yes 
35 NB Weston Rd Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/CR 
Farside, 
RCC/CS 
Yes 
35 NB 
Troutbrooke Dr 
(North) 
Yes Move 
Marg. Farside, 
ONR 
PL/ONR 
Nearside, 
RM/O 
Yes 
35 NB 
Driftwood Ave 
(North) 
Yes Move 
Marg. Farside, 
SCHY/RA2 
Nearside, 
COM/RA2 
Yes 
35 NB Hullmar Dr Yes Move 
Marg. Far-nearside, 
OA/RM 
Farside, 
OA/RA2 
Yes 
36 WB Alness St Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/CS 
Farside, 
CS/CM 
Yes 
36 EB 
Humberwood 
Blvd at 
Morningstar Dr 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
ONR/OP 
Farside, 
ONR/RM 
Yes 
36 EB 
Humberwood 
Blvd at Upper 
Humber Dr 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Far-nearside, 
ONR/RD 
Far-farside, 
PL/RD 
Yes 
36 EB 
Humberwood 
Blvd at Topbank 
Dr (North) 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Farside, 
ONR/RD 
Nearside, 
SCHY/RD 
Yes 
37 NB 
Fairway Rd 
(North) 
Yes Move 
Marg. Farside, 
OP/RD 
Nearside, 
RD/RD 
No 
37B NB Golfdown Dr Yes Move 
Marg. Far nearside, 
O/RA1 
Nearside, 
RD/ 
Yes 
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Land Use Change (continued) 
 
(continued) 
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
37B NB Finch Ave West Yes Move 
Marg. Far nearside, 
ONR 
Farside, 
OP/ONR 
Yes 
37A SB 
Queens Plate Dr 
East at Rexdale 
Yes Remove 
Marg. Far-nearside, 
O/PL 
/ No 
37A SB 
Rexdale Blvd at 
Precision Rd 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/CA 
Farside, 
CA/Ca 
Yes 
37A SB 
Rexdale Blvd at 
Brydon Dr 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
PL/CO1 
Farside, 
CA/IC 
Yes 
37 SB 
Eglinton Ave 
West 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
ON/SMS 
(OA) 
Farside, 
SCH/ON 
Yes 
37 SB 
Princess 
Margaret Blvd 
(South) 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Farside,  
O/RD 
Nearside, 
RD/RD 
Yes 
52 WB 
Scarlett Rd at 
Lockheed Blvd 
North 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Farside, 
OP/RD 
Far-farside, 
RD/RD 
Yes 
52 WB 
Opposite 327 
Dixon Rd 
Yes Move 
Marg.  
OR/RA2 
Far-farside, 
RA3/RA2 
Yes 
54 Eb Brimley Rd Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
UTR/UTR 
Farside, 
CR/UTR 
Yes 
54 EB 
Morningside 
Ave 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
PL/CSM 
Farside, 
RA2/CR 
Yes 
54 EB Stotts Terr Yes Move 
Marg. Far-nearside, 
ON/RM 
Nearside, 
ON/RM 
No 
86 WB 
Meadowvale Rd 
at Sheppard Ave 
East 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
RM/ON 
Farside, 
CG/RD 
Yes 
86 WB 
Kingston Rd at 
Amiens Rd 
(West) 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Farside, 
SCHY/CS 
Far-nearside, 
CA/RM 
Yes 
86 WB 
Kingston Rd at 
Old Kingston 
Rd 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
CA/RD 
Farside, 
OP/CS 
Yes 
86 EB 
Kingston Rd at 
Galloway Rd 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/CA 
Farside, 
RA3/RM 
Yes 
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Land Use Change (continued) 
 
 
(continued) 
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
97 NB Mill St Yes Move 
Marg. Far-nearside, 
OR/ON 
Farside, 
CR/RA2 
Yes 
97 NB 
William Carson 
Cres 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
PL/CR 
Farside, 
COC2/CF 
Yes 
97 SB 5800 Yonge St Yes Move 
Marg. Farside, 
UT/RA3 
Nearside, 
CO1/CP2 
Yes 
110 SB 
 Birmingham St 
at Eighth St 
Yes Remove 
Marg. Nearside, 
OP/DVL 
/ No 
113 WB 
Kennedy Rd at 
St Clair Ave 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
OC/RA1 
Farside, 
CS/CG 
Yes 
113 EB 
Danforth Ave at 
Emmott Ave 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/CF 
Farside, 
CPC1/MCR 
Yes 
113 EB 
Danforth Ave at 
Elward Blvd 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
CA/MCR 
Farside, 
CA/MCR 
Yes 
37 NB 
Cordova Ave 
(North) 
Potent. Move 
Marg. Far-farside, 
OP/RA2 
Nearside, 
RA2/RA2 
Yes 
37A NB 
Rexdale Ave at 
Humberwood 
Blvd 
Potent. Move Notic. 
Nearside, 
ON/OA 
Farside, 
ON/CS 
Yes 
16 SB 
St Clair Ave 
East at 
Birchmount Rd 
(West) 
Potent. Move 
Marg. 
Far-farside, 
ONR/CS 
Nearside, 
ONR/CG 
Yes 
25 NB McNicoll Ave Potent. Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
OP/RM 
Far-farside, 
RD/ RM 
Yes 
25 SB 
Pape Ave at 
Hopedale Ave 
(West) 
Potent. Move 
Marg. 
Farside, 
OP/RD 
Nearside, 
RD/RD 
Yes 
36 WB Sentinel Rd Potent. Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
OP/CG 
Farside, 
RA3/RA1 
Yes 
36 WB 
Islington Ave 
(West) 
Potent. Move 
Marg. Farside, 
ONR/ON 
Nearside, 
OP/ONR 
Yes 
37 SB Milady Rd Potent. Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
OP/RD 
Far-farside, 
RD/RD 
Yes 
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  192 
 
 
Land Use Change (continued) 
 
  
Route 
(Direction) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Adjacent LU/ 
Opposite LU 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
39 WB 
Old Finch at 
Morningside 
Ave 
Potent. Move 
Marg. 
Far-nearside, 
ONR/RD 
Near/farside, 
ONR/RD 
No 
54 EB 
Prudential Dr 
(East) 
Potent. Move 
Marg. Farside, 
OH/RAC3 
PL 
Nearside, 
ROW/CS 
No 
54 EB 
Opposite 5450 
Lawrence Ave 
East 
Potent. Remove 
Marg. 
Midblock, 
OP/PL 
/ No 
86 EB 
Highland Creek 
Overpass 
Potent. Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
OP/CS PL 
Far-farside, 
OP/RD 
Yes 
110 SB 
Garnett James 
Rd at Twelfth St 
(East) 
Potent. Remove 
Marg. 
Far farside 
OP/RM 
/ Yes 
129 NB 
4325 McCowan 
Rd 
Potent. Move 
Marg. 
Midblock 
OP/RD 
Midblock 
(North) 
CM/Rd 
Yes 
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Land Use Facing Changes  
Route 
Stop 
(side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
facing  
land use 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering Land 
Use 
Sunk 
Costs 
16 SB 
Danforth at 
Eglinton 
Yes 
Move, 
Consolidate 
with 
Horton 
Blvd 
Sig. 
Nearside, 
Back 
corner CR 
Farside,  
Front CR 
Yes 
97SB 
Florence 
Avenue 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
Back 
corner CG 
Far nearside, 
Side CG 
No 
15 EB 
Islington 
Avenue 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
Back 
corner I 
Far farside,  
Side CO1 
Yes 
16 SB 
Ellesmere Road 
(South) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Far far 
farside, 
Back CG 
Farside, 
Front CG 
Yes 
25 SB Mallard Road Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
Back CS 
Far nearside, 
Side CS 
Yes 
35 NB 
Yewtree 
Boulevard 
(North ) 
Yes Move 
Notic. 
Farside, 
Back CM 
Nearside, 
Front Corner 
RA 
Yes 
35 SB 
William Cragg 
Drive 
Yes Move 
Notic. Far 
nearside, 
Back 
corner CR 
Nearside, Front 
CS 
Yes 
36 WB 
Highway 27 
West Side 
Yes Move 
Notic. Far farside, 
Back  CR 
Far nearside,. 
Front CSM 
Yes 
36 WB 
Woodbine 
Downs 
Boulevard 
Yes Move 
Notic. 
Nearside, 
Back CS 
Farside, Front 
of IC 
Yes 
36 EB 
Tobermory 
Drive 
Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
Back 
corner 
COM 
Far far farside, 
Side COM 
Yes 
37 NB Dixon Road Yes Move 
Notic. 
Far farside, 
Back CG 
Far nearside, 
Front corner 
CSM PL 
Yes 
39 WB Ravel Road Yes Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
Back CF 
Farside, 
Front CSM 
Yes 
54 EB 
Greencedar 
Circuit (West) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Farside, 
Back CR 
Far nearside, 
Side RA2 
Yes 
(continued) 
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Land Use Facing Changes (continued) 
Route 
Stop 
(side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
facing  
land use 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering Land 
Use 
Sunk 
Costs 
16 SB 
Danforth Road 
at Horton 
Boulevard 
Yes 
Move, 
consolidate 
with 
Eglinton 
Ave 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
Back/Side  
CR 
Far nearside, 
Front CR 
No 
97 NB 
Cummer 
Avenue 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
Back 
corner CS 
Far far nearside, 
Side CS 
No 
25 NB 
Gateway 
Boulevard 
North 
Yes Move 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
Back CS 
Far nearside, 
Front CR 
Yes 
54 WB Tower Drive Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
Back 
corner CS 
Farside,  
Front of CS 
Yes 
129 NB 
Milner Avenue 
(North) 
Yes Move 
Marg. Far farside, 
Back I 
Nearside, 
Side CR 
Yes 
129 SB 
Sheppard 
Avenue 
Yes Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
Back 
corner CG 
Far nearside, 
Side CG 
Yes 
25 SB 
Lawrence 
Avenue East 
Potent. Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
Back 
corner CR 
Farside, Front 
COC2 
Yes 
39B 
WB 
5910 Finch 
Avenue East 
Potent. Move 
Marg. 
Nearside, 
Back I 
Farside,  
Back I 
Opp. Side RD 
Yes 
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Land Use Distance 
(continued) 
Route 
(Direct.) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering  
Land Use 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering Land 
Use 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
25 NB 
Overlea Blvd 
(East) 
Yes Move 
Notic. Farside,  
SBK CM 
Far-Nearside, 
BUFF CM 
Yes 
35 NB 
Grandravine 
Dr 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK RA3 
Farside,  
BUFF RA2 
Yes 
35 NB Shoreham Dr 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK RA1 
Farside, BUFF 
RA2 
Yes 
36 EB Oakdale Rd 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK CP2 
Farside, SLB 
CP1 
Yes 
36 EB Jane St (East) 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Farside,  
SBK CM 
Nearside,  
BUFF CG 
Yes 
39 WB 
Birchmount 
Rd 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK RA3 
Farside, BUFF 
RA2 
Yes 
54 EB Cherryhill Ave 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK RD 
Farside,  
BUFF RD 
No 
97SB Elmhurst Ave 
Yes 
Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK CO2 
Farside,  
ADJ CS 
Yes 
25 NB Deerford Rd 
Yes 
Move Marg. 
Nearside,  
SBK RD 
Farside, BUFF 
RA2 
Yes 
52 WB 
Dixon Rd at 
Chetta Pl 
Yes 
Move 
Marg. Nearside,  
SBK RA3 
Far-farside, 
SLB RA3 
Yes 
54 EB Orton Park Rd 
Yes 
Move 
Marg. Nearside,  
SBK RM 
Far-farside,  
BUFF RA1 
Yes 
86 EB 
Kingston Rd at 
Franklin Ave 
Yes 
Move 
Marg. Nearside,  
SBK RD 
Far-Farside,  
BUFF RD 
No 
36 WB Westmore Dr Potential Move Notic.. 
Nearside,  
SBK CG 
Far-farside, 
BUFF CSM 
Yes 
37A SB 
Queens Plate 
Dr West at 
Rexdale Blvd 
(North) 
Potential Move 
Notic. 
Far-farside,  
SBK CM 
Farside,  
BUFF CG 
Yes 
54 WB Don Mills Rd Potential Move 
Notic. Nearside, 
SBK RA2 
Farside, BUFF 
CR 
Yes 
54 EB 
Victoria Park 
Ave 
Potential 
Remove
Replace  
Notic. 
Nearside, 
SBK RA3 
Existing Far-
farside,  
BUFF CS 
Yes 
129 SB Pitfield Rd Potential Move 
Notic. Nearside,  
SBK RA3 
Far Farside, 
SLB CG 
Yes 
16 SB 
Lawrence Ave 
E 
Potential Move Marg. 
Nearside, 
SBK HOSP 
Farside, BUFF 
CG 
Yes 
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Land Use Distance Change (continued) 
 
(continued) 
Route 
(Direct.) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering  
Land Use 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering Land 
Use 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
25NB 
Fairview Mall 
Dr (North) 
Potential Move 
Marg. Farside, 
SBK RA3 
Nearside, 
BUFF CP1 
Yes 
25 NB 
Finch Ave 
East 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RA3 
Farside, SLB 
CG 
Yes 
25 NB 
Cliffwood Rd 
(North) 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside,  
SBK SCH 
Farside,  
SBK CS PL 
No 
35 NB Trethewey Dr Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CS 
Far-nearside, 
BUFF CS 
Yes 
35 SB 
Eddystone 
Ave 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RA2 
Farside,  
SLB CA 
Yes 
35 SB 
Sheppard Ave 
West 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CM 
Far-nearside, 
SBK CL 
Yes 
36 WB 
Duncanwoods 
Dr 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RA2 
Farside, BUFF 
RD 
Yes 
36 EB 
Wilmington 
Ave 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RA2 
Far-nearside, 
RA2 
Yes 
37A NB 
Rexdale Blvd 
at Kipling Ave 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CR 
Farside, SLB 
CR 
Yes 
37 SB 
1738 Islington 
Ave 
Potential Move 
Marg. 
Midblock, 
SBK SCH 
Midblock 
south,  
BUFF COME 
Yes 
39 EB Bayview Ave Potential Move 
Marg. Far-
nearside, 
SBK RM 
Far farside,  
SLB RM 
Yes 
52 EB 
Dixon Rd at 
Skyway Ave 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CL 
Far-nearside, 
SBK CL 
Yes 
54 WB 
Overture Rd 
(West) 
Potential Move 
Marg. Farside, 
SBK RA3 
Far-nearside, 
BUFF CR 
Yes 
54 WB Centennial Rd Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RM 
Farside, SLB 
RD 
Yes 
54 WB 
Scarborough 
Golf Club Rd 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CS 
Far-nearside, 
BUFF CS 
Yes 
54 WB 
The Donway 
West 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK CR 
Farside, BUFF 
CM 
Yes 
86 WB 
Beechgrove Dr 
(West) 
Potential Move 
Marg. Nearside, 
SBK RD 
Far-nearside, 
BUFF RD 
Yes 
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Land Use Distance (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Route 
(Direct.) 
Stop 
(Side of 
intersection) 
Rating Recom. 
Impact 
of 
Action 
Existing 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering  
Land Use 
Recom. 
Condition 
 
Location, 
Buffering Land 
Use 
Sunk 
Costs 
(Shelter/ 
Bay) 
86 WB 
Eglinton Ave 
at Bellamy Rd 
South 
Potential Move Small 
Nearside, 
SBK RA3 
Far-farside, 
SLB CR 
Yes 
86 EB 
Kingston Rd at 
Beechgrove Dr 
Potential Move Small 
Nearside,  
SBK CS 
Farside,  
SLB RM 
No 
97NB 
Sheppard Ave 
East 
Potential Move Small 
Nearside,  
SBK RAC3 
Farside,  
ADJ COC3 
No 
97 SB 
Park Home 
Ave 
Potential Move Small 
Nearside, 
SBK RAC3 
Farside,  
ADJ CO3 
Yes 
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Appendix E: Unrectifiable Potentially Problematic Stops 
Land Use 
Route Stop (side of intersection) Land Use 
15 WB 400 Evans Avenue CA 
16 SB Danforht Road at Midland Avenue CA 
37A NB Rexdale Blvd at Precision Road CA 
37A SB Queens Plate Drive East (East Side) CA 
39 WB Markham Road CA 
86 EB Eglinton Avenue at Barbados Boulevard CA 
86 EB Kingston Road at Celeste Drive CA 
113 WB Danforth Road at Hubert Avenue CA 
113 EB Danforth Avenue at Leyton Avenue CA 
129 SB 2050 McCowan Road CA 
25 SB Seneca Hill Drive O 
35 NB Steeles Avenue West at Murray Ross Parkway (East Side) O 
36 WB Norfinch Drive O 
52 WB Sage Avenue O 
54 WB Starspray Loop O 
54 EB Walkway to Ridgewood Road O 
86 WB Meadowvale/Sheppard Loop O 
129 NB Steeles Avenue East O 
15 WB Horner Avenue OC 
16 SB St Clair Avenue East at Marsh Road OC 
16 SB St Clair Avenue East at North Woodrow Boulevard OC 
113 WB Opposite 519 Kennedy Road OC 
113 WB Kennedy Road at Summer Drive (South Side) OC 
25 NB Opposite 1450 Don Mills Road OG 
35 SB Sheppard Avenue West (South Side) OG 
35 SB Giltspur Drive OG 
37 NB The Kingsway (North Side) OG 
35 NB Wilson Avenue (North Side) OH 
129 NB Nugget Avenue OH 
129 SB Kenhatch Boulevard OH 
35 SB Eglinton Avenue West (South Side) ON 
37 NB Eglinton Avenue West ON 
54 WB Opposite Walkway to Ridgewood Road ON 
86 EB Lawson Road at Highway 2A Overpass ON 
15 EB Opposite 810 Royal York Road ONR 
25 NB York Mills Road ONR 
25 NB Moatfield Drive ONR 
25 SB Moatfield Drive South Side ONR 
25 SB Millwood Road at Overlea Boulevard South Side ONR 
(continued) 
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Land Use (continued) 
Route Stop (side of intersection) Land Use 
35 NB Steeles Avenue West ONR 
36 WB Opposite 685 Finch Avenue West ONR 
36 EB Islington Avenue (East Side) ONR 
39 EB Opposite 636 Finch Avenue East ONR 
37A NB Humberwood Boulevard at Hullrick Drive South ONR 
37B SB Finch Avenue West ONR 
37B SB Sandhill Drive ONR 
37B SB Barker Avenue ONR 
54 WB Leslie Street at Overland Drive ONR 
54 WB Opposite 1105 Leslie Street ONR 
54 WB Opposite 1103 Leslie Street ONR 
54 WB Leslie Street at Eglinton Avenue East ONR 
54 EB Meadowvale Road East Side ONR 
36 WB Humberline Drive at Viewcrest Circle OP 
39 WB Yonge Street OP 
54 WB Meadowvale Road OP 
110 NB Judson Street (North Side) OP 
110 SB Garnett Janes Road at Coin Street OP 
110 SB Ninth Street at Birmingham Street OP 
37 NB Dundas Street West OR 
25 NB Sheppard Avenue East (North Side) PG 
25NB Leith Hill Road (North Side) PG 
15 WB The West Mall at Sherway Drive PL 
16 SB Triton Road at McCowan Road PL 
16 SB Town Centre Court PL 
25 SB Rochefort Drive PL 
25 SB Gateway Boulevard PL 
36 EB Yonge Street PL 
37A NB Queens Plate Drive West at Janda Court PL 
37A SB Rexdale Boulevard at Brydon Drive PL 
52 WB 626 Dixon Road PL 
52 WB Dixon Road at Carlingview Drive PL 
52 EB Opposite 950 Dixon Road PL 
54 WB Leslie Street at Lawrence Avenue East (South Side) PL 
54 EB Morningside Avenue PL 
86 WB Eglinton Avenue East at Bellamy Road North PL 
97 NB McGlashan Road PL 
97 NB William Carson Crescent PL 
129 SB Triton Road PL 
15 EB Royal York Road at Oakfield Drive (North Side) SCHY 
35 NB Driftwood Avenue (North Side) SCHY 
52 WB Varna Drive (West Side) SCHY 
(continued) 
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Land Use (continued) 
Route Stop (side of intersection) Land Use 
52 EB Brookview Drive SCHY 
52 EB Rosewell Avenue East Side SCHY 
86 WB Kingston Road at Amiens Road (West Side) SCHY 
37 SB The Westway (South Side) UB 
16 NB St Andrews Road UT 
25 NB Bedle Avenue UT 
25 SB Au Large Boulevard UT 
36 WB Signet Drive West Side UT 
37B NB Elmhurst Drive UT 
37B SB Golfdown Drive UT 
54 WB Brimley Road (West Side) UT 
54 EB Marcos Boulevard UT 
97 SB 5800 Yonge Street UT 
110 NB Titan Road UT 
113 WB Kennedy Road at Kenmark Boulevard UT 
16 SB Benleigh Drive UTR 
54 EB Brimley Road UTR 
129 NB McNicoll Avenue UTR 
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Land Use Facing 
Route Stop (side of intersection) Facing 
Land 
Use 
39 EB Kennedy Road Back CG 
86 EB Kingston Road at Celeste Drive Back CA 
16 SB Danforth Road at Eglinton Avenue East Back CR 
37A SB Opposite 237 Queens Plate Drive East  Back CR 
37A SB Queens Plate Drive East at Harness Road (South Side) Back CR 
54 EB Cedarbrae Mall Back CR 
54 WB Port Union Road (West Side) Back CS 
86 EB Eglinton Avenue at Cedar Drive Back CS 
86 WB 6070 Kingston Road Back CSM 
97 NB Lord Seaton Road Back CF 
110 NB Opposite 730 Islington Avenue Back COM 
37A NB Opposite 225 Rexdale Boulevard Back I 
39 EB 5373 Finch Avenue East Back I 
110 SB Judson Street Back I 
16 NB Danforth Road at St Clair Avenue East (North Side) Back corner CG 
36 EB Albion Mall Back corner CR 
54 WB Morningside Avenue Back corner CR 
110 NB The Queensway (North Side) Back corner CR 
52 EB Avenue Road Back corner CF 
37 SB Summitcrest Drive Back corner COM 
15 EB Eastwick Road Back corner I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
SECURE PLANNING OF BUS STOPS IN TORONTO  202 
 
 
Land Use Distance 
Route Stop (Side of intersection) Distance 
Land 
Use 
35 NB Raven Road (North Side) SBK RD 
54 WB Eglinton Avenue East at Bessborough Drive (West Side) SBK RD 
54 EB Leslie Street at Marshfield Court SBK RD 
54 EB Paulandar Avenue SBK RD 
86 EB Kingston Road at Manse Road SBK RD 
129 NB Walkway to Historic Terrace SBK RD 
25 NB Steeles Avenue East SBK RM 
25 SB Goodview Road SBK RM 
39 WB Leslie Street (West Side) SBK RM 
54 EB Ling Road SBK RA1 
36 EB Finch Avenue West SBK RA2 
37 NB 2825 Islington Avenue SBK RA2 
97 NB Hilda Avenue at Green Bush Road SBK RA2 
97 SB McGlashan Road South SBK RA2 
15 EB Sherway Gardens Road at Sherway Gate  SBK RA3 
25 NB St Dennis Drive SBK RA3 
25 NB Graydon Hall Place SBK RA3 
25 NB Parkway Forest Drive SBK RA3 
25 NB Au Large Boulevard SBK RA3 
35 NB Exbury Road (North Side) SBK RA3 
35 NB Eddystone Avenue SBK RA3 
35 NB Yorkwoods Gate SBK RA3 
35 N B Finch Avenue West (North Side) SBK RA3 
35 NB San Romanoway (North Side) SBK RA3 
35 NB Stong Court SBK RA3 
35 SB Steeles Avenue West (South Side) SBK RA3 
35 SB Hullmar Drive SBK RA3 
35 SB Chalkfarm Drive South (South Side) SBK RA3 
36 WB Torresdale Avenue (West Side) SBK RA3 
36 WB Opposite 1685 Finch Avenue West SBK RA3 
36 WB Tobermory Drive SBK RA3 
37A NB Humberwood Boulevard at Kingsplate Crescent  
(West Side) 
SBK RA3 
37 SB Dixon Road SBK RA3 
37 SB 1300 Islington Avenue SBK RA3 
37 SB Central Park Roadway (South Side) SBK RA3 
39 EB Bayview Avenue SBK RA3 
39 EB Don Mills Road SBK RA3 
39 EB Pharmacy Avenue SBK RA3 
54 EB Carnforth Road East Side SBK RA3 
129 NB Finch Avenue East SBK RA3 
(continued) 
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Land Use Distance (Continued) 
Route Stop (Side of intersection) Distance 
Land 
Use 
129 NB Finch Avenue East (North Side) SBK RA3 
129 NB Alton Towers Circle North SBK RA3 
97 SB Hilda Avenue at Steeles Avenue West SBK RA3 
97 SB Steeles Avenue West at Tangreen Court SBK RA3 
36 EB 685 Finch Avenue West SBK RS1 
54 WB Barrymore Road SBK RS2 
25 SB Wynford Drive SBK CO1 
25 NB Green Belt Drive (North Side) SBK CO3 
86 WB Eglinton Avenue East at Brimley Road SBK CR 
54 EB Fortune Gate (East Side) SBK CS 
54 EB Bennett Road SBK CS 
86 WB Kingston Road at Lawrence Avenue East SBK CS 
54 EB Eglinton Avenue East at Laird Drive (East Side) SBK CSM 
25 NB Overlea Boulevard at East York Town Centre SBK CM 
25 SB Clock Tower Road SBK CM 
36 WB York Gate Boulevard SBK CM 
36 EB Kipling Avenue SBK CM 
37A SB Queens Plate Drive West at Janda Court SBK CM 
37A SB Queens Plate Drive at Highway 27 SBK CM 
39 WB Sandhurst Circle West SBK CM 
97 SB Steeles Avenue West (South Side) SBK CM 
97 SB Abitibi Avenue (South Side) SBK CM 
35A NB Woodbine Race Track Loop  SBK CSN 
25 SB St Dennis Drive SBK SPEC 
15 EB 185 Evans Avenue SBK I 
36 WB 1150 Finch Avenue West SBK I 
37 SB 2200 Islington Avenue SBK I 
39B WB Neilson Road SBK I 
129 NB Commander Boulevard (North Side) SBK IC 
15 EB Arnold Street SBK ICS 
36 WB Opposite 1111 Finch Avenue West SBK ICS 
15 EB Royal York Road at Coney Road (North Side) SBK SCH 
36 WB Romfield Lane SBK SCH 
129 NB Sandhurst Circle South SBK SCH 
36 EB Humberline Drive at Humber College Boulevard SBK PSCH 
39 WB Au Large Boulevard SBK PSCH 
 
